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2ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
A sharp rise in house prices became a political issue in Korea in the late 1980's. It
opened a heated debate among scholars and experts on the causes of house price rises.
In the debate, a common belief was that high land prices had been one of the main
causes of high house prices. In fact, the proportion of land cost in new house prices has
steadily increased as the latter has risen in Korea during the past two decades. This
research calls into question the notion underlying that common belief that land prices
exist independently of housing development. Most policy measures are sought on the
basis of this notion. This research argues that land prices are an outcome of conflicts
between landowners and developers in the process of housing development.
In exploring the idea that the determination of land cost for housing is a result of con-
flicts between landowners and developers, the research came to the question of what
the source of conflicts is, a question of why and how the two actors enter into conflic-
tive relations. It was a suggestion of Marx's concept of rent that surplus profits are the
material source of conflicts; the ability of developers to create higher surplus profits
provides possibility of landowners to demand more payments for their land; landown-
ers' appropriation of increasingly larger portions of surplus profits then conditions the
way developers produce housing; thus both enter into a conflictive and contradictory
relationship. It was thus hypothesised that the rising land cost for housing has been
primarily a result of that conflicting and contradictory interaction, which is perma-
nently operating in housing development. However, how far and in what forms the
conflict affects housing development and the determination of land cost are affected by
social mediation of the interaction.
Thus the research, the test of the above hypothesis, comprises two parts: the identifica-
tion of the material aspect of the process by which landowners and developers entered
into conflicting relations resulting in increasing land prices for housing as suggested in
Marx's concept of rent; and the examination of political and economic circumstances in
which social relations between the two actors were conditioned to leave that material
process unregulated.
This hypothesis was tested with reference to the case of housing development in Seoul
during the 1970's and 1980's. The empirical examination disclosed that the rising land
cost for housing in Korea has been due to the conflictive nature of the relationship
between landowners and developers. Developers have created large surplus profits by
exploiting rapidly growing speculative demand for housing and government housing
programmes relying on private development; this have provided room for landowners
to raise land prices such that increasingly larger portions of new house prices have been
allocated to land cost; increasing government intervention have been unsuccessful in
controlling this conflictive and contradictory process and the consequent spiral rises in
land cost and house prices because of its inability to break from its self-financing hous-
ing development strategy; this inability has been due to historical circumstances which,
characterised by strong state and weak labour relations and the subordination of finance
to industrial capital, have conditioned housing development to be driven by the private
appropriation of development gains.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION: RISING
LAND COST FOR HOUSING,
PROBLEMS AND ISSUES
In the late 1980's, there was a sharp rise in house prices in Korea. This was becoming a
recurrent problem, as similar rises in the late 1970's showed. Land problems, namely
land shortage and high land prices, have been blamed as a major cause of the rise. High
land prices, it is often argued, affect house prices in two ways: (a) they directly push up
new house prices as a factor cost; and (b) they make housing development unprofitable
which aggravates housing shortage and eventually results in a rise in overall house
prices. The portion of land cost in new house prices has been steadily increasing in Ko-
rea over the past two decades. It has been taken as evidence that high land prices have
pushed up the production price of housing.
The rising land cost in housing development has thus been a matter of grave concern to
the government and a pending issue among housing experts and scholars. However,
why and how land cost for housing has been rising as such has not been properly ques-
tioned. Land cost means land prices which are incorporated into new house prices as a
factor cost of production. Land cost is thus expressed in prices per a unit of floor space
of house building while land prices are done in the amount per a unit of land area. The
common argument has been that land prices have risen independently of housing devel-
opment process; and that the rising land prices have increased land cost pushing up
new house prices. Rising land prices are here regarded as a 'cost push facto? in the
production price of housing, an independent variable of new house prices. The deter-
mination of land cost in housing development has thus been regarded as taking place
exogenous to and prior to the development process. A result is that house price and
12
land price are considered separately in the current policy debates on how to control the
rise in land cost and new house prices.
The research aims to examine the process by which land cost is determined in housing
development with reference to the case of Seoul during the 1970's and 1980's. It will
argue that the determination of land cost itself is a process of housing development
rather than exogenous to it. The source of land prices, development gains, is created by
developers in the process of housing development. Landowners claim a part of it for
land prices. Thus developers and landowners enter into a conflicting relation in sharing
the development gains. This research is going to show that the rising land cost in Korea
can be explained by that conflicting relationship between these two actors in the hous-
ing development process.
1.1 House Price Boom in the Late 1980's
The latest price boom in the housing market began at the end of 1987 after years of
standstill in the early and mid-1980's. It started in Gangnam, a southern part of Seoul.
Between the end of 1987 and that of 1988, prices of apartments in the Gangnam Area,
one of the most prestigeous residential areas in Seoul, rose by 50 to 80 percent. For the
one year from February 1989 to February 1990, the prices and Chonsei( 1 ) deposit of
apartments in the same area rose by more than 40 percent (Kim, J.H. and Cho, Y.H.,
1990a).
This is compared to the rise in consumer prices, 5.7 percent in 1989 and 8.6 percent in
1990, and the increase in wage earner's income, 24.4 percent in 1989 and 17.2 percent
in 1990 (KNT-IC, 1 992a). Figure 1.1 shows the rising trend of house price and rent in
the latter half of the 1980's in Seoul and in all cities. Between 1985 and 1990, the aver-
age house price and Chonsei deposit rose by 54.1 percent and 90.7 percent respectively
1) Chonsei is one of the most popular rental tenure system in Korea. In this system,
tenants deposit a lump-sum of money when they occupy rental houses instead of
paying rents on monthly or yearly basis. Interests on the deposits become rent.
That is the Chonsei deposit, which is refi.inded to the tenants when the lease
ceases.
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in Seoul (KHB, 1986-1991, each year) while the consumer price rose by 30.2 percent
(KNHC, 1992a). Those in all cities also rose fast in the late 1980's.
House prices and rent had already been rising since the beginning of the 1970's faster
than consumer prices. The sharp rise in house prices was not new as seen in Figure 1.2.
The figure shows that there have been ups and downs in the change of house prices.
Land prices show a relatively consistent rising trend though not without occasional
steadiness. The early 1970's, the early 1980's and the mid-1980's show steadiness or
falls in the prices, while 1978, 1983 and the late 1980's exhibit sharp rises. However,
the long term trend clearly shows that land and house prices have been rising faster
than the consumer price. The recurrent price booms have rendered the chronic problem
of rising prices acute. The price rise in the late 1980's had, however, a greater political
impact than the previous ones due to the specific historical circumstance of the period.
In 1987, the authoritarian constitutional system (known as the Fifth Republic) was
pulled down by the people (known as June 29 Democratisation Movement). A more
moderate government was established in the early 1988 in accordance with the new
constitution(2). The new government launched the Two Million Housing Construction
Plan as the new president promised at the presidential election in December 1987.
According to the plan, two million houses were to be built within the five years of new
presidential tenure from 1988 to 1992.
After the change of government in February 1988, industrial disputes occurred widely
throughout the nation. In these disputes, workers began to demand appropriate hous-
ing to be provided or their wages to be adjusted according to the rising house prices
and rent (KCCI, 1990). Newspapers were reporting the impact of such rise in house
prices and rent in somewhat sensational fashion. Included in the reports were cases in
which tenant households had to move to lower quality houses or to the outskirts of
cities to seek cheaper rental houses and incidents of family suicide in despair of being
unable to afford the house they used to live in. Leading daily newpapers carried a series
2) The constitutional system was reformed in such a way that the power of the
president and the central government were weakened while that of the National
Assembly and local governments were strengthened. See Subsection 3.5.1,
Chapter 3 for detail.
1L)
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Figure 1.1 House Price and Rent (Chonsei Deposit) Indices, Seoul and
All Cities, 1985-1991, 1985=100.
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Figure 1.3 Changes in House Prices and Rent by Housing Size, Seoul,
February 1989 - February 1990.
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Source: Drawing based on Kim, J.H and Cho, Y.H (1990a).
of feature articles on the hardships of tenant households(3).
Frustration of middle and higher income households by the sharp rise in house prices
was also reported. Figure 1.3 shows that the prices and rent of larger apartments rose
faster than those of smaller ones in Seoul(4). Between February 1989 and February
1990, the price and Chonsei deposit of small apartments with 15 pyongs or less in floor
area rose by 18 and 20 percent respectively; while those of large apartment with 65
pyongs or more rose by 50 and 60 percent (Kim, J.H. and Cho, Y.H., 1990a).
3) Examples are 'Here, our neighbours' in Chosun-Ilbo, July 13, 14, 1988;
'Homeless neighbours' in Dong-A-Ilbo, August 1, 3, 4, 8, 10, 1988; 'The over-
crowded Capital City' in Dong-A-Ilbo, February 2, 1989; 'Housing problem, to
be solved in light of distributional justice' in Hangyore-Shinmoon, April 29, May
2, 4, 9, 13, 15, 1989; 'Homeless people' in Hangyore-Shinmoon, March, 22, 28,
1990.
4) In Korea, housing size represents both the quality of the house and the prestige
of the residents. Thus houses, particularly high-rise flats, are categorized in
terms of its floor space presented in 'pyong' (1 pyong is equivalent to 3.3 square
meters); the larger the size, the more expensive and prestigious the house.
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Radical students and politicians in the anti-establishment movement circles, attributed
the housing crisis to the failure of Korean capitalism. Reformist movement, such as the
Citizen's Federation for Economic Justice, criticised moral weakness of the government
in the implementation of land and housing policies. They accused the government of fa-
vounng higher income or property owning people and of lack of political will to eradi-
cate housing and land speculation.
The government had to adopt various measures to respond to this increasing politicisa-
tion of the housing problem. The President declared war against all speculative activi-
ties in the housing and land markets. They were believed to have accelerated the rise in
house and land prices. The government revised the Two Million Housing Construction
Plan to allocate a larger portion of housing to low income families. It announced a plan
to develop two New Towns in the outskirts of Seoul to stabilize the rapidly rising
prices in the middle and high income class apartments in the Gangnam Area. The sharp
rise in house prices and rents in the late 1980's thus again brought the housing and land
problem to the forefront as one of the most pressing political issues.
1.2 Demand and Supply
Then why had house prices risen in that form?. The common answer in Korea to this
question identified broadly with three reasons; accumulated housing shortages, increas-
ing speculative demands and rising land prices. The first two reasons will be briefly ex-
amined in this section. The third reason will be examined in the next section, Section
1.3.
In housing studies, until the mid- 1970's, spatial and demographic factors such as rapid
urbanisation and urban migration were emphasized as major causes of housing short-
ages (Mills, E. and Song, B.N, 1979; Sohn, J.M, 1988). Population in Korea grew at
an annual rate of 2.2 percent in the 1960's, 1.9 percent in the 1970's and 1.5 percent in
1980's. It has been estimated that in 1991 the population exceeded 43 millions, which
is more than 1.7 times as many as the 25 millions of 1960. The number of households
17
Table 1.1	 Population, Households and Housing Stock, 1960-1990
unit: thousand
Households Housing Shortage
Year	 Region	 Population	 (A)	 Stock (B)	 (A-B)
	
1960 Whole	 Country	 24,989	 4,263	 3,589	 674
	Cities	 6,997	 1,223	 825	 398
	
______ Seoul	 2,445	 433	 268	 165
	
1970 Whole	 Country	 30,852	 5,526	 4,360	 1,166
	
Cities	 12,685	 2,377	 1,398	 979
	
______ Seoul	 5,423	 1,030	 584	 446
	
1980 Whole	 Country	 37,407	 7,470	 5,319	 2,151
	
Cities	 21,409	 4,362	 2,468	 1,894
	
______ Seoul	 8,351	 1,724	 968	 756
	
1985 Whole	 Country	 40,420	 8,751	 6,104	 2,647
	
Cities	 26,418	 5,779	 3,349	 2,427
	
______ Seoul	 9,626	 2,126	 1,176	 950
	
1990 Whole	 Country	 43,520	 10,277	 7,374	 2,903
	
Cities	 32,397	 7,695	 4,749	 2,963
	
______ Seoul	 10,618	 2,544	 1,463	 1,081
Source: EPB (1960; 1970; 1980; 1985; 1990)
Table 1.2 Relative Contribution of Migration to Population Increase,
All Cities and Seoul, 1960-1985.
	
Increase in	 Migration
Period	 Region	 population (A)
	
(B)	 B/A
_____________ __________	 (1,000s)	 (1,000s)	 (percent)
1960-1970	 Seoul	 2,988	 2,411	 80.7
_____________ All cities
	 5,413	 3,693	 68.2
1970-1980	 Seoul	 2,931	 1,778	 60.7
____________ All cities	 9,493	 5,313	 56.0
1980-1985	 Seoul	 1,282	 605	 47.2
____________ All cities
	 4,256	 2,459	 57.8
Source: Yoon, J.J (1991)
increased at higher rates than the population, as nuclear families proliferated. The in-
crease in households has been regarded as a major factor of growing housing demand.
Table 1.1 shows the census data for total population, number of households and hous-
ing stock in Korea between 1960 and 1990. In the table, the gap between the number
of households and the housing stock has widened since 1960. The situation has been
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even worse in urban areas. Urban population increased 3.6 times between 1960 and
1985, from 7.3 millions to 26 millions. This has been mainly due to migration. Table 1.
2 shows the relative contribution of migration to the increase in urban population.
The rise in house prices have been attributed primarily to this accumulating housing
shortage; and as this has been accepted as a self-evident fact, many writers mention this
in introductory comments (Kim, CS, 1988; Huh, J.W, 1990; Kim, J.H, 1990; Kim,
K.H & Kim, K.Y, 1992). The ratio of housing supply, that is, the ratio of the number
of dwellings to that of households, has been used as an indicator of the housing situa-
tion in Korea. The government housing policy has tacitly targeted one hundred percent
ratio as a desirable housing supply ratio, i.e., one house for one household (Kwon, T.J,
1978; KRIHS, 1979; Yoo, J.H, 1988). As shown in Figure 1.4, the housing supply
ratio had been steadily decreasing up until the late 1980's, when it started to recover.
However, the ratio of housing shortage does not represent exactly the real situation(5).
Formal statistic shortage only represents the ratio of the number of formally registered
dwelling units to that of formally registered households. The problem is that the regis-
tered number of dwelling units does not represent actually existent dwelling units. One
registered unit may comprise two or more units. For example, most detached houses in
large urban areas accommodate two or three households. They are registered as one
unit in the House Register and in the House-Tax Ledger, and thus counted as one unit
Table 1.3 Changes in Physical Housing Conditions
___________________ 1970 	 1975	 1980	 1985	 1990
Average housing size
(M2)	 47.7	 58.2	 68.4	 72.6	 81.4
Housing space per
household (M2)	 35.9	 41.4	 45.8	 46.4	 52.8
Housing sace per
person(M')	 6.8	 8.2	 10.1	 11.3	 13.8
Personsperroom	 2.4	 2.3	 2.1	 1.8	 1.7
Source: Adapted from KNHC (1992a).
5) See Kwon, T.J. (1978) and Yoo, J.H. (1988) for criticisms on the inappropri-
ateness of housing shortage as a criterion by which the perfomance of the gov-
ernment housing policy is to be measured.
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of dwelling in the Census survey. They are, however, designed and built from the
beginning to comprise two or three independent dwelling units to accommodate several
households.
Thus the supply ratio does not reflect the actual physical housing situation. Rather,
housing conditions have been improving in many respects. Table 1.3 shows some sta-
tistics indicating the improvements in terms of dwelling space per person as well as av-
erage housing size. Housing space per household rose 1.5 times and that per person
doubled between 1970 and 1990. These data are for registered dwellings. Thus the
supply ratio represents neither shortage of shelter nor the housing conditions of people
in physical terms. Further, this implies that housing shortage is not necessarily the
result of lack of housing investment.
The shortage index merely conceals the uneven distribution of ownership of shelter
space among households. Figure 1.5 shows that owner occupancy in housing has been
decreasing in Korea. As of 1990, sixty percent of the urban households in Seoul lived
in rental houses (EPB, 1990). The decrease in owner occupancy may be a consequence
of the way housing is provided rather than lack of housing provision. It represents a
change in the way people pay for their housing; more and more households have failed
to buy houses outright. A survey reported that the share of the housing bill in urban
household expenditure steadily rose from 24 percent in 1970 to 38 percent in 1980
(KRIHS, 1985). Another survey by the Korea Housing Bank disclosed that it took 7.7
years for a new married couple to buy their own house in 1988 while it was 5.9 in 1982
(Hankook-Ilbo, July 21, 1989). This means that more people have had to turn to C/ion-
sei and monthly rental housing. From this and Table 1.3, it can be said that housing
supply has increased in terms of shelter space per household and per person; but that
the increase has been accompanied by house prices rising faster than people's ability to
buy them outright.
Moreover, the considerable increase in housing supply that took place in the late 1980's
was accompanied by a simultaneous rise in house prices. Figure 1.6 shows a sharp in-
crease in housing construction in that period. Annual housing construction reached
750,000 units in 1990, nearly three times the average annual construction during the
early and mid-1980's. How did house prices continue to rise while housing supply
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Figure 1.4 Change in Housing Supply Ratio, 1960-1990.
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Source: Produced for this thesis based on data from EPB (1960; 1970;
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Figure 1.5 Changes in Owner Occupancy, 1960-1990.
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Figure 1.6 Annual Housing Construction by Sectors, 1975-1991.
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Source: Produced for this thesis based on data from KINHC (1992a).
increased at the same time?. The implication is that the rise in house prices cannot be
explained solely by housing shortages as measured in terms of the number of house-
holds and housing stock. Thus, speculative demand for housing has been commonly
taken as another important factor causing high house prices.
Researchers have pointed the finger to the alleged distorted financial market in Korea,
which is believed to have promoted speculative investment in real estate, therefore
creating excessive demand for land and thus raising land prices. As will be seen in
Chapter 3, the Korean government has since the 1960's adopted repressive financial
policies to concentrate all available financial resources into industrial development.
This, according to this explanation, has resulted in dual financial systems; an institu-
tional financing system based on low interest rates, and an unregulated financial market
system providing much higher interest rates. Thus private savings had been attracted
either to the unregulated money market or to the real estate market. Renaud argues
that the repressive financial policies of the Korean government have deflected private
savings into capital gain on real estate. This has resulted in excess demand in the land
and housing market inflating prices (Renaud, B., op. cit).
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The rapid rise in land prices has thus been helped by changing conditions in the financial
sector, such as an increase in money supply, the alleged competition between the stock
and property markets over private savings, the financial behaviour of firms, inflation and
govermnent regulations of the property market (Chung, H.S., 1985; Lee, iS., 1990;
Rhyu, H.W., 1990; Suhk, H.H., 1990; Sohn, J.Y., 1991). The price boom in the late
1980's have been commonly attributed to high liquidity generated by the trade surplus
and expansionary economic policy at that time. Afier a slow-down in the economy in
the mid-1980's, the GNP growth rate picked up again in 1986. In that year, the GNP
grew by 12.2 percent and exports grew by 28.1 percent. The balance of payments for
the first time turned to surplus (FKJ, 1987a). One year later, in 1987, the GNP grew by
12 percent. In 1988, the trade balance exceeded 10 billion dollars (Uhm, J.D., 1992). It
is generally assumed that this trade surplus and the consequent monetary expansion,
were responsible for the property boom. Land prices rose by 14.7 percent in 1987, the
largest rise since the previous property boom in 1983. In the summer of 1988, prices of
real estate began to rise rapidly. In 1988 and 1989 land prices in large cities rose by 30
percent annually. House prices also rose rapidly, as previously shown in Figure 1.2.
The new government, established in 1988, at first maintained the existing Stabilisation
First Economic Policy. However, new events led to a change. Under the increasing
pressure of the ruling party politicians and Chaebols, large industrial conglomerates in
Korea, the Economic Ministers were replaced in March 1990, with those who advo-
cated 'the Growth First Policy'. The new team adopted measures to promote economic
expansion, which provoked both economic and property booms. The government
released an additional financial package of 1,000 billion won for special plant and
equipment. Restrictions on credit for investment in equipment were removed (Lee, H.,
1992). Along with this policy, the economy grew fast. The GNP grew by 9 percent in
1990.
The new Economic Planning Board (EPB) Minister argued that the alleviation of infras-
tructure shortage should be the first priority in economic policy. Consequently, the gov-
ernment began to expand public works including the construction of express ways
(Ibid). At the same time the President had an election pledge to frilfil: the implementa-
tion of the Two Million Housing Construction Plan. The government promoted housing
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development mainly by providing land in the capital region. A large quantity of green
areas were developed into residential areas. It was in this context that the government
started to build five new towns around Seoul. Between 1988 and 1991, 2,140,000
houses were constructed, out of which 1,430,000 units were built by private developers
(Yang, G.M., 1992).
Housing shortage and excess demand due to speculative investment are the two reasons
commonly accepted as the explanation of why house prices have risen fast. These are
demand side reasons. The costs of inputs, suspected of causing high house prices, are
the accepted supply side reasons. It is at this point that it becomes necessary to examine
in more detail the third alleged reason for the rise in house prices,. i.e., the influence of
rising land prices. This will be done in the next section.
1.3 Land Cost in New House Prices
Figure 1.7 shows the indices of costs of land, labour and building materials compared
with house prices. In the figure, the rise in labour cost in the late 1980's is also consid-
erable. It coincides with the rapid rise in wages of manual workers in general after
industrial workers succeeded in their struggle for higher wages which culminated in
1988 and 1989(6). Land prices have risen faster than any other prices since 1975.
Accordingly, the proportion of land prices in new house prices, i.e., land cost for hous-
ing, has increased. Occasional data reveal that the rise in the portion of land cost was
considerable in the 1970's (KRIHS, 1979; 1981; KNHC, 1985). Data collected for this
research also confirm the same trend. Figure 1.8 is a collection of data from apartments
built in the southern part of Seoul, Gangnam, and New Towns in its vicinity during the
past fifteen years. Although there are variations, a long term rising trend is clearly seen.
The portion of land cost in new house prices was no more than 10 percent
6) Between 1980 and the second quarter of 1989, manual workers' wages rose 3.2
times on average, which is similar to the rate of rise in labour cost in housing
construction shown in figure 1.7 (KLI, 1990).
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Figure 1.7
	
Indices of Land Price, House Price, Labour Cost and
Building Material Cost, 1975-1990
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Source: Produced based on data compiled from KNHC (1981),
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in the early 1970's. It went up to 25 percent in the late 1970's and early 1980's. It rose
to 30 to 50 percent in the late 1980's.
In the late 1980's, attention was thus turned to rising land prices as a major cause of the
rise in house prices. As was said in the beginning, land prices are conceived to affect
house prices in two ways: (a) high land prices directly push up new house prices; and
(b) high land prices discourage housing development because they make this invest-
ment less profitable, and consequently reduce housing supply driving up the prices of
existing houses.
The government has intervened to relieve the burden of land cost in housing develop-
ment in two ways: the relaxation of density regulations and direct control of land
prices. As to the first, building density in housing development is normally measured in
Floor Area Ratio (FAR), the ratio of floor area to site area, in Korea. Prices are con-
verted into different land cost according to FAR. In the early 1970's, the ratio was no
more than 180 percent for high-rise apartments in Seoul. This was, however, increased
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Figure 1.8 Changes in the Prices and Land Cost of Apartments, Gang-
nam, Seoul, 1974-1992
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Source: Produced for this thesis based on data obtained from KRIH
(1981); developers including Hyundai Housing and Industrial De
velopment Co., Samsung Engineering & Construction Co., an
Korea National Housing Corporation; newspapers (Chosun-Ilbo
August 24 1977; December 13 1991; December 23 1991
Kyonghyang-Shinmoon, January 27 1983; Hankook-Kyounje
Shinmoon, July 1986).
* Houses built on land provided by the Public Purchase and Devel
opment (PPD) system. The PPD is a system in which the govern
ment agencies purchase land by compulsion and provide the lan
after development for both public and private housing.
to 300 percent in 1990. In the case of Korea National Housing Corporation (KNHC),
until the early 1980's houses were mostly five-storied apartments and the Floor Area
Ratio was between 60 to 100 percent. In the mid- 1980's, 12 to 15-storied high rise
apartments began to hold the majority and the average Floor Area Ratio began to
exceed 150 percent. In 1990, the density went up to 250 percent and 24 storied apart-
ment buildings are now no longer rare in large apartment estates (Unpublished data
from the Department of Land Development, KNHC, 1992).
Regarding the direct control of land prices for housing, the government introduced a
new land development system in 1981, which has since become the major method in
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providing land for housing. It is the Public Purchase and Development (PPD). In this
system, land prices are appraised by licensed agencies. Then public developers have the
power to purchase that land at appraised prices, avoiding the market prices demanded
by the landowners. The amount of housing land provided through the PPD projects had
considerably increased by the end of 1980's. In 1981, when it was first introduced, the
PPD projects accounted for only 4.6 percent of total housing land development by
public agencies. The portion increased to nearly 80 percent in the late 1980's (see Table
5.3, Chapter 5).
According to Figure 1.8, however, both the relaxation of density regulations and the
direct control of land prices by means of the PPD seems to have been not effective
enough in reducing land cost. As shown in the figure, the composition ratio of land
cost reached 50 percent in some housing estates developed by the PPD system in 1992.
This, as well as a plain comparison between price indices as shown in Figure 1.7 has
often been cited as an evidence in support of the argument that land prices have pushed
up house prices (Hwang, M.C, 1985c; Huh, J.W, 1990; Cho, J.H, 1990). The rising
prices of residential land has been one of the major source of developers' complaints.
Developers appear, accordingly, not responsible for rising land prices (e.g., Lee, H. S.,
1991). Many scholars and experts accept this assertion uncritically.
The common explanation of why land prices for housing have risen so fast has not been
related to the process of housing development. The common answer has been that the
country is small in area relative to the increasing population and economic activities;
that the inflexible land use control by the government has aggravated the scarcity of
land; that expansion of floating money due to loose monetary policies and directed
financial policies have resulted in the prevalence of speculative demand for land; and
that the loose land taxation system has helped to attract speculative money to land
(Hwang, M.C, 1985a; Mills, E., 1988; Cho, J.H, 1990; Lee, J. S., 1990; Renaud, B.,
1989). All these apparent explanations will be examined in more detail in Chapter 2.
Land for housing has been steadily provided in Korea since the 1960's. Table 5.3
(pZ3S) shows annual land supplies in the whole nation. 46 km 2, 17 to 20 km2 and 26 to
40 km2
 of residential land were provided every year during the late 1960's, the 1970's,
and the 1980's respectively. This land supply could accommodate 150,000 to 350,000
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houses on average a year. In Seoul, which is known as the place where land shortage
has been most serious, there has been a series of large scale land developments since
the 1960's. 59 km2 and 40 km2 of land were provided for residential development dur-
ing the 1960's and 1970's respectively through the Land Readjustment Project, which
was the major land development method in that period. During the 1980's, approxi-
mately 14.3 km2 and 24 km2 were provided in Seoul by the LRP and the PPD respec-
tively for residential development (KRIITS, 1990). This provided room to build
between 50,000 to 60,000 apartments. As will be described in Chapter 5, occasional
surveys on available land for housing in Seoul showed that there has been always land
available for housing in the city. There were 6.76 km2
 of idle land which can be used
for housing in Seoul as of September 1988 (Ibid.). In other words, to attribute the
rapid rise in land prices simply to land shortage is not sufficient; it neglects the way
land is provided which may have a greater effect on land prices.
1.4 Control of Land and House Prices
According to the notion of the relationship between land prices and house prices which
has underlain the arguments so far, land prices are determined independently of the
housing development process. This notion is pervasive in the current debate on the
control of new house prices.
The house price control system was first introduced in 1972. It was applied to housing
development building with more than a certain number of dwelling units( 7) on a single
site and which benefit from government support. The latter includes loans from govern-
ment-controlled funds at cheaper interest rates and the exemption and reduction of
taxes related to housing development. The selling prices were to be approved by the
city government. This was changed to the Price Ceiling System in 1981. According to
this system, when a developer built an estate with more than certain number of houses
) Until May 1982, it was 50 houses. Afler that it was reduced to 20 houses (The
Housing Constmction Promotion Law).
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(see Footnote 6), those houses had to be priced under the limit set by the government.
The system was applied in major large cities including Seoul. The Price Ceiling, set at
1.34 million won/pyong in Seoul in 1981, lasted almost unchanged until the late 1989,
when it was replaced by the new Factor Cost Linkage System (Kim, J. H., 1988b; Yoo,
J.H, 1991; Lee, H.S, 1991; Yim, D.I-I, 1992).
This Price Ceiling System, it is argued, had made housing development less and less
profitable resulting in poor private housing development in the early and mid-1980's in
Seoul. Figure 1.6 is a comparison between the contributions to annual housing con-
struction in Korea between private and public developers from 1975 to 1991. The fig-
ure shows that private developers have played the more important role in annual hous-
ing construction. However, private developers also show more fluctuations in their an-
nual constructions. Between 1975 and 1978, annual housing construction by private
developers accounted for about 70 percent of the total. Between 1980 and 1985, it fell
to 50 to 60 percent. Between 1987 and 1991, it rose up to 80 percent (KNHC, 1992a).
Private housing development was thus relatively weak in the early and mid-1980's. The
sharp rise in house prices in the late 1980's has been attributed to that poor housing
supply (Kim, J. H., op. cit; Yoo, J.H, op. cit; Lee, H.S, op. cit.; Yim, D.H, op. cit).
However, the argument that high land prices had made housing development unprofit-
able discouraging housing development, does not explain how housing development in
Seoul, as well as in the whole country, could increase very sharply while land prices
rose even faster in the late 1980's as shown in Figure 1.2. and 1.7. The notion of the
relationship between land prices and house prices underlying the argument causes a
problem in seeking policies to regulate land and house prices; policy measures to con-
trol land prices and new house prices are accordingly considered and suggested sepa-
rately in the debates on how to promote housing development while keeping new
house prices under control.
The liberalisation of price control has recently been suggested as one of the most con-
vincing measures to stabilise house prices in the long run. It is argued that the elimina-
tion of price control will encourage housing development; this will increase housing
supply and in the end lead to the stabilisation of house prices (Kim, J. H., 1988b; Yoo,
J.H, 1991). On the other hand, there had been worries about the short term negative ef-
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fects of liberalisation on house prices. For example, some cautions have been suggested
regarding the psychological impact of liberalisation on the speculative demand raising
house prices even higher in a very short time. For the long term effect of the elimina-
tion of price control, however, there seems to be a consensus of opinion that it will
bring down house prices as it will increase housing supply (Yoo, J. H., 1991; Kim, J.
H., 1988b). It is suggested then that price control must be abolished as well as other
state interventions which may impede the private housing development. This is the
recurrent concern of those who advocate free market mechanisms in housing develop-
ment.
In contrast, concerning land prices, stricter control has been advocated. The imposition
of heavier taxes on land prices has been suggested. Restrictions of the amount of land
which one individual can possess for housing has also been proposed. In addition, sup-
ply of cheap residential land in large quantities through direct development by the
government agencies has been argued for.
This research is not directly concerned with the effectiveness of price control itself, but
with the way the issue of land cost is dealt with in the debates. Without understanding
how land cost is determined in the housing development process, debates on the issue
can not generate any effective measures. In the arguments so far, the relationship be-
tween house prices and land prices in housing development has not properly ques-
tioned. The effect of the liberalisation of new house prices on land prices has not been
debated. In order to be able to suggest any effective policy measures, one must under-
stand how land price and house prices are determined in the housing development
process.
1.5 Research Question and General Hypothesis
In conclusion, the question which the arguments so far are supposed to answer, re-
mains unresolved. That is,
30
How is it that, as new house prices have risen, increasingly larger
portions of them have been allocated to land cost?.
This is a preliminary question from which this research starts. To formulate a hypo-
thetical answer to this question requires an understanding of the relationship between
land prices and house prices. It involves a question of how the two have affected each
other resulting in the increasing proportion of land cost in new house prices. Figures
1.2 and 1.6 may suggest the existence of certain correlation between land cost and new
house prices, or between land prices and house prices. However the figures themselves
do not provide any explanation of why they appear so.
An hypothetical answer to the question can only appear after concepts referring to the
relation between land prices and house prices in the housing development process have
been examined and reformulated. This reformulation implies referring to the relation
between landowners and developers, which is one of conflicts and competition over de-
velopment gains. Thus the research needs to address the conceptual question of
(1) What is the nature of the relationship between land prices and hous
prices in housing development?.
The research will argue the following: developers competition for development gains in
housing development creates the material condition that permits large portions of these
gains to be appropriated by landowners. Landowners are not passively, simply appro-
priating part of development gains already created. They continuously fix larger por-
tions of development gains into land prices and thereby condition developers to organ-
ise housing development on the basis of ever higher land prices. In other words, both
can affect each other: land prices can push up house prices and house prices can lead
rises in land prices. Which one lead the other depends on the outcome of the interac-
tions and conflict between these two actors. It is thus through the interaction between
landowners and developers that land cost for housing rise and fall and such changes are
implicated on new house prices. An empirical test of this argument constitutes one of
the two main parts of the research.
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However, the interaction between these actors is not unregulated; it is socially medi-
ated mainly through government interventions. In Korea, the government has inter-
vened to control land cost through direct involvement in housing development. The
Public Purchase and Development System (PPD) has been the most important evidence
of this. However, as seen in Figure 1.8, the PPD projects seems to have not been too
effective. Thus the second question becomes:
(2) What, and how, political and economic circumstances have condi
tioned the increasing and unsuccessful government intervention i
controlling rising land prices for housing?.
Answering this question forms the second part of the research, that is, an examination
of the historical, political and economic conditions in which the interaction between
landowners and developers had been mediated and shaped through the government
intervention.
The two secondary questions above suggest that the research will answer the central
question by examining two aspects of the process by which land cost for housing has
been rising in Korea: the material conditions of the relationship between landowners
and developers and the social mediation of the relationship. A tentative answer to the
central research question can be formulated from the above very introductory examina-
tion:
Housing developers in Korea were able to create large development
gains during the 1970's and 1980's, benefiting from two favourable
conditions: (i) a booming housing market and large scale govern-
ment housing programmes relying on private development; and, (ii)
weak land ownership, as the country lacks a distinctive landowner
class. The creation of large development gains has provided a mate-
rial foundation for landowners, being increasingly aware of the eco-
nomic potentials of their land, to demand more payments for land.
Landowners then by transforming increasingly larger portions of the
gains into land prices have created a condition in which developers
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had to produce housing on the basis of higher and higher land prices
in successive developments. The spiral rise in land and house prices
allocating increasingly larger proportions of the latter to the former
is an outcome of this conflictive process.
The next chapter reviews the literature considered to be the most relevant for these is-
sues in order to see whether the research questions have already been answered, and if
there is an answer, whether it coincides with that proposed above. After the literature
review, the above questions and hypotheses will be reconsidered to propose a research
programme. Then the next four chapters constitute the empirical research.
CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND
RESEARCH DESIGN
2.1 Introduction
As indicated in the previous chapter, studies on land and house prices in Korea are
mostly based on a tacit assumption that land prices rise independently of house prices.
Most literature on land prices concentrates on factors that supposedly facilitate a rise in
land prices. Some scholars introduced a different view that land prices are determined
by house prices as suggested in Ricardo's theory of rent, which merely reverses the cau-
sality.
In these views, the actual process by which house prices and land prices are determined
through the conflicting interaction between landowners and developers is not consid-
ered. An important contribution to this argument has been provided by Michael Ball.
Ball's thesis of the structure of housing provision suggests that the increase of land cost
for housing is an outcome of the conflictive interaction between landowners and devel-
opers.
Yet, why and how landowners and developers come into a conflictive interaction
resulting in rising land costs for housing had to be further explored. In this thesis, it is
sustained that the answer has to do with the material basis of the conflict between land-
owners and developers. For this purpose, the thesis examines Marx's concept of land
rent. A hypothetical answer to the preliminary Research Question, an alternative to the
commonly accepted explanations in Korea, is then proposed at the end of this chapter
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based on both, the thesis of the structure of housing provision and Marx's concept of
land rent.
Section 2.2 examines literature that mostly concentrates on factors causing rises in land
prices, based on the tacit assumption that such rises push up house prices. This section
also reviews some scholars' interpretations of the Ricardian view, which seems to con-
tradict the common belief in Korea. The review of literature in Subsection 2.2.1 and
2.2.2 is heavily based on studies on house prices and land prices in Korea. The exami-
nation will identify the limitations of both arguments, due to their inability to address
the actors involved, and the social relationships associated with the production process.
Subsection 2.2.3 examines Ball's thesis of the structure of housing provision. The thesis
suggests that the relationship between land prices and house prices in housing devel-
opment is an economic presentation of the social relation of landowners and develop-
ers. It is not a unilateral relationship in which one determines the other but one in which
the two sides conflict and compete over the creation and appropriation of development
gains in housing development.
Section 2.3 reviews Marx's concept of land rent in order to clarify the material condi-
tion in which landowners and housing developers enter into conflict. This section
reviews Marx's concept of rent formulated in the agricultural context. Section 2.5
examines the arguments around the applicability of Marx's concept of rent to urban
situations. The review of literature in these two sections suggests that Marx's concept
of differential rent provides some important points to understand the nature of the
material basis of the conflict between landowners and developers.
Based on this concept, this thesis proposes at the end of this chapter a hypothetical an-
swer to the central question of this research.
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2.2 Land Cost: Determinants or Residuals of House Prices?
2.2.1 Land Cost as a 'Cost Push Factor'.
It seems that in Korea it has been taken for granted that rising prices of housing land
have led to the rise in new house prices. It has been almost customary for writers on the
housing problem to refer to a rapid rise in land prices as one of the most insurmount-
able constraints in housing development. Developers have particularly complained
about rising land prices as a major barrier to their business and have taken it as a pri-
mary indication of the irrationality of the Price Ceiling System (Lee, H. S., 1991).
Scholars and experts have shared the same view without either theoretical or empirical
justification. Simple comparison of price indices of factors of production, land cost,
construction cost and new house prices has sufficed to support the argument. Figure
1.7 (p24) is an illustration of a typical comparison. In the figure, housing land prices
have clearly risen faster than any other prices. Such index comparison has either been
an object of earnest analysis in studies of land and house prices (Hwang, M.C., 1978;
KRIHS, 1979; Mills, E., 1988; Huh, J.W., 1990; Lee, H. S., 1991) or been accepted as
an evidence in support of the prevalent ideas in housing policy (Kim, K.S., 1979; Kim,
J.H., 1982; Ohn, Y.T., 1990; Park, Y.C., 1991). Almost all literature on the relation-
ship between new house prices and land prices takes this comparison as indubitable
evidence to justify the argument that land prices have pushed up new house prices.
As land cost has been blamed as the major cause of the fast rise in new house prices, it
has not been anything odd in Korea to treat the housing problem as identical with the
land problem. Major efforts are thus devoted to the explanation of why land prices have
risen faster than other price indices.
The first and the most widely accepted view is that it is inevitable that land prices rise
faster than other prices in such a country as Korea that has one of the highest popula-
tion density and one of the highest urbanisation and economic growth rate in the world.
According to the World Development Report 1991, as of 1989 Korea had a population
of 42.4 million in an area of 99,000 km2 . It meant a population density of 428 persons
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per square kilometres, the fourth highest in the world following Hongkong (5,700),
Singapore (2,700), and Bangladesh (769). In terms of average annual growth rate of
GDP per person, between 1965 and 1989, Korea's economy grew at 7 percent, the
highest growth rate in the world together with that of Singapore. As of 1990, half of
the population lived in cities of 1 million or more population, the highest rate in the
world except those of Hongkong, Singapore and Kuwait (World Bank, 1991). Almost
all literature on land issues begin with such spatial demographic constraints (Chung,
H.S., 1983; Choi, S.Y., 1985; Kim, Y.M., 1985; Lee, J.J, 1988a; Lee, K.H, 1988).
Secondly, strict land use control by the government has been criticised as having aggra-
vated the land scarcity. Mills, for example, argues that strict land use controls, such as
Green Belts, affect the price of land in urban areas. An optimal land use, according to
Mills, is achieved when marginal productivity of various uses become the same. In Ko-
rean urban areas, however, he argues, the government artificially obstruct the equalisa-
tion of marginal productivity by preventing land from being freely converted to higher
productive uses (Mills, E., 1988). Renaud and Kim, K. H. similarly point to the spatial
policies of the Korean government to restrict the growth of large cities through strong
zoning policies (Renaud, B., 1989; Kim, K. H., 1990a). Thus they advise the govern-
ment to relax regulations on land use and release more land for housing. Increase in
land supply, the authors assume, would lead to lower land prices.
In the above two arguments, land scarcity, be it natural as in the first case or artificial as
in the second case, is responsible for high land prices. The position of this thesis is that
the scarcity may be an important condition for rising land prices, but it by itself does
not explain the actual process of price rises. For example, according to a comparison of
land price indices between East Asian countries between 1970 and 1987, land prices in
Korea have risen faster than those in Hongkong and Singapore which are much more
densely populated than Korea (Yamada, H. and Kashiwadani, M., 1989). The Citizens
Federation for Economic Justice (CFEJ) illustrates that, in densely populated advanced
capitalist countries such as the Netherlands and Denmark, land prices are less than 20
percent of those in Korea when adjusted by per capita income (CFEJ, 1989).
Authors such as Logan and Molotch suggest that land does not respond to the market
in a same way in which other commodities do to balance the supply and demand: land is
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relatively impervious to laws of demand and supply because of its monopolistic nature.
More release of land may attract more speculative investment. This often pushes the
entire price upward rather than restore the price to the previous one (Logan, J.R. and
Molotch, H.L., 1987). As will be seen in Chapter 4 and 5, large scale land development
in Seoul was often accompanied by a fast rise in land prices rather than vice versa. In
other words, it is not enough to attribute high land prices simply to land scarcity or lack
of supply.
In this respect, it may be natural for some scholars to explain fast rises in land prices in
connection with changing situations in the financial sector characterised by increasing
incorporation of land in the circulation of capital, which implies growing speculative
investment in land.
Figure 2.1 shows rates of changes in land prices and some economic variables, money
supply and the consumers' price. Lee, J. S. links the cyclical fluctuation of the rate of
change in land prices to that in money supply. According to him as well as others
mentioned above, the industrial development strategy of the Korean government has
Figure 2.1
	
Annual Changes in Land Prices, Money Supply and Build-
ing Permission, 1975-1990
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distorted financial market such that bank rates were often negative in real terms and
thus floating money was attracted to the unregulated money market or the property
market inflating land prices. The late 1960's is known as the first period of property
boom. The government adopted an expansionary policy to ease stringency of capital by
increasing money supply and inducing foreign loans. Money supply increased by more
than 60 percent. This money was mostly allocated to export industry. Lee, J.S argues
that a large portion of this money flew into the land market, and the inflation of land
prices in the late 1960's was due to this. As shown in Figure 2.1, land prices rose by
approximately 50 percent per annum between 1964 and 1969. In the late 1970's, the
government again increased money supply to support the Heavy and Chemical
Industrial development. In addition, foreign currency flew in from the Middle East
Construction projects. This increased liquidity and speculation in land revived. Land
prices rose by 25 percent in 1976. This rose to 60 percent and 80 percent in 1977 and
1978 respectively. Between 1986 and 1988, liquidity increased mainly due to increasing
trade surplus. Speculative money flew into the property sector. Land prices rose by
more than 30 percent per annum between 1988 and 1990 (Lee, J.S., 1990).
Lee, J. S. argued that as land has been incorporated into financial circulation the price is
largely a 'bubble'. By this he means land prices inflated by speculative demand beyond
actual rent capitalised with the present interest rate. Logan and Molotch describe the
'bubble' as the case in which prices are driven by people's expectations of what other
people will do rather than by any calculation of actual gains which can be realised
through production on land (Logan, J.R. and Molotch, H.L., op. cit.). Lee, J. S esti-
mates the ratio of the prices of total land in the country to the GNP to show the magni-
tude of the 'bubble'. At the end of 1988, the ratio was 9.2. This is compared to those of
other countries, 1.58 in the United Kingdom in 1985, 4.04 in Japan in 1985, and 0.92 in
the United States in 1985 (Lee, J. S., op. cit.; Shinhan Research Institute 1990).
Such speculative behaviour is common practice in the land market. The 'bubble' effect
may explain short term fluctuations in land prices just like those in the stock exchange
index. However, it is inappropriate in explaining long-term steady rises in land prices.
Moreover, the research question of this thesis is about land actually used in housing de-
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velopment rather than land for which future use is still uncertain and thus expectations
on future gains are only speculative.
The factors are not taken as mutually exclusive. They are often combined to explain the
causes of the rise in land prices. Rhyu, H.W. brings all the factors under three headings:
social, economic and institutional (Rhyu, H.W., 1982; 1990). The social factors
includes the increase in population, the proliferation of nuclear families, urban migra-
tion. The economic factors include industrial development, price rises in general and
increasing income. The institutional factors are the unlimited private ownership of land,
strict land use control, free private appropriation of development gains and the ineffi-
cient control of speculative land trade. These factors are certain conditions which may
facilitate a fast rise in land prices. Conditions by themselves, however, do not raise land
prices; there must be actors who exploit such conditions to benefit from rising land
prices.
Scholars and experts in socialist and reformist movements, which were active in the
1980's, turned to large entrepreneurs or monopoly capitalism as a major cause of high
land prices. Monopoly capitalism here indicates the domination of Korean society by
large entrepreneurs including the giant industrial conglomerates, that is, Chaebols. Re-
formist movement indicates those who have opposed dictatorial governments and
dominance by the large industrial conglomerates. They have struggled for democratiza-
tion through the establishment of a civilian government. Presently they campaign for the
elimination of the dominance of monopoly capital and thereby more equal distribution
of wealth among people, and the eradication of political and economic corruption. The
Citizens Federation for Economic Justice (CFEJ) is a civilian organisation leading
reformist movements. The CFEJ argues that the rise in land prices is not simply caused
by land scarcity but by the unequal distribution of land, i.e., land hoarding and the
monopoly of land by large entrepreneurs and rich people (CFEJ, 1989). A survey
revealed that as of 1989, 5 percent of landowners in the highest rank owned 65.2 per-
cent of the total private land in Korea; the largest 10 percent landowners held 77 per-
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cent; 25 percent landowners owned 91 percent of land. In the four largest cities, 70
percent of households had no land at all (Landgonggaenium Committee( 1 ), 1989).
This high concentration of land property might give the misleading impression that a
powerfiil landowning class exists in Korea. The traditional landowning class had been
practically resolved as a consequence of the Farm Land Reform Law in 1950. After that
there has been a land market in which people buy and sell land, but not institutional
manifestation of landowning class.
The reformist arguments assume that once such irregular market behaviour as land
hoarding and speculation is eliminated then land prices would not rise so fast (CFEJ,
1989; Kim, T.D. and Lee, K.S., 1989). The CFEJ thus call for the imposition of heav-
ier taxes on land to discourage land speculation and land hoarding, and the restriction
of the private ownership of land (CFEJ, op. cit; Kim, T.D. and Lee, K.S., op. cit). The
CFEJ has also carried on a citizen's campaign to attain economic justice including more
equal distribution of land and housing among the population.
Such monopoly theory is, however, not appropriate in explaining the rise in land cost in
residential development. As will be seen later, in most residential development land is
owned by small landowners. Most developers have been experiencing much more diffi-
culties in dealing with a number of small landowners than large landowners.
More radical and socialist-oriented students and scholars are critical of such reformist
arguments. Chang, S.H and Kim, H. S criticise the reformist argument that the fast rise
in land prices is a result of mismanagement of the capitalist market system and deli-
ciencies of the institutional system to regulate the market (Chang, S.H., 1990; Kim,
H.S, 1991). According to Chang, S.H., this managerial approach is based on two
assumptions. The first is that the state is a neutral and autonomous body. The second is
1) Landgonggaenium literally means 'public concept of land'. It indicates the
idea to restrict ownership, use and disposition of land held by individuals and
firms primarily to discourage housing and land speculation. In 1989, when
rising land and house prices became a political issue, the government
organized a committee, called the Landgonggaenium Committee. This
committee, constituted by professors and government officials and re-
searchers, was assigned to develop the idea into concrete policies. In 1990,
three laws regulating land holding and transaction were promulgated based
on the committee's study report.
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that there can exist a normal market situation, that in which irregular behaviour such as
speculative demand, land hoardings and monopoly pricing are eliminated. The latter
assumption implies that the fast rise in land prices is basically due to such irregular
market behaviour; and once the irregularity is corrected, rise in land prices will be based
on the improvement of productivity on land. Thus the role of the state becomes to cor-
rect this irregular market behaviour.
Chang, S.H. claims that the two assumptions are unrealistic. He argues that they
neglect the fact that the role and position of the state is determined by the power rela-
tion between social classes or social forces with different interests. Secondly, he argues
that land prices tend to rise faster without the irregular market behaviour previously
mentioned (Chang, S.H., op. cit.). This second point will be examined now in more
detail since it has an important implication for the research question of this thesis. It
may indicate whether the rising land cost in new house prices is due to fortuitous mar-
ket situations or due to certain inherent tendency in the capitalist social system.
Chang, S.H., following Marx's ideas, attributes the rise in land prices to a general ten-
dency of land prices to rise in capitalist society. Land prices are the present value of
rent which a parcel of land is supposed to yield not only at present but also in the
future. It is the capitalisation of land rent at a certain annual interest rate, and thus
defined as r (rent) I i (interest). According to Marx, the interest rate i in this formula
has a tendency to fall for two reasons. Firstly, the general rate of profit in capitalist
society tends to fall as capitalism develops. Since the interest rate is in the long run
regulated by the general rate of profit, it accordingly tend to fall. Secondly, as society
develops, loan capital tends to increase. As a consequence, the interest rate also tends
to fall. From this, Marx argues: 'it follows that the price of land has a tendency to rise,
even independently of the movement of ground rent and the prices of the products of
the land, of which rent constitutes a part' (Marx, K., 1894-1974).
Second, capital is more vigorously involved in land development as capitalism devel-
ops. But more capital investment in land results in higher land prices by the continuous
transformation of capital embedded in land into rent (Chang, S. H., op. cit.). Marx
stated that this was one of the reasons for the increasing enrichment of landowners
(Marx, K., op. cit.).
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On the second point, Chang, S.H. further argues that increasing investment of capital in
land in Korea has been due to capital's strategy to overcome, by increasing land supply,
the monopoly power of landowners (Chang, S.H., op. cit.). According to Murray, this
is generally a way in which capital tries to overcome the power of landed property as a
barrier to capital accumulation (Murray, R., 1978). Chang, S.H. asserts that such inten-
sive capital investment, however, in the end reinforces the monopoly power of land-
owners as the surplus profits due to intensive investment increasingly fall into the hands
of landowners (Chang, S.H., op. cit.). Thus for Chang, S.H., the rise in land prices in
Korea is due to the development of capitalism. This implies, for him, that as far as
capitalism is maintained in Korea, fast rises in land prices are inevitable.
Chang, S.H.'s explanation is very general and abstract. Whether the rise in land prices in
Korea has been actually due to what described above, needs an empirical examination.
For example, in the past decades during which land prices have risen faster than any
other prices and income, interests rates have not fallen. Thus the rise in land prices in
Korea has not been due to decreasing interest rates. If the rise is due to the develop-
ment of capitalism, why have land prices in Korea risen to higher level than those in the
advanced capitalist societies as indicated before by the CEFJ?. Chang, S.H.'s argument
does not go far enough to give a proper answer to this.
Thus the reasons for rising land prices have been sought from the spatial and demo-
graphic conditions of the country, the repressive financial policies, the policy failure to
maintain market order, or the development of monopoly capitalism in Korea. In these
explanations, the source of land prices and the way it is created and appropriated in the
form of land prices are disregarded.
In a capitalist society, prices of conmiodities are based on their values. Raw land has no
such value and the question becomes where land prices come from. The argument of
this research is that in order to get into the question, it is necessary to consider land
prices in connection with the process by which the source of land prices is created and
appropriated. For housing land, attention must be paid to how development gains are
actually created and appropriated in housing development. House prices are in the end
limited by housing demand, the willingness and ability by people to pay for houses.
There must be a limitation in the rise in house prices including new house prices. Thus,
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the argument of this work goes, land prices for housing cannot exist independently of
house prices: they cannot be determined outside housing development. For this reason,
the analysis moves now to the examination of land rent theory.
2.2.2 Land Cost as Residuals of House Prices.
The significance of theories of rent in classical economics is that land rent is considered
in relation to production on land. The dominant notion had been that land rent is deter-
mined by the price of products on land. Ricardo stated that 'corn is not high because a
rent is paid, but a rent is paid because corn is high' (Ricardo, D., 1951: 74). In the case
of housing, this suggests that high land cost is caused by high new house prices. This
has led some scholars to introduce Ricardo's view of rent to the argument. They have
reinterpreted Ricardo's argument in an attempt to reconcile it with the common belief in
the country that land rent pushes up house prices.
One of those scholars is Hwang M.C. He transposes Ricardo's arguments into the issue
of the relationship between house prices and land cost and then argues that new house
prices determine land cost rather than vice versa (Hwang, M.C., 1985b). By doing this,
he contradicts the common belief, including his own remarks in the same article and
elsewhere, that high land cost has been responsible for the high house prices (Hwang,
M.C., 1978; 1985b). Hwang, M.C. makes a compromise between the two contradic-
tory arguments: 'From the point of view of an individual producer, land rent is clearly a
cost [price determining]. However, from the point of view of the whole housing indus-
try, high house prices due to high housing demand lead the rise in residential land
prices' (Hwang, M.C., 1985b: 538).
The compromise between rent as price determining and rent as price determined was an
issue at point in classical economics. According to Blaug, John Stuart Mill was the first
who admitted that the rent that land could earn in one use forms a cost that must be
paid when it is used for some other purpose. Jevons extended this by distinguishing rent
as cost and rent as income. Rent for him is understood as the earnings of any input
(e.g., land, labour and capital) in excess of what the input can earn in the most remu-
nerative alternative use (Blaug, M., 1985). According to Blaug: 'From the viewpoint of
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the firm hiring the productive agent, rents are part of the costs of production; but from
the point of view of the industry or of society as a whole, they are price determined..'
(Ibid.: 83)
Adam Smith also treated rent as a differential surplus and hence as price-determined.
The surplus is caused by a function of both differences in fertility and differences in
situation. However, earlier in his book, the Wealth of Nation, Smith regarded land rent
as a price determining factor. Smith argued that rent paid on land under cultivation of a
main crop forms ongoing normal rent; and rent on land in other use is obliged to follow
that ongoing rent since land which does not receive such ongoing rent will be with-
drawn from cultivation (Ibid.).
Lee, J.J. brings Adam Smith's two statements together for comment: 'The two argu-
ments cannot be right at the same time. However, either of the two cannot be wrong.
Then the concepts of rent in the two cases must be different' (Lee, J.J., 1988b: 72).
Then Lee, J.J, following Buchanan's exposition, distinguishes two aspects of rent: rent
as an income and that as a price. He suggests that land rent is determined by the prices
of products on land when land rent is taken as an aggregate category of social value
distributed to the landowning class. In Lee, J.J.'s argument, land rent, wages and inter-
est represent the cost of the three requisites of production; land, labour and capital
respectively. The total supply of labour and capital can be regulated by wages and
interest. But, total land supply does not increase or decrease according to how much
rent is paid to land-owning class as a whole since the quantity of land in a particular
society is fixed. The total land rent in a society thus becomes income to landowners
which is left over after the costs of other factors of production, wages and interest, are
deducted from the total prices of products on land. It is in this sense that rent is deter-
mined by the prices of products (Lee, J.J., op. cit.)
However, from the individual producer's point of view, Lee, J.J argues, land rent be-
comes a cost: it enters into the price of the product. Land will be put to the use which
offers the highest rent. Those who want to use land must pay the best price which that
land could earn from other uses. When rent for other uses rise, one must pay the in-
creased rent, which will in turn push up the cost of production. In this respect, land rent
becomes a price to the user (Ibid).
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This thesis questions this argument. It may be unrealistic to suppose that all land in a
society is ftilly in use. It is more likely that there is always idle land in a society either
unused because of its poor quality or kept aside for more profitable thture use. Even if
there is no idle land, land is continuously converted from one use to another. In this
sense, the quantity of land in a society is little more fixed than capital and labour. Just
as interest rates and wages regulate the supply of capital and labour to be put in use, so
does land rent that of land for use; higher land rent would put more poor quality land
into use or would convert land from less profitable uses to more profitable ones.
Thus, the distinction between the two aspects of land rent, income when aggregated
and price when individualised, is not so convincing. The position of this thesis is that
land rent has the two aspects regardless of whether it is counted in aggregate or in
individual terms. It is a price to those who want to use land; it is an income to a land-
owner who leases or sells his land. So is interest and wages; they are revenue to money
lenders and labourers while prices to their users. Why does only land rent become an
income when individual rents are summed up into total land rent while it is a price when
counted by individual rent?. It is further argued that rent as an aggregate income is a
residual, total income minus wages and interest. If rent, interest and wages are consid-
ered categories of revenue(2) rather than cost to certain production, why is rent alone a
residual after interest and wages are extracted from total income?. These issues are not
clear in Lee, J.J.'s argument.
The distinction between total rent and individual rent in a society may have a meaning
in explaining a possible contradiction between individual capital and total capital in land
dealing. As the mobilization of capital through land becomes the major objective of
landed interests (Harvey, D. 1982), business in real estate becomes important for indi-
vidual enterprises (Haila, A., 1988). More capital engagement in the appropriation of
value rather than in its creation however runs counter to the collective class interest of
capitalists (Harvey, D., op. cit.). One of the functions of the capitalist state thus
becomes the regulation of such a self-destructive process which is often in conflict with
2) Such connection of revenue and its source, capital-interest, land-rent,
labour-wage, itself is criticised by Marx as mis-leading: It personifies capital
and land and thus conceals the true source of value and fundamental con-
flicts between classes (Marx, K., 1894-1974).
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the interests of individual capital (Harvey, D., 1985b)(3 ). However, this has little rele-
vance to the question of whether rent is a price determining or price-determined
expense.
The arguments so far thus fail to provide any meaningful clue to our research question.
This is due to their inability to address actors involved in, and their 'social relations' as-
sociated with, the process of creating and appropriating value using land. Without ad-
dressing them, the debate is bound to be inconclusive. This point is picked up and
developed by Michael Ball in his thesis of the structure of housing provision.
2.2.3 Social Relation in Housing Development.
According to Michael Ball, housing provision involves a variety of agents. They enter
into certain relations which form a structure of housing provision. Each agent inter-
venes at one or more points in the physical process of housing provision and the rela-
tions of agents involved in the process determine the housing situation. Thus interven-
tions by agents and responses by others to them, producing conflicts of interests, are
key determinants of particular forms of housing tenure and its problems. The relations
are of conflict and competition, and are multi-dimensional. They involve conflicts be-
tween the agents in a structure of provision, conflicts between the agents and wider so-
cial and economic process, and conflicts between agents in different structures and
between different structures. These conflicting relations determine the process of
housing provision and are responsible for certain housing problem. Therefore any
aspect of the housing problem should be considered in the context of its structure of
provision (Ball, M., 1983; 1985a; 1986a; 1986b).
Criticisms have been directed against this argument, which has often been misunder-
stood. Kemeny, for example, criticises Ball as concentrating on the production side at
the expense of the consumption side (Kemeny, J., 1987). Morris and Winn criticise that
3) The present conflict between the Korean government and entrepreneurs over
the control of the possession by entrepreneurs of real estates which are not
to be used for their business (thus known as the 'non-business real estates')
and the 'real-name accounts reform which aims to eradicate the widespread
use of aliases in bank accounts to avoid the taxman's scrutiny may be a case.
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Ball's focus is still connected to housing tenure and housing policy, which they think
Ball has denounced as inappropriate subjects for study (Morris, J. and Winn, M., 1990).
However, what Ball's argument suggests is not what subjects are appropriate and what
are not for housing study, but the way in which any subject or aspect is to be analysed.
The determination of land cost in housing development is accordingly to be put in the
context of the social relations in housing provision. In the 'cost push factor' view,
house prices are regarded as the sum of land cost, construction cost and builders' profit.
Accordingly, high land prices cause high house prices. The Ricardian residual view of
rent claims that land prices do not cause house price rises but are a residual conse-
quence of the level of house prices relative to construction cost. In the light of Ball's
thesis, both previous arguments have a theoretical limitation in answering the question
of whether and how land prices affect house prices. They are unable to see through the
role of actors and their social relations in housing development. In these two line of
arguments, land price is not an outcome of conflicts between landowners and devel-
opers but a technical factor which is exogenous to the conflicts (Ball, M., 1983).
Ball distinguishes land rent and development profits. In housing development, the dif-
ference between a house price and the construction cost of that house becomes the
development gain. This gain arises 'partially from building but primarily from convert-
ing the land to a successful housing development; the latter therefore is a development
profit' (Ibid: 146). 'This gain is divided between the landowner and developer: the for-
mer gets a price for their land and the latter a profit from housing development on that
land' (Ibid: 143).
The social relation between developers and landowners is embodied in the purchase of
residential development land. The two are involved in a struggle over the appropriation
of the final gain from residential development. Both are fighting over the conversion of
development gains into profits and rent. Landowners hold land and wait for the best
market conditions to sell their land. They take political actions against, for example, any
legislation to reduce their chances to realise the best prices for their land. Developers
organise their development and production process in ways which facilitate their reten-
tion of development profits at the expense of the landowners. The struggle has certain
effects on house prices. For example, the attempts by developers to minimise the con-
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version of development profit into land prices affects the organization of company,
development process and the patterns of employment of building workers. It thus
affects production methods and so can raise the price of housing. The assumption in
Ricardian theory of rent that production techniques are determined prior to the dis-
tributional struggle is here rejected. The techniques are instead a crucial element of that
struggle (Ibid.).
Thus, in Ball's thesis, land prices for housing are an outcome of the struggle between
landowners and developers rather than something exogenous to it. Land prices do
affect house prices through the effects of the struggle between landowners and devel-
opers on the construction methods and organisations. This is consistent with the central
hypothesis of this thesis and provides an important explanation of why the housing in-
dustry is making such slow progress in the improvement of productivity. Yet, in order
to provide an appropriate answer to the research question, i.e., why the struggle has
resulted in such a particular form of change in the composition of new house prices
(i.e., allocating increasingly larger portions to land cost), the material nature of the
relationship between land prices and house prices has to be further explored.
In relation to this issue, Ball argues that the division between development profit and
rent is theoretically indeterminate. As the conflict and competition are historically spe-
cific, he argues, no general concept prior to empirical analysis is possible: 'The nature
and content of competition have to be deduced through analysis of given historical situ-
ations, as part of the overall process of unravelling the dynamic of particular structures
of provision' ((Ball, M., 1986a: 457). It depends on the contemporary balance of power
between builders and landowners (Ball, M., 1983). Emphasis is thus placed on the
empirical analysis of concrete situations (Ball, M., 1986a).
This brought about criticisms. Roweis, in his review of the book, Land Rent, Housing
and Urban Planning, edited by Ball et al in 1985 complains that 'nothing specific can
now be said about the politics of land use and development as such beyond the repeti-
tion that it is necessary to look at "detailed historical situations" (Roweis, S., 1986:
125). He argues that 'to acknowledge the historical specificity of territorial politics is
one thing, but to specify this specificity is another' (Ibid: 125). Haila similarly criticises
that Ball 'fails to make a distinction between phenomena and underlying causal struc-
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tures' (Haila, A., 1989: 1530). Ball is thus accused of denying any role of theory or
concept in the analysis of the structure of provision.
The criticisms, however, seem to be based on an exaggeration of Ball's argument. The
whole debate may be falsely led to the epistemological controversy over whether the
uniqueness of concrete events makes it impossible to use generalized theory or con-
cepts in the analysis of concrete situations. Ball recognizes that a clear theoretical per-
spective is necessary in investigating the creation of the built environment and under-
standing of particular concrete situations (Ball, M., 1 986a). Nor is he without concepts
in his empirical analysis of particular structures of provision (e.g., Ball, M., 1983):
'Explanation depends on the theoretical approach adopted. Marxist theory suggests a
particular ordering of relationships between social agents within a structure of provi-
sion' (Ball, M., 1986a: 457). Ball's seeming rejection of the possibility of a generalised
theory in the analysis of the structure of provision should be understood in the context
of his criticisms on urban rent theories. What he rejects is 'the mechanistic attempts'
(Ball, M., 1987: 269) to apply or transpose Marx's categories of rent to the urban con-
text.
Most criticisms seem to be levelled against Ball's often unelaborated remarks rather
than to concepts and methods Ball actually uses in his works analysing particular emp-
irical subjects such as owner occupation housing development in Britain. What Ball is
arguing is that rent is realized through the actions of agents. Those agents form a struc-
ture with certain social relations between them. The social relation of agents actually
determines the way rent is generated and realized, and shapes the problems of the built
environment. Hence, without addressing the question of the structure of provision, the
interests and roles of agents within it, the problems of the built environment cannot be
analyzed. The significance of Ball's thesis is that it calls for attention to be given to
actors, and to relations between actors as socially mediated. To the issue of land cost in
the production process of housing, it suggests a sociological dimension in the analysis
of the relation between land rent and housing prices, which has been ignored in most of
the literature reviewed so far.
What is yet to be clarified further is the material condition of the conflict. If' theoretical
indeterminacy' means that the de
	 ation of the land cost through the interaction be-
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tween landowners and developers is solely fortuitous, how could the portion of land
cost in new house prices have risen steadily for such a long period of time?. Ball's thesis
has come under criticisms in this respect, a criticism that is shared by this research.
Moms and Winn remark that 'Ball offers no analysis of the material basis for the social
relations between the various agents within the structure of provision' (Morris, J. and
Winn, M., 1990: 232). In other words, it is not clear why agents are necessarily in con-
flict and competition with each other. Healy and Nabarro argue that Ball analyses the
interests and behaviour of agents in the structure of owner occupation housing provi-
sion in Britain (e.g., Ball, M., 1983), but gives no explanation of what generate the
interests and strategies, i.e., the framework in which agents make their choices (Healy,
P. and Nabarro, R., 1991). Kemeny sees the differences between 'the power and con-
flict thesis' (as termed by Bassett, K. and Short, J., 1980) and the managerial thesis, on
the one hand, and Ball's thesis, on the other hand, as 'one of degree rather than princi-
ple' (Kemeny, J., 1987: 252). The former have also been criticised for their neglect of
the material basis of conflict in the property relations. Then what is the nature of the
material basis and how does it direct and condition the struggle of landowners and
developers to result in increasing portion of land cost in house prices?. Without under-
standing the material conditions of the social relation, it will be difficult to explain the
relationship between land prices and house prices properly. This is going to be a contri-
bution of this thesis as presented in the following sections in this chapter.
Ball indicated that the Marxian concept of rent may explain the nature of conflict be-
tween landowners and developers although he was critical about the mechanistic trans-
position of Marx's categories into the urban context (Ball, M., 1986a). He suggested an
integration of the theory of rent into his thesis of the structure of provision (Ball, M.,
1985).
The following two sections explore what can be derived from Marx's concept of rent
for the understanding of the relationship between landowners and housing developers.
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2.3 Marx's Concept of Rent
In the late 1960's and the early 1970's, the advanced capitalist countries faced new
urban problems related to property: the prevalence of urban protest movements due to
increasing inner city poverty, racism and spatial segregation by race and income, and
lack of essential social facilities; the increasing importance of property relation in urban
development due to increasing concentration of large enterprises of international char-
acter; the sudden boom and slump of land and property markets threatening financial
systems, etc. (Ball, M. et. al. eds, 1985).
The conventional market or supply and demand model based on the neo-classical eco-
nomics was criticised as unhelpful in understanding these new situations. It was thought
unable to consider two important aspects in the analysis of land and property issues: the
involvement of diverse agents with different interests and strategies and the monopolis-
tic nature of land (Harvey, D., 1973; Ball, M., 1985). Many theorists turned to Marx's
concept of land rent to seek alternative views in understanding the new situations.
Attempts have been made to use Marx's concept of rent in a variety of urban issues.
One stream of analyses focused on the implications of landed property, the private
ownership of land, on class conflict for living places and its implications on workers'
strategy for class struggle (Edel, M., 1977; Harvey, D., 1978; Bandyopadhyay, P.,
1984; Katz, S., 1986). The second group of analyses has focused on the role of landed
property in capital accumulation, finance circulation (Harvey, D., 1982, 1985) and its
effects on the built environment (King, R.J., 1989); the changing characteristics of
property markets in central cities where land becomes an increasing financial asset
under the increasing internationalisation of business and capital circulation (Haila, A.,
1988); the role of the state in rent relation and associated social and political conflicts at
national level over the distribution of social value into wages, profits and rent (Roweis,
S.T. and Scott, A.J., 1981). A third group has focused on urban property market be-
haviour which has become more and more speculative (Logan,, J.R. and Molotch, H.L.,
1987); the generative mechanism of capital gains in domestic properties (Badcock,
B.A., 1984, 1989); the characteristics of house landlordism (Allen, J., 1983).
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In dealing with such a wide range of issues, there have been many reinterpretations and
redefinitions of Marx's concept. Thus it may seem to be stale to have a review of
Marx's concepts here. The existing interpretations and redefinitions have, however,
been made for different theoretical frameworks and for different purposes of analysis.
Moreover, there have been confusions and controversies over how to reinterpret
Marx's concept in the new urban context. It is thus required to look at Marx's concept
with a focus on the particular concern in this research: what it tells about the relation-
ship between landowners and developers in housing production.
2.3.1 Ground Rent as an Independent Category of Value
For Marx, ground rent is the concept explaining the form in which landed property is
economically realized in the capitalist society. Landed property means the private
ownership of land and is a social relation (Marx, K., 1894-1974).
Landed property had been the major condition of production in precapitalist societies.
In the formulation of the theory of rent, Marx's primary concern was how this landed
property maintains its economic role in the capitalist society in which capital takes the
leading role in production and accumulation. His objective thus was to identify the
objective basis of the existence of landed property in the capitalist mode of production.
It was to establish the fact that landed property in the capitalist mode of production is
not simply a legacy of precapitalist modes. To establish the fact that the existence of
landed property is not arbitrary, not something which may or may not exist in the capi-
talist mode of production (Thid.)
Marx's theory of rent was presented within the context of his theory of value. Thus a
review of his concept of rent begins with basic concepts in Marx's theory of value, rely-
ing here on Harvey's clarification (Harvey, D., 1982). As very briefly stated in the
beginning and in Section 2.2.1, the value of a commodity is equal to the labour embed-
ded in it. Labour here does not indicate actual labour time. Market exchange tends to
obliterate individual differences both in the condition of production in terms of produc-
tion organizations, technology and means of production, and the skills of labour. Corn-
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modities are paid for not according to actual labour but the labour required to produce
that commodity under the average conditions of production and with the average skills
at the time. The latter is called 'socially necessary labour time' and represents the value
of the commodity.
A gap between the value produced by labour and the portion of the value required to
reproduce labour power forms the surplus value. This surplus value becomes the basis
of profit and its magnitude is determined by the struggle between capital and labour.
Capital required to produce a commodity is divided into constant capital and variable
capital. Constant capital means the total value of raw materials and instruments of pro-
duction used up in the production process while variable capital indicates the value of
labour power consumed in the same process. Since value is created by labour, com-
modities produced with the same amount of total capital can have different values
according to the composition of constant capital and variable capital. The ratio of con-
stant capital to variable capital is termed the organic composition of capital. Thus
commodities produced with lower organic composition of capital (i.e., labour intensive)
have more value than those with higher composition(4). The former yields a higher rate
of profit which is defined as the ratio of surplus value to total capital spent in the pro-
duction process. However, commodities do not exchange according to their individual
values. If commodities were exchanged according to their values, capital and labour
will flow into those sector with lower organic composition of capital until the rate of
return becomes equalised across different sectors. In other words, the rate of profit
tends to be equalised among sectors of production with different organic composition
of capital. That is called the equalisation of the rate of profit, and this equalised rate of
profit becomes the social average rate of profit (Marx, K., op. cit.). Thus commodities
exchange not according to their individual value but to their price of production, which
is the cost of production (capital used up in the production process) plus the social
average profit (Harvey, D., 1982).
4) Higher value leads to higher prices and disadvantage competitive position.
When production branches or firms are not in competition, higher values can
be realised. When they are in competition, the diference between higher
values and lower values will not be realised.
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Marx defined ground rent as a category of surplus value independent of profit and
wage. It is 'the independent and specific economic form of landed property on the basis
of the capitalist mode of production' (Marx, K., op. cit.: 624). This means that although
rent is a deduction taken from the surplus value that would otherwise be received by
the capitalists, it does not disturb profit and wage, the two major categories of social
value.
In the very brief review of the theory of value, it has been seen that value is divided into
labour and surplus value. The latter is distributed among capitalist producers through
the equalization process. Then how can landed property have a third category of value
which does not disturb the others: profits and wages?. This was the major question in
Marx's theory of rent.
Marx distinguished ground rent from interest and what he calls lease money. The latter
means a deduction from the average profits or the normal wages, or both. The private
ownership of a portion of land enables the owner to levy all other tributes including in-
terest and lease money as well as the ground rent. They altogether determine the price
of land, which is the capitalised income from the lease of the land.
'Economically speaking, neither the one nor the other of these portions
[interest and lease money] constitutes ground rent; but, in practice, it con-
stitutes the landlord's revenue, an economic realisation of his monopoly,
much as actual ground rent, and it has just as determining an influence on
land prices'. (Thid: 625).
This implies that although the existence of landed property is objectively ensured by the
ground rent defined as an independent category of surplus value, its economic realiza-
tion in practice is also dependent upon other tributes including lease money. What
makes the concept of rent more confusing is the fact that the price of land, by involving
such tributes other than ground rent, becomes dependent upon fortuitous market situ-
ations. Marx wrote:
'the price of things which have in themselves no value, i.e., are not the
product of labour, such as land, or which at least can not be reproduced
by labour, such as antique works of art by certain masters, etc., may be
determined by many fortuitous combinations. In order to sell a thing,
nothing more is required than its capacity to be monopolized and alien-
ated'. (Ibid: 633).
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Failure to distinguish ground rent as an independent category of value from other trib-
utes has been a major source of confusion and controversies in Marxist urban rent theo-
ries. This will be discussed in the next section. The distinction is important to the
research question of this thesis. It has an implication as to whether the rising land cost
in new house prices is due to an inherent nature of capitalist housing development or
due to fortuitous land market situations.
Now the examination returns to the question of how landed property can have rent as
an independent category of value in the capitalist mode of production in which social
surplus value is distributed among capitalist producers through the equalization proc-
ess. Differential and absolute rent are suggested as the forms in which ground rent
arises as a pure form of surplus value, distinguished from the actual movement of
market prices.
'These two forms [differential and absolute rent] are the only normal
ones. Apart from them the rent can be based only upon actual monopoly
price, which is determined neither by price of production nor by value of
commodities, but by the buyers' needs and ability to pay. Its analysis
belongs under the theory of competition, where the actual movement of
market-prices is considered'. (Ibid.: 764).
2.3.2 Differential Rent and Absolute Rent
This subsection will examine first the case of differential rent in agricultural production.
The market value of agricultural products is determined by the price of production in
the worst soil. Producers on better land therefore will make surplus profits (that over
the social average profit) because the production cost will be lower. These surplus
profits become the source of rent. Landowners can claim parts or all of them as rent
without affecting market values of the products. This is the first type of differential
rent, Differential Rent I. It is fixed by the difference between individual price of pro-
duction and the general price of production, which is regulated by the price of produc-
tion on the worst soil (Harvey, D., 1982).
What makes the process complicated is the fact that the quality of land and consequent
productivity can be altered by capital investment. In other words, individual price of
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production can vary according to the magnitude of capital investment in the land. Pro-
ducers who invest more capital to improve, for example, the fertility of land than others
will have lower cost of production and thus more surplus profits. In this case too, land-
owners can claim parts or all of them as rent. This is the second type of differential rent,
Differential Rent II.
Capital always competes for higher rates of profit. This competition results in unequal
amounts of capital investment in various land with the same qualities. This brings about
an uneven spread of new techniques and production methods with different productiv-
ity. In consequence, this second type of differential rent becomes increasingly important
as a society develops.
In the formation of surplus profit, Differential Rent I and II are distinguished. In the
former, the formation is based on the investment of the entire capital in land of varying
quality. In the latter, it is based on the varying differential productivity of successive in-
vestment of capital in the same land. However, in the transformation of surplus profit
into rent, it is always the excess of the general regulating production price of the output
per acre over the individual average production price. In the case of Differential Rent
II, it thus always presupposes that the various actual individual production prices of the
partial outputs of the individual successive investments of capital have previously been
reduced to an individual average price of production(5).
This means that Differential Rent II, though they must first be distinguishable, must be
transformed back into Differential Rent I (Marx, K., 1894-1974). In other words, sur-
plus profit created by additional capital investment too is appropriated by landowners in
the form of rent as if it arises from certain quality inherent in land.
Differential rent does not arise on marginal land on which no surplus profit could be
produced. However, even for the worst land, landowners will not let the land for use
without charging a price. Absolute rent is that which is received by landowners by
withholding land until it produces something in excess of the price of production.
5) This is what distinguishes Marx's concept from Ricardo's marginalist view
(Ball, M., 1977).
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This absolute rent as well as differential rent was suggested as the form of rent, which
is defined as an independent category of surplus value. It is to be distinguished from
those parts of land prices fluctuating according to market situations such as monopoly
pricing, as Marx noted in the above quotation (p 55).
However, whether absolute rent can be such an independent category of surplus value
has been an area of controversy. In absolute rent, landed property acts as the barrier by
permitting new investment of capital only when it yields a rent. Then how is this distin-
guished from monopoly pricing in the land market which Marx excluded from the
analysis of ground rent as a pure form?.
As stated before, as the value of a commodity is equal to labour time consumed for its
production, the individual rate of profit is inversely proportional to the ratio of constant
capital to variable capital, the organic composition of capital. In such a production
sector as agriculture where the organic composition is lower than the average, the value
is higher than the price of production.
Marx asserted that absolute rent cannot exceed the value of the product over its price
of production. This has been a point of controversy. A common question has been: 'If
landed property gives the power to sell the product above its price of production why
does it not equally well give the power to sell the product above its value, at an arbi-
trary monopoly price? (Cutler, A., 1975). And if the upper bound of the absolute rent is
not set by the value of the product, absolute rent cannot be distinguished from monop-
oly price and cannot be rent as a pure category of value independent of profit and
wage.
Edel identified in Marx's own writings four possible answers to the question. According
to Edel, among these possible answers one was not totally arbitrary as outlined in the
following. If the prices of agricultural products are driven up above their values, the
total social surplus value begins to decrease as more value than that created in the agri-
cultural sector has to be paid for the agricultural product. In other words, the social
average rate of profit itself begin to fall below the level which the higher organic com-
position industries can achieve without agriculture. Capital, it is implied, thus would not
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flow into land when the price of production exceeds the value of the products (Edel,
M., 1976).
The question is then who (capitalist producers) can and will care for the rise and fall in
the social average rate of profit?. Who is to check further flow of capital into the agri-
cultural sector in order to prevent any fall in the average rate of profit. If capitalist pro-
ducers can be aware of and care for the average rate of profit (defined as the ratio of
surplus value to the cost of production), then all production sectors which have higher
organic composition of capital must cease to exist. This is unrealistic.
Marx mentioned the possibility of rent to push the price above the value.
'...the rent would create a monopoly price if grain were sold not merely
above its price of production, but also above its value, owing to the limits
set by landed property to the investment of capital in uncultivated land
without payment of rent'. (Ibid: 775) (6)
There seems no reason why the absolute rent must be limited by the value of products
and thus be distinguished from monopoly prices. This rent is based on monopoly pric-
ing by landowners, and involves lease money, the analysis of which was set aside by
Marx as belonging under the theory of competition, not under that of rent.
The purpose of this research is to identify the aspect of the process by which land cost
for housing rises which cannot be explained solely by fortuitous market situtations but
by certain tendency inherent in the production process of housing. Previous analysis
showed that absolute rent is not distinguished from monopoly pricing in the market and
thus cannot be an appropriate concept, a pure form of rent explaining that tendency.
This lead the research to the examination of differential rent as the only form of rent
which arise without disturbing profits and wages.
6) This is distinguished from the case of, what later theorists termed, monopoly
rent, 'a price determined only by the purchaser's eagerness to buy and ability
to pay, independent of the price determined by the general price of
production, as well as by the value of the products' (Marx, K., 1894-1974:
775).
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2.3.3 Role of Landed Property in Differential Rent
Differential rent has often been regarded as technically determined. In other words, the
differentials in qualities of land in terms of fertility or location are regarded as techni-
cally measurable and landed property has only the role of collecting the differentials and
has no role in determining rent. In relation to the research question of this thesis, this
means that land cost is a residual of the price of production minus other factor costs.
Marx's following statement appears to support such a view.
'Differential rent does not act as a determining factor in the general price
of production but is based on it: it arises from the difference between the
individual and the general price of production'. (Ibid: 646).
However, this does not mean that landed property is merely passive in the determina-
tion of rent and the prices of production. Ball provided a critical review of such a resid-
ual view of rent. He criticized that the role of landed property has been misunderstood
by those who see rent as merely a distributional result in the sphere of exchange (Ball,
M., 1977). Ball argues that 'the rent relation creates the very existence of surplus prof-
its appropriated as rent' (Ibid:396). Differential rent is not purely fi.inctional. It affects
not only the distribution of surplus value produced but also the production of surplus
value itself In other words, landed property affects or dictates the patterns of capital
investment, the process of creating surplus value itself
As seen in the case of Differential Rent II, the formation of surplus profit is determined
increasingly by the magnitude of operating capital invested for the improvement of land
such as fertilization, mechanization and irrigation development. Thus there exists a defi-
nite amount of capital which is considered normal under the prevailing conditions of
production. Competition among capitalist producers results in continuous search for
new methods of production with higher productivity which often require more capital
investment. Landowners can add the amount of rent for a newly increased portion of
operating capital on their land to the existing average rent in the society. Landowners
thereby dictate that new tenants command sufficient capital to continue cultivation in
the same intensive manner (Marx, K., 1894-1976).
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Marx illustrated cases which showed the roles of landed property (Ibid.). When a new
production method applies to small parts of land in a society, the rent of those small
parts of land will increase as production on the land will yield higher profit than that on
other land. However, as soon as the new method has become general enough to be the
normal one, in theory, the general price of production (the price of production on the
worst soil) would fall and thus rent due to the new methods would decline too. How-
ever, landed property prevents the decline in rent. Once rent payment at certain level
become general, producers are obliged to continue to pay the level as far as the price of
production can find demand for the products at the ongoing prices.
New production methods often means more capital investment in land than before. Ad-
ditional investment of capital in agricultural land does not necessarily mean an increase
in productivity. There can be cases in which additional investment in the same land
results in decreasing productivity as suggested in the law of diminishing return. In these
cases, the rate of surplus profit decreases as capital investment increases. However,
capitalist producers continue to invest as far as they can realize the average rate of
profit. In other words, the additional investment can be made until the total amount of
capital does no longer yield any surplus profit which can be appropriated by landowners
as rent.
However, the existence of landed property does not allow additional investment of
capital to continue to this point. Because once the farmer pays a certain amount of rent
for the previous investment of capital, he must continue to pay it. If it is necessary to
produce the additional output by additional investment of capital, the regulating market
price would have to rise to the extent which could compensate the deduction from the
farmer's profit for ongoing rent.
Landed property here does not merely enable the owner to transfer the surplus profit
from the farmer to himself, but becomes an artificial barrier to the successive invest-
ment of capital in the land preventing underproductiveness and drops in rent. The exis-
tence of differential rent thus causes a rise in the general price of production. Thus
Marx writes:
'In the same proportion as the latter [the production of surplus value]
develops, landed property acquires the capacity of capturing an ever-
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increasing portion of this surplus-value by means of its land monopoly and
thereby, of raising the value of its rent and the price of land itself. (Ibid:
638).
The existence of landed property is thus not something subsidiary to capital. It affects
the portion of social value excluded from the equalisation process of rate of profit or
wage (Harvey, D., 1982).
Examples were suggested by Marx. They are the cases in which differential rent arise
on the worst soil. As far as differential rent is concerned, in the worst soil there is no
other regulating price of production but its own average price of production, which
itself becomes the general price of production regulating the market price. Two cases
are illustrated. The first is the case in which additional investment of capital made in the
worst soil results in surplus-productiveness while the general price of production is
unchanged. The second is that in which the productiveness of successive investment of
capital in the worst soil decreases raising the general price of production. Theoretically,
in these two cases, rent can not arise on the worst soil.
An example of the first case is a situation in which a large part of agricultural land sup-
plying a majority of agricultural products in a country is of the worst kind of soil and
the additional investment of capital on this soil (for its improvement) at first extends
only to a small area of the worst soil. Then the better cultivated portion of the worst
soil would yield a surplus profit, which the landlord 'would be quick to transform
wholly or in part into rent, and to fix in the form of rent' (Marx, op. cit.: 743). Once a
surplus profit as such is fixed in the form of rent, rent might be gradually formed on all
soils of same quality as they began to employ the improved method of cultivation.
Here, it is the transformation of surplus profit into ground rent that prevents the possi-
ble fall in the price of production due to the improved productivity. Differential rent
here is not merely the result of the difference between individual and the general price
of production. Thus landed property maintains a higher price of production than neces-
sary.
An example for the second is the case in which the productiveness of additional capital
investment decreases. An additional investment on the worst soil in this case will raise
the price of production and since its price of production becomes the regulating price
of production for the products in general, the worst soil will not yield any rent. How-
62
ever, if the additional investment was made on only parts of the worst land, that worst
soil in which no additional investment of capital had taken place yet would yield rent.
Here what is important is to what extent the additional investment of capital on the
worst land is generalised. If additional investment of capital on the worst soil spread
slowly, then in the end all the worst soil would yield rent.
Marx's concept of rent thus provides an explanation of the material condition of the
conflicts between landowners and producers. Producers permanently work out new
ways of maximising surplus profits. This provides possibilities for landowners to trans-
form and fix such newly increased surplus profits into land rent and thereby increase the
portion of land prices in the prices of the products. This rent relation then influences the
method of production. This process can result in a spiral rise in land rent and the prices
of the products. This explanation of material condition of the relationship between
landowners and producers gives a clue to answer the central Research Question of this
thesis, i.e., how it is that as new house prices have risen, increasingly larger portions of
them have been allocated to land cost. The previous analysis suggests that this is a
process which outcome is determined through the conflicts between landowners and
developers, conditioned by the developers' ability to create surplus profit and the land-
owners' ability to transform part of it into land rent.
The review of the literature so far leads to the reformulation of research questions and
hypotheses. Before doing it, it is necessary to briefly review the issue of urban rent,
since it involves the question of whether Marx's concept of rent can be applied to the
analysis of urban issues, including housing development. This will be examined in the
following section.
2.4 Urban Application
2.4.1 Applicability of Marx's Concept of Land Rent to Urban Situations
Ball has provided one of the severest criticisms against attempts to apply the categories
of agricultural rent to urban analysis. He argues that the concept of agricultural land
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rent cannot be applied to urban situations broadly for three reasons: first, agriculture
and the built environment have different mechanisms of rent appropriation because of
the differences in the formation of market value; second, agricultural rent is based on
differentials in productivity while urban rent is not; third, the relationship between
landlords and capitalist tenant farmers is not reproduced in the urban development
process.
With respect to the first argument, Ball argues that in agriculture each land has a par-
ticular cost of production according to the differentials in fertility while the price of
production is generalised. As discussed in the previous section, in agricultural produc-
tion the price of production on the worst soil becomes the general price of production.
Thus there forms a uniform market price. In the built environment, however, Ball
argues, each building has more or less the same cost of production but the determina-
tion of market price is individualised. In other words, there is no uniform market price
for buildings (Ball, M., 1977).
Here location becomes an important attribute of land in explaining urban land rent.
Marx mentioned that location and fertility were two main causes of the unequal results
of equal capital investment in land for production and thus of differential rent. Yet, his
discussion of agricultural land rent was confined to fertility (Marx, K. 1894-1974). The
difference in the mechanism of rent appropriation is due to the effect of location in the
determination of the market price of buildings. To illustrate the difference in market
structure, Ball compares corn and building representing an agricultural product and an
urban product respectively. Corn is sold at a uniform market price while in case of
building, there is no uniform market price because of the locational specificity. In the
latter case, the price will depend on its location while in the former, the effect of loca-
tion is not to alter the price but its individual average price of production (Ball, M., op.
cit.).
In other words, in agricultural products, a uniform market value is formed while mdi-
vidual prices of production differentiate; in buildings, market value is individually
formed while individual prices of production (cost of production plus social average
profit) becomes uniform. Therefore, the relationship between rent and market price is
not the same. For building, the capability of landlords to appropriate rent depends on
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the market price while for corn this depends on the individual price of production
(Thid).
Regarding the second point, Ball suggests that productivity cannot be measured for
buildings. According to him, agricultural land is used productively while urban land is
not because buildings are produced for unproductive uses. He gives the reason:
'although the construction of the built environment requires the expenditure of labour,
the uses to which those buildings are put need not produce surplus value' (Ball, M.,
1977: 400). Thus, for Ball, 'the major urban land use, housing is an obvious example'
that 'frequently urban land is not used for commodity production' (Ball, M., 1985:
514).
The third contextual difference, which, Ball argues, makes agricultural rent inapplicable
to urban situations is that the relationship between landlords and capitalist tenant farm-
ers is not reproduced in the urban development process. In the latter case, much more
complex multilateral relationships are formed among developers, landowners, builders,
financiers, purchasers, rentiers and tenants. The amount of rent is determined basically
by the struggle between landlords and farmers and its effect on market prices in the
agricultural sector. In the urban case, the appropriation of rent on buildings is deter-
mined by the structural relations between all these agents. (Ball, M., 1985).
Clark and Haila criticize this argument. First, they dispute Ball's comparison between
corn and building. Clark indicates that urban buildings can better be compared with
farms rather than corn, a product of the farms (Clark, E., 1987). In the same vein, Haila
argues that corn must be matched by services provided by urban buildings (Haila, A.,
1990). This seems not to be the point. Moreover, Clark and Haila's arguments are
based on different conception of land rent from Ball's conception. This will be taken up
later in this section. The question is whether Marx's concept of differential rent is valid
only when products on land have uniform market value and different prices of produc-
tion as Ball seems to suggest.
Clark argues that Ball's distinction between agricultural production and urban produc-
tion does not necessarily justify Ball's rejection of the applicability of Marx's concept of
rent in urban situations. According to Clark, the distinction is that, in agriculture, land
enters into the economy as an element of production or an instrument of production
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while, in the built environment it enters as a condition of production, the foundation,
the site, or the spatial basis of operation. What the differences call for is not such re-
jection but more attention to the basis for rent on land used for commercial and
consumption purposes as opposed to the basis for rent on productive land (Clark, E.,
1987).
It is also questionable that differences in actors and in the relationship between them
make the concept of differential rent inapplicable to urban situations. Different sectors
of production involve different actors with different interests and strategies. Com-
plexities in their relationship differ from one production sector to another. Agricultural
production in modern societies relies on increasingly complex relationships among pro-
ducers and landowners, traders, financiers and consumers. Housing development
differs from commercial building development in terms of actors involved. It has to be
further explained why the involvement of different actors makes Marx's categories in-
applicable in urban situations.
The position of this thesis is that while rent generating processes are different in
agricultural land and urban land, what makes them analogous is the origin of rent.
Differential rent is defined as that arising from the surplus profit due to differentials in
the quality of land whether it is location, fertility or else. Haila makes the criticism that
the differences which Ball specified do not alone prove the inapplicability of the con-
cept of rent developed in an agricultural context to the urban situation. 'Employment of
analogies by transferring theories from one context to another is a common procedure
in any science' (Haila, A., 1989: 1527). To support the inapplicability argument, one
has to show 'how the urban context distorts the essence of agricultural rent theory, or
in what way agricultural rent theory is dependent on its specific context' (Ibid: 1527).
The alternative concept of land rent suggested by Clark and Haila raises a further
important point at issue: the distinction between land rent and building rent, and that
between land rent and monopoly price. As previously mentioned, they begin with dif-
ferent conceptions of rent.
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2.4.2 Land Rent, Building Rent and Monopoly Price
Both Clark and Haila see buildings as improved land. Clark argues that the building is
not itself an independent, complete commodity, but a permanent land improvement, a
fixed capital producing commodities in the form of services which the building provides
to its users (Clark, E., 1987). In this view, Ball's comparison between corn and building
is regarded as misleading. Haila argues that in order for the comparison to be correct,
the counterpart in the urban case must be services which buildings provide, not build-
ings themselves. 'In a study of urban rents the analysis of the use of real estates is far
more important than analysis of building costs' (Haila, A., 1989: 1527).
Housing here is conceived as an improvement of land. This view was suggested by
Harvey earlier. Harvey regards housing as an improvement incorporated into land:
'Housing has to be produced and it has to be paid for as a commodity. Once this is
done, however, the house may be regarded as a relatively permanent improvement
incorporated into the value of the land' (Harvey, D., 1985: 64). Folin argues that hous-
ing, once built, is like land. Its increase in price over time and its existence as a sphere
of investment is a result of the exercise of a monopoly and not of the work of labour in
a production process. It thus must be placed in the same category as landed property
itself (Folin, M., 1985).
In this view, all revenues accrued to properties involving land are regarded as land rent
and rent becomes a concept which explains the property market. This view is based on
a different conception of land rent from the one put forward by Ball and shared by this
thesis. For Ball, land rent is a payment to owners of raw land. In the case of owner oc-
cupied housing provision, he argues that rent is the income received by the initial land-
owner from housing development and that once the speculative builder becomes the
landowner the rent relation ceases (Ball, M. 1985). The price of a newly built house,
for example, depends on the prevailing general level of house prices. The value of the
land plot of the house is only notional; it may only be distinguished for the purpose of
accounting or valuation of tax base or collateral. Views regarding capital gains to
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houses or buildings as land rent are based on a false belief that land attracts to it all this
potential surplus profit, because of its general scarcity and locational specificity (Ibid.).
For Clark and Haila, any payments and capital gains accruing to properties involving
land is all called rent. Clark argues that any rent yielded on vacant land presupposes the
potential returns of a certain level of capital investment on the land. Then why should
not the annual return after capital has been fixed to the land, that is, building is con-
structed, be considered as land rent?. Clark seems to indicate that Ball thus dismisses
the rationale behind Marx's concept of Differential Rent II and its relation to Differen-
tial Rent I (Clark, E., op. cit.; Haila, A., op. cit.).
Ground rent still has its role even in cases in which building owners own the land. Clark
cites Marx's notes on the relationship between land rent and building rent. 'The interest
on durable improvements to land becomes land rent as soon as the capital laid out is
amortised' and that, 'though such improvements are the product of capital, they operate
just like the natural differential quality of the soil' and 'it is ground rent and not the
houses themselves that forms the real objective of speculative building' (Clark, E., op.
cit.: 266).
Haila claims that by limiting the category of rent to actual payments, Ball downgrades
unnecessarily the utility of the theory of rent. She suggests that when zoning regula-
tions allow more efficient use of a site than the actual one, the expectations of owners
on potential and alternative rent may have an effect on actual use and price (Haila, A.,
1989).
Here, the point of dispute is the distinction between land rent and building or house
rent. Ball's point of criticism is the indifference of such a conception of rent to actors
involved in the production process in land with different interests and strategies and to
their social relations. The latter, according to him, shapes all aspects of the production
process, including the determination of land rent: 'The theory based on such a concep-
tion is universal in that it can be applied to any land use and it is ahistorical in that it is
indifferent to .... whether it goes to the initial landowner, the builder or the state as a
land tax' (Ball, M., 1983:146). Ball also said: 'Different types of landed interest have
distinct relations to their land holdings, which means they do not respond in the same
way to changing economic circumstances'. For example, some investors are interested
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in long-term gains, while others in maximizing short term profits. All such differences
are dismissed in the view of Clark and Haila. Therefore 'the need to limit the category
of rent to payments to landowners is very important for the urban context.....Failure to
conform rigidly to the definition can lead to endless confusion' (Ball, M., 1985: 512-
5 13).
When the scope of concept of rent is reduced to explain the relationship between land-
owners and developers, two important points become apparent: (i) it explains a ten-
dency for the portion of land cost to rise; and (ii) it explains how land prices become
that part of surplus profits which are excluded from the process of profit equalization.
Concerning the first point, Marx's examination of the role of landed property in the
definition of differential rent provides an illustration of the circumstances in which the
portion of land cost in new house prices could tend to increase. There might be, for ex-
ample, a situation in which new housing development methods spread progressively in a
region. Theoretically the price of new houses produced with such new methods will fall
either due to savings in the construction costs or reduction in land cost. However,
urban landed property acting similarly as the rural one would not allow such fall to
happen.
Landowners would sell their land at higher prices to developers who employ such new
productive methods since those developers will be prepared to buy land at higher prices
as long as they are able to realize average or higher rate of profits. This means increases
in land rent. As the new development methods spread progressively, rent for all other
land would rise to the same level. This is the process by means of which increasingly
larger portions of new house prices tend to be allocated to land cost. It is a tendency
for land cost to rise in capitalist housing development, independently of fortuitous short
term market situations.
The implications of this process for Korea are twofold. First, cost saving construction
technology and higher density housing development, which have long been believed are
ways of achieving cheap housing production, do not necessarily lead to a fall in the
prices of new houses. Second, once land rent has risen due to the new development
methods, all later developers are obliged to adopt the same or more productive meth-
ods. New development methods can be more productive construction technology,
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more intensive use of land (e.g., high density development) or more efficient organiza-
tion and management. It is normal practice that competition between developers brings
about endless search for such new ways of development, i.e., new ways of increasing
surplus profits. This provides the possibility for landowners to raise land prices to ever
higher levels.
According to Harvey, by appropriating surplus profits due to differences of the quality
of land, either naturally given or artificially created, landowners create a condition in
which developers compete with each other increasing the efficiency of housing
production. On the other hand, by taxing away surplus profits resulting from new
production methods, landowners become a barrier to housing development; they
become a threat to the development gains (Harvey, D., 1982). This is the material
source of the conflict and contradiciton between landowners and developers.
The second point indicates that these conflicts and contradictions are part of intrinsic
nature of the process of housing development. They might be also related to fortuitous
market situations, but to attribute the rise and fall in land prices only to demand and
supply in the market conceals the real nature of those conflicts and contradictions. The
market may amplif, or reduce the conflict but not remove them.
The tendency to identify land rent with monopoly pricing in the land market, as seen in
the discussion on land rent and monopoly price above, seems to have been caused by
the use of 'monopoly' by Marx as a concept explaining the private ownership of land in
his theory of rent. Marx described that land rent is generated because of monopoly by
landowners of certain pieces of land (Marx, K., op. cit.).
Bryan clarifies the concept of monopoly in Marx's theory of rent (Bryan, R., 1985). Ac-
cording to him, 'monopoly' in Marx's theory of rent is associated with a range of empiri-
cal forces which prevent rates from equalising. It is 'a constraint on the equalisation of
technical norms of production and thus on the tendency for profit rates to equalise'
(Ibid: 87). In other words, monopoly in the theory of rent means a condition in which
the equalisation process of the rate of profit is hampered or prevented because of the
existence of landed property. This is distinguished from monopoly indicating certain
market structure. Marx thus writes;
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'Their [absolute and differential rent] monopoly would consist in the fact
that, unlike other products of industry whose value is higher than the
general price of production, they are not levelled out to the price of pro-
duction'. (Marx, K., 1894-1974: 762).
Some critics on the utility of Marx's theory of rent in contemporary society seem to be
based on a misunderstanding of this point, i.e., a misconception of 'monopoly' in the
theory of rent as a market structure. Tribe argues that in Marx's conception,
landownership as a class monopoly is confused with landownership as an individual
monopoly, and neither can be economic concept of monopoly (Tribe, K., 1977).
According to Tribe, 'monopoly' in Marx's theory of rent refers to the individual power
of each landowner confronted with his tenants; but from the point of view of the econ-
omy as a whole, this represents no more a monopoly than an aggregation of e.g. village
shopkeepers' (Ibid: 87). In case of class monopoly, that is, when land is held almost
exclusively by two or three social groups, it does not automatically imply that they
operate together as monopolists. For Tribe, it is thus necessary to develop 'the
concepts of forms of commodity exchange for the economic analysis of monopoly
pricing of land and products, which is missing as a whole in Marx's theory of rent (Thid:
77).
Bryan claims that Marx's theory of rent presupposes the existence of a distinct landlord
class and as the existence of a distinctive landlord class is doubted in the period of 'fully
developed capitalism'(Bryan, D., 1990: 180), no theory of ground rent other than the
theory of capital is needed (Ibid.). Deak similarly asserts that Marx's land rent is a con-
sequence of the survival of precapitalist relations of production at a specific stage of
development of capitalism. Since in contemporary urban situation, a distinctive landlord
class no longer exists, there is no land rent (Deak, C., 1985).
These arguments are based on the conception of monopoly, as the basis of land rent, as
a particular market structure rather than a process by which a certain portion of surplus
value is excluded from the equalisation process. The aspect of monopoly as market
process is well recognised by Marx when he distinguishes 'practical effects' of landed
property from rent as a category of value. But he sets its analysis aside as belonging
'under the theory of competition, where the actual movement of market-prices is con-
sidered', not under a distinctive theory of rent (Marx, K., 1894-1974: 764).
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According to Bryan, this distinction between land rent as an exclusion of a certain por-
tion of surplus value from the equalisation process of the rate of profit, and that due to
particular market structure, monopoly, has important political economic implications.
The former is related to the social average rate of profit and rate of wage. Hence, con-
flicts between capital and landed property, and conflicts between landed property and
labour. The latter has no direct association with relations between, for example, labour
and capital. There is only the relationship between buyers and sellers in the market, no
referece to class (Bryan, R., op. cit.).
On the basis of this conception, housing development is
'a particular field of production in which the general process by which
the general rate of profit is formed is hampered by the private ownership
of land' (Marx, K., 1969: 37).
The arguments so far suggest that rising land cost for housing in Korea has to do with
the conflicts between landowners and developers inherent in the capitalist housing
production which cannot be explained solely by referring to the relationship between
sellers and buyers in the land market. From this a conceptual answer to the question
about the relationship between land prices and house prices can be derived. In housing
development, it is developers who organise the creation of surplus profit, the material
source of land rent. Thus the ability of developers to create surplus profits provides
scope for landowners to realise land rent. Landowners, however, are not simply pas-
sively appropriating parts of the surplus profits already created. They perpetually
exclude parts of surplus profits from the process of profit equalisation and fix them into
ongoing land rent. They increase the portion of land prices within the prices of the
products, in this case housing. Moreover they increase the average levels of investment
in land and thus affect development methods, which are the ways in which developers
organise the creation of surplus profits. Marx thus wrote:
'Rent -as the price of land- may not determine the price of the product di-
rectly, but it determines the methods of production, whether a large
amount of capital is concentrated on a small area of land, or a small
amount of capital is spread over a large area of land, and whether this or
that type of product is produced'. (Marx, K., 1972: 515)
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From the point of view of developers, this means that the higher the rate of surplus
profits they create or are expected to create, the higher land prices they have to face as
the business of housing development continues.
This is the contradictory relation between landowners and developers inherent in the
process of capitalist housing production. Whether the contradiction becomes an explicit
problem depends on circumstances. This does not mean that the actualisation is only
fortuitous. Certain social relations respond to the contradiction (e.g., eminent domain
and the direct intervention of the state) and define the positions and roles of landowners
and developers in the determination of land cost. The question of why land cost has
risen in Korea as shown in Figure 1.8 (p25) must be put in this context.
2.4 Summary and Research Design
2.4.1 Research Questions
The analysis of the literature considered most relevant for this research, and the inter-
pretation of the most important concepts in this field can now be summarised in the
form of the central problems and suggestions concerning the relationship between new
house prices and land prices. The analyses contained in this chapter suggests that nei-
ther the factor cost view of land rent nor the Ricardian residual view, can give a proper
explanation of the relationship between landowners and developers. It has been shown
that the reason for this limitation is their inability to consider social relations associated
with the determination of land rent. The thesis of the structure of housing provision
established that the relation between land prices and house prices must be explained in
the context of the interaction between landowners and developers and social relations
relevant to it. This has been taken as the starting assumption of this research. However,
these relationships are historically specific to concrete situations. The interactions
between landowners and developers are not fortuitous. The acceptance of the starting
assumption, which is the result of the theoretical analysis of this chapter still keeps open
the question of what are precisely those interactions between landowners and housing
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developers that had resulted in the rise of land prices and house prices in Korea. Social
relations are responses to and at the same time consequence of the conflicting nature of
the interaction. The theoretical definition of this interaction has been provided by
Marx's concept of differential rent.
Thus the Central Research Question, preliminarily formulated in Chapter 1, is refor-
mulated as follows:
What relation between landowners and developers has brought
about the continuous rise in land cost for housing in Korea de-
spite increasing government intervention to regulate it?.
This Central Research Question has been answered with the following Central Hy-
pothesis:
The continuous rise in land cost for housing in Korea is the out-
come of the conflictive and contradictory interaction between
landowners and developers, determined by the fact that devel-
opers create surplus profits and landowners appropriate in-
creasingly larger portions of them in the form of land rent. This
affects the way developers produce housing and limit their abil-
ity to reduce house prices. The government has not been able to
regulate that interaction because of its inability to break from its
housing development system driven by the private appropria-
tion of surplus profits.
The Preliminary Research Questions raised in Chapter 1 have been reconsidered and
reorganised into four research questions in order to test empirically this Central Hy-
pothesis. The questions are divided into two categories. The first two questions address
material aspect of the process by which landowners and developers struggle in the crea-
tion and appropriation of surplus profits. The other two questions concern social rela-
tions between landowners and developers, which have conditioned the material process
of creating and appropriating surplus profits leading to an increasing portion of land cost
in new house prices.
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Accordingly, Research Question One is restated as follows:
(1) Have housing developers in Korea been responsible for the rising
land costs that have accompanied the housing programmes since
1970's?.
This aimed to disprove the common belief that high land prices have pushed up house
prices and that housing developers have been no responsible for rising land prices but
victims of it. The hypothetical answer derives from Marx's concept of differential rent:
Housing developers in Korea have created and realised high
surplus profits in housing provision since the 1970's and
thereby have provided the material source of rising land cost.
To test this hypothesis, it is necessary to examine the developers' strategy and behav-
iour to increase surplus profits and the amount of surplus profits they were able to real-
ise. The latter can be done by analysing the composition of new house prices. The
examination needs to be done for two separate periods: the 1970's, when no restrictive
control on new house prices existed, and the 1980's, when the strict Price Ceiling Sys-
tem was applied. As shown in Figure 1.8 (p25), the portion of land cost rose under the
Price Ceiling System introduced in 1981. Thus an examination of how and to what
extent developers has been able to realise surplus profits under the Price Ceiling System
becomes a major concern of the examination for the 1980's.
The test of Hypothesis One will show that it is developers who have created the mate-
rial basis that provides the scope for land cost to rise. Then, what follows is Research
Question Two:
(2) What has been the role of landowners in the creation and appro-
priation of development gains?
The hypothesis to this question is again based on Marx's concept of differential rent:
Landowners have increased the proportion of land cost by perma-
nently transforming and fixing larger surplus profits into land
rent. Although this has been dependent upon the ability of devel-
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opers to create surplus profits, the existence of land rent has influ-
enced the ways in which developers produce housing.
These two Research Questions are about the roles of landowners and developers and
the interaction between the two. The ability of developers to create surplus profit be-
comes the foundation on which landowners and developers interact with each other.
The creation of surplus profits is however not solely within developers' discretion. It is
a condition of housing production forced by the fact that landowners will come into the
process of surplus profit creation and demand parts of it. Once developers create the
possibility of increasing surplus profits, this provides the possibility for landowners to
demand further surplus profits for land prices. In other words, developers, by creating
surplus profits, create conditions for the landowners to get a further part of it. This is a
conflicting process in which landowners and developers interact with each other. The
theories reviewed in this chapter indicate that there is a tendency for the outcome of
this process to result in the allocation of increasingly larger portions of house prices to
land cost. However, the way this tendency is realised, if it is realised at all, depends on
the specific ways in which landowners and developers relate to each other in particular
historical situations. The outcome of this process, in a specific country, in a specific
period, may also influence decisively the way in which housing is developed.
Whether such contradictory relations become an explicit problem in a society is
dependent upon social relations responding to the contradiction, which is conditioned
by historical circumstances. This defines a considerably large field of inquiry impossible
to cover by a single research project. Being forced to be selective, this research has
focused on those relations between landowners and developers which had been influ-
enced by the Korean Government intervention. Government intervention represents the
institutional form of these social relations. The conflicts and contradictions between
landowners and developers in Korea have brought about increasing government inter-
vention in land development for housing. However, land cost has been rising despite in-
creasing government intervention. Research Questions Three and Four deal with these
problems. Research Question Three is as follows:
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(3) How has the direct involvement of the government in land devel-
opment had affected the relationship between landowners and de-
velopers and what has been the effects on land prices for housing?
The answer to this question is hypothesised as follows:
The Korean government intervention in the land development has
politicised the determination of land prices for housing. As a conse-
quence, the direct relationship between landowners and developers
has been replaced by an indirect relationship mediated by the gov-
ernment, in which a growing conflict between landowners and the
government has become the distinctive feature. Changing power
relations between the government and landowners have resulted in
the first losing control over land prices for housing.
Government intervention is the institutional form of social relations responding to the
conflicts between landowners and developers. These social relations are historically
conditioned. Thus to complete the test of the Central Hypothesis, the historical speci-
ficity of social relations must be examined. Thus the Research Question Four
becomes:
(4) What political and economic circumstances have conditioned the
government's inability to control land prices for housing?.
The answer is hypothesised as follows:
The National Development Strategy to minimise the financial
burden on the government in the 'non-productive sector', as
housing has been officially understood, has led the government
to design a housing development system driven by the private
appropriation of development gains. The government has con-
tinually changed its forms of intervention in housing develop-
ment but without breaking from the principle of self-financing.
Thus the government only intervened in the distribution of
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development gains among the actors involved, which has been
dependent upon the power balance between these actors.
2.4.2 Research Method
2.4.2.1 Geographical Area for Empirical Analysis.
This is an examination of a particular empirical case to identify certain tendencies inher-
ent in the relationship between landowners and developers in housing development. The
problem is that evidence is, in the end, presented in the form of prices - land prices and
house prices - and actual prices fluctuate according to market situation which involves
all 'obfuscating and irrelevancies'. This obscures the existence of any inherent tendency
in it. For example, whether high land prices have caused high house prices or vice versa
cannot be identified through short-term market observation. One way to overcome this
problem might be to observe relatively long-term trend in changes in land cost and new
house prices. In Korea, it is known that the property market moves up and down every
ten years for a long cycle and every five for shorter one (e.g., Chung, H.S, 1985; Suhk,
H.H., 1990). Thus observations of changes in the prices in a geographical area for more
than ten years are necessary.
In addition, what is desirable for the research is a geographical area where interactions
between landowners and developers and government policies responding to them are
easily observable; where housing development has been taking place in steady phases
and thus data can be obtained on a consistent basis; where housing development is not
conditioned solely by any exceptional factor such as monopoly of all land by a few
landowners. Thus an area large enough to involve a large number of landowners and
developers is desired.
In these respects, the southern part of Seoul, Gangnam Area, and New Towns in its vi-
cinity have been selected for the case study. They are shown in Figure 2.2. The research
questions then will be examined with reference to housing developments taking place
during the 1970's and 1980's in these areas. Gangnam literally means 'South of Han
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River' that flows through the central part of Seoul. Until the early 1970's, the area was
largely paddy fields. During the 1970's and 1980's the whole area was developed into
an urban district. At present it is divided into two boroughs, Gangnam-Gu and
Seoucho-Gu. It had an area of 8,600 ha with a population of nearly one million as of
1990 (SMG, 1991). During the period of its development some 170,000 houses were
built, 70 percent of which are 5 to 15 storied apartments. The area is also one of the
most prestigious residential districts and has a residential land with the highest price in
the country (KNHC, 1992a).
This has been steadily developing on a large scale for twenty years. Comparison
between changes in new house prices and land prices can be made on a consistent basis
in terms of geographical area and steadiness of housing development. In addition, as it
has been developing recently, information and data can be obtained relatively unim-
paired both through documents and interviews.
High rise apartments became a major housing type in large cities from the mid-1970's
and in the nation as a whole in the 1980's. It is in apartment development that the con-
flicts between landowners and developers have been collectivised and acute. It was in
the Gangnam Area and New Towns in its vicinity that competition among developers
for land and conflicts with landowners was most intense. The development of these
areas has been accompanied by the emergence and rapid growth of large housing
developers. Gangnam has provided the sites for large developers to achieve rapid
growth through large apartment estate development. They were major developers of
the area. Thus conflicts between landowners and developers are observed in a collective
form.
It has also been in this area where rises in house prices and land cost have been most
acute and clearly seen. It has been the place where speculative investment in housing
and land has been most active; speculative investment in housing and land took place
during the 1970's and 1980's in the most acute form in the country. House prices and
land prices have also risen most remarkably in this area. The region has thus served as a
wellspring of housing speculation and as a place where new policy measures related to
housing development are experimented with.
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The area has been a place where government policy measures to control the develop-
ment of housing and land as well as the markets have been formulated and tested. In
other words, state intervention in rent relation is plainly observed. Policy measures such
as land expropriation and price control were first introduced in the area and the prob-
lems with them are most clearly observed. It is the very site where the Land Readjust-
ment Project (LRP), the major land development method during the 1970's, had to give
way to the new Public Purchase and Development (PPD) in the period of political and
economic crisis of the early 1980's. The area thus provides consistent data in a long
time span which are necessary for a longitudinal analysis.
What has happened in the development is not peculiar or exceptional compared with
those in the rest of the country but enables us to see the nationwide phenomena in an
amplified and specific form.
2.4.2.2 Survey
First, for the comparison between land cost and new house prices in the Gangnam area,
prices of private apartments during the two decades were collected and presented.
Newspapers and the Korea Housing Association Bulletin (KHAB) were used. The data
cover some 63,000 units of apartments, two thirds of total apartments built in the area.
For land costs, the Current Land Prices Tables made by the Korea Appraisal Board
(KAB) are used. The KAB has been surveying the current land prices since the late
1960's. It conducts the survey once a year for every Dong (district). In the table, land
prices are listed in three categories for each Dong: the high, the middle and the low
grade. The middle grade prices are used in this research. As the survey is conducted
once a year, April or May each year, data for each month were obtained by the method
of interpolation. Data from the KHA bulletin and newspapers are not on a consistent
basis in terms of time and places. However, they are compared to the data from the
KAB to check whether those obtained through interpolation deviate too much from the
actual prices Data obtained through interviews have been used in the same way.
Second, staff specialised in land purchase and planning from the three largest private
housing developers and the KNHC were interviewed. The interview asked how they
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had obtained land, what forms of conflict they had had with landowners, and what
types of housing in what circumstances they had built. Two small developers were
interviewed for comparison( 7). They provided information concerning the behaviour
and strategies of developers in land purchase and how they confront landowners in
various development methods. In the following chapters, information provided by
interviewees was quoted as recorded in the interview when it was short and simple.
However, when it included composite information and long statements, and thus it
could not be quoted in verbal terms, it was interpreted in the text with the source of the
information at the end.
For the business performance of development companies, documents from individual
companies, the Korea Housing Association, the city government, and those issued by
the Security Companies, the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Korea Pro-
ductivity Office as well as reports in newspapers and real estate magazines were con-
sulted.
Landowners were not interviewed. First, the information on landowners needed in this
research is that on the behaviour of landowners in the past, i.e., two to twenty years
ago. And it was almost impossible to find such old landowners. Even if some of them
could be found, it was doubtful that any useful information on the overall behaviour of
landowners could be obtained from the memory of a small number of people. More
significantly, what was needed in this research was not the opinions or views of land-
owners but the effects of their behaviour on developers and housing development,
which landowners themselves were likely to be unconscious of. Information on these
could be obtained through interviews with persons in charge of land purchase and de-
velopment in development companies, and documents.
The struggle between landowners and the state is relatively well documented. Data on
the changes in compensation costs and procedures of expropriation, and political
debates on the issues were obtained from the documents of the government and the
KNHC, Government statistics, the National Assembly Construction Committee
records, and newspaper reports as the events sometimes attracted public attention.
7) Interviewees are listed in Appendix B.
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However, interviews were needed for details of land expropriation processes including
the changing forms of struggle between landowners and public developers in selected
development estates. Cases of New Towns and large apartment estates were examined
one by one rather than in aggregate to see changes in the relation between landowners
and the government in terms of power in the struggle over development gains. The
struggles have been most fierce in these towns. The interview with KNHC is concen-
trated on five cases of PPD projects which show changing patterns of the landowners'
struggle for their land value. For political and economic conditions, documents, news-
papers, National Assembly Records and recollections of former high ranking officials in
the government were used.
2.4.2.3 Structure of Chapters
Chapter 1 derived preliminary research questions from a review of the problem of rising
house prices and land cost in Korea. Chapter 2 was a review of literature on the rela-
tionship between land prices and house prices, and that of landowners and developers.
In the succeeding chapters, the results of empirical tests of the hypotheses are pre-
sented. The structure of chapters, however, does not follow exactly the sequence of the
research questions. Hypothesis Four, for example, becomes a background with which
all other questions can be more effectively examined. Thus for the convenience of pres-
entation, Question Four is taken up first in Chapter 3. This chapter examines the ways
in which the government policies have regulated the relation between landowners and
developers in housing development in changing political and economic circumstances.
The political necessity to increase housing provision and the economic need to maintain
the self-financing principle in housing development have been conditions for the gov-
ernment policies of housing development. The chapter shows the historical process by
which these two conflicting conditions have directed the government to adopt policy
measures to directly control development gains and land prices, but to fail.
Chapter 4 and 5 share Question One and Two. This is due to the characteristics of the
empirical examination of the question. Housing development in the Gangnam area is di-
vided into two phases in terms of policy environment. There was no direct control of
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new house prices and land prices until the early 1980's. However, thereafter, both new
house prices and land prices were placed under the direct control of the government
through the Price Ceiling System and the PPD system. Chapter 4 and 5 are thus distin-
guished by this policy change. Each chapter examines developers' behaviour under dif-
ferent policy conditions. Developers' behaviour can be judged in empirical examination
relative to landowners' behaviour. Thus both chapters also include examination of land-
owners' behaviour as suggested in Hypothesis Two.
Chapter 4 first shows that housing developers in Seoul were able to realise large sur-
plus profits by exploiting rapidly growing speculative demand for housing during the
1970's and the early 1980's. This had provided room for land prices to rise. The chapter
then shows the way in which landowners had increasingly marginalised those surplus
profits intensifying their conflicts with developers in housing development by the early
1980's.
Chapter 5 shows the ways in which developers have pursued high surplus profits by
evading the Price Ceiling System; and those in which landowners have transformed the
surplus profits into land prices. The chapter concludes that rising land cost for housing
is the outcome of the conflicts between landowners and developers over the surplus
profits.
Chapter 6 exclusively examines Question Three. It examines the extent to which the
government could have solved the conflicts and contradiction associated with the rent
relation. It shows the process by which the government intervention has politicised the
determination of land cost and has increasingly failed to regulate it.
Under the strategy to use private appropriation of development gains as a main motive
for housing development, the direct involvement of the government in rent relation has
only politicised the distribution of development gains between developers and landown-
ers. With the weakening position of the government in terms of political power due to
democratisation, state involvement has increasingly failed in checking the rise in land
costs.
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Chapter 7, the final one, first summarises what has been found in all the preceding
chapters to confirm that the Central Hypothesis is supported by the empirical exami-
nation.
CHAPTER 3. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
CONDITIONS OF HOUSING
DEVELOPMENT
3.1 Introduction
One of the significant points of the central hypothesis is that the rising land cost in hous-
ing development in Korea has not been due to accidental market situations. It was hy-
pothesised that the rising land cost for housing has been due to the contradictory and
conflicting interaction between landowners and developers in the process of housing
production. Marx's concept of differential rent suggested that such interaction tends to
result in rising land cost for housing. As indicated in the previous chapter, whether such
interaction brings about rising land cost for housing and subsequently rising house
prices, i.e., spiral rises in land and house prices, depends on circumstances. It depends
on certain social relations which are induced to respond to the contradictory and con-
fictive relation between landowners and developers.
The social relations are defined and materialised in policies within specific political and
economic circumstances. Thus, in testing the Central Hypothesis, it is necessary to
look at the political and economic conditions in which housing development policies
regulating the relationship between landowners and housing developers have been for-
mulated. That is, an examination of how the particular political and economic environ-
ment in Korea has conditioned the relation between landowners and developers to result
in rising land costs for housing. Without that examination, the research will be inconclu-
sive on whether the rising land cost has been due to an inherent contradictory relation-
ship between landowners and developers or to fortuitous market situations specific to
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Korea during the past two decades. This is what was addressed by Question Four in
the previous chapter.
This chapter will show the following.
(1) That the Korean government has been obliged to intervene in housing development
primarily by the political necessity to win the support of the people in periods of
political crisis. The intervention has, however, been conditioned by the principle of
minimising its financial burden. This is due to the national development strategy, which
has attempted to concentrate all the available resources to industrial development. As a
consequence, the development systems of both public and private housing have been
designed on the principle of self-financing, i.e., housing development projects had to be
financed mainly from their own development gains. This self-financing principle has
been invariant in the ever changing housing development policies and development sys-
tems throughout the 1970's and 1980's.
(2) That the principle of self-financing implies that the private appropriation of develop-
ment gains has been the major motive of housing development. Speculative investment
in housing development has been a necessary condition for successful implementation of
the government housing plans. The inflow of speculative money into housing develop-
ment has at the same time intensified the conflict between landowners and developers.
(3) That the government has had to increasingly interpose itself between landowners
and housing developers to prevent their conflict from becoming a major barrier to
achieving the government housing goals. Policy changes have been the forms in which
government intervention has responded to and influenced the conflict between
landowners and developers. Government intervention, without it making financial
contributions, has politicised the distribution of development gains. However, the
intervention has failed to prevent the conflict resulting in rising land costs for housing.
Along with this process, the power balance the government and landowners has also
changed.
This is what is evidenced with regard to Hypothesis Four in the particular political and
economic context of housing development in Korea during the 1970's and 1980's. To
support this hypothesis, this chapter examines the historical process by which the politi-
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cal and economic circumstances in Korea have conditioned government housing strat-
egy. It then looks into how such conditioning has been translated into policy measures
regulating the relationship between landowners and developers.
This examination differs from the conventional studies on housing policies in Korea.
Most current examination of housing policies in Korea have been assessments of how
far the formally stated policy objectives have been realised, or how far the housing situ-
ation has got closer to each critic's interpretation of value criteria such as equity,
fairness and efficiency. In these studies, only technical and ethical aspects of policies
have been considered. Not questioned are the political and economic process by which
such technical and ethical aspects have been shaped. This chapter attempts to examine
those processes within which policies regulating the relationship between landowners
and housing developers have been formulated.
The study in this chapter covers the 1970's and 1980's. However, the periods prior to
the 1970's needs an overview too('). This period includes the historical background
during which the strong state and weak labour relation, and the dominance of large
industrial conglomerates, had emerged. This history can be divided into four phases.
Each phase is taken up in separate sections.
Section 3.2 covers the period from 1945 when the country became independent from
colonial rnle to the early 1970's. It is in this period that the government started
industrial development programmes and thus adopted a financial policy to concentrate
all resources under its control into industrial development. Housing provision was given
the lowest priority in the allocation of financial resources. Toward the end of the period,
the government was pressured to pay attention to housing provision. Hence the
formulation of the first long-term housing construction plan.
Section 3.3 comprehends the 1970's. Politically, the country had been under the
despotic rule of President Park in this period. This period is also characterised by rapid
economic growth, inflationary economic policies, the growth of the unregulated money
market, and the property boom. The conflict between landowners and developers under
1) See the Chronological Table for Chapter 3, Appendix A.
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the existing development system came into the open and the government was obliged to
intervene in the relationship between landowners and developers.
Section 3.4 deals with the period between 1979 when the Park regime collapsed and
1986 when the government was under increasing pressure for a democratic constitu-
tional change. It was the period when there was a pressure for a more active role of
government in housing development. Thus a radical change in the housing development
system was introduced leading toward more direct control by the government of devel-
opment gains.
The fifth section takes on the period between 1986 and 1990. The period is character-
ised by political democratisation meaning the weakening power of the government. This
heightened the inability of the government to control the conflict between landowners
and developers and consequent rising land prices for housing.
3.2 The Origin of the Government Involvement in Housing Pro-
vision, 1945-1972
This period is characterised by the historical process by which the strong state and weak
labour relation was established. This enabled the government to leave housing provision
to private development. Toward the end of the period, the government was obliged to
take a more active role in housing provision because of increasing popular unrest. The
government reorganised the housing provision system. However, it did it in such a way
that major responsibilities rested still with private housing developers in terms of financ-
ing.
3.2.1 Weak Labour, Strong State and Private-initiated Housing Provi-
sion.
When Korea was liberated from Japanese colonial rule in August 1945, the economy
was in disintegration. Most factories were left idle. Supplies of energy and resources
89
from the Northern part of the country were cut off. Politically too, the country ran into
chaos. Immediately after the liberation, people's committees, representing the long-suf-
fering peasantry and labourers, were organised in local areas. They disarmed the Japa-
nese, took over administration and punished collaborators. In rural areas, they drew up
plans to redistribute land. In urban areas, they formed trade unions seizing factories and
controlling transport and communications. This conflicted with the interests of the tradi-
tional landlord class and entrepreneurs newly emerged in the colonial period. With the
occupancy by the United States Army of the southern part of the Korean peninsula in
September 1945(2), the landlord class and entrepreneurs were restored to power. They,
in a coalition with bureaucrats that had served in the colonial government, established
the first South Korean Government under the strong anti-Communist, American-edu-
cated President Rhee in August 1948. The people's committees combined to form the
All-Korea Council of Labour Union (known as Chon-Pyong), which was outlawed by
the new Government, and led a number of strikes during the period of political struggle
between the left and right political parties in the latter half of the 1940's. The late forties
in Korea were thus adorned by workers' strikes and peasants' uprisings. The conflicts fi-
nally led to the confrontation between South Korea and North Korea, known as the
Korean War (1950-1953) (Hamilton, C., 1986).
The failure of the communist North Korea to 'liberate' the South in the Korean War
meant also a defeat of the labour-peasantry class in South Korea. Although they have
been a strain on the successive regimes' nerves as potential supporters of North Korea,
the latter were since in a weak position until the early 1980's. It is against this historical
background that housing provision has been given very low priority in the national
development strategy.
Between 1945 and 1950, the authorities did not care about housing. The United States
Army Military Government could at best allocate houses seized as enemy properties
2) After the Japanese surrendered to the allied forces in the Second World War,
Korea was divided into two parts demarcated by parallel 38 degrees north
latitude. The United State Army occupied the southern part of the peninsula
while the Soviet Union Army advanced into the northern part. The United States
established the Military government in September 1945 and governed the south
until the first South Korean government was established in August 1948. South
Korea is hereafter referred to as Korea unless otherwise stated.
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from Japanese residents to the refugees and returnees from Japan and Manchuria(3).
Under the first Korean government, established in August 1948, the situation was not
improved (MOC, 1987).
It was after the Korean War that the government became actively involved in housing
provision. Just before the war, Korea had a stock of 3,284,000 houses. The war de-
stroyed 596,000 houses, nearly one fifth of the total housing stock (Ibid). The govern-
ment provided emergency housing including camps or temporary shelters with aid from
the United States (Ibid). It was only during this period in the history of housing provi-
sion in Korea that the government directly provided housing with its own funds.
Between 1951 and 1956, nearly 100,000 units were constructed annually. 30 to 50 per-
cent of the annual construction was provided by direct government investment (MOC,
1985).
However, from 1957, when the US aid began to fall, the government abandoned its
policy of direct housing provision. Since then the role of the government has been re-
duced to the control of a small amount of housing loans (KNHC, 1 992c). A more sys-
tematic attempt to leave housing provision to the private sector was made after 1962,
when a new military government began to mobilise all resources for industrialisation.
The background of the emergence of the military government goes back to the late for-
ties and fifties.
The late 1940's and 1950's had been charactensed by the growth of large entrepreneurs.
Industrial facilities formerly owned by the Japanese were sold to managerial employees
of the same companies under the Japanese. Large landlords sold off their land before
land was appropriated under the Farm Land Reform Law which was enacted in Febru-
ary 1950. These landlords were also encouraged to purchase such industrial facilities.
The factories were often sold at prices below their actual value and financed by low
interest government loans frequently in return for political favours (Hamilton, C., op.
cit.).
3) South Korea had a population of 15,890,000 at the time of the liberation in
August 1945. In a year, nearly 4 millions, mostly these repatriates, were added
to this (MOC, 1987).
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The late forties and fifties were periods when the country suffered from a severe short-
age of manufactured goods, and relied heavily on foreign aid for its survival. Thus, dur-
ing these periods, opportunities for profitable investment arose both in commerce, par-
ticularly importing, and in import-substituting industrial production. The large entrepre-
neurs were given the best access to controlled supplies of foreign exchange and domes-
tic credits, which were the chief ingredients of business success. The high protection of
domestic output, and quantitative restrictions on imports assured the possibility of
highly profitable operations. In the late fifties, this accumulation system based on such
mercantile activities began to collapse (Ibid.).
The economy grew well for a while after the Korean War which ended in 1953, due to
the influx of foreign aid. However, growth fell rapidly in 1959 and 1960 in response to
sharp cuts in U.S aid. Between 1954 and 1958, GNP grew at an annual rate of 5.7 per-
cent on average. The growth rate fell to 4.8 and 2.5 in 1959 and 1960 respectively
(Mason, E., et al., 1980; Rho, J.K., 1989). The recession was compounded by a poor
harvest in 1959 and 1960. Rural areas were impoverished. The traditional Spring famine
persisted (Hamilton, C., op. cit.). Entering the 1960's, unemployment and inflation
began to rise again and the U.S government announced that assistance would be termi-
nated by the early 1960's (Mason, E., et al, op. cit.).
As the economy slowed down, the anger of the populace increased against the large en-
trepreneurs accused of having accumulated wealth by illicit means and those that were
identified as corrupt and the abusers of authority. Discord was growing between Presi-
dent Rhee and the United States over economic policy. The United States wanted the
Korean government to adopt economic policy towards a more self-supporting system.
However, President Rhee persisted in the strategy toward maximizing foreign assistance
to overcome the scarcity of domestic resources. No serious effort was made to increase
domestic savings. Rhee's strong anti-Japanese attitude ran counter to the United State's
strategy in the region. The US wanted to form an anti-communist alliance in the region,
and also wanted to reduce its financial burden by having Japan help Korea's economic
development (Mason, E., et al., op. cit.). Even the large entrepreneurs, created and sus-
tained by the regime's control of aid ftinds, began to lose confidence in the regime's
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dealing with the economy as the commercial pursuit and import-substituting industrial
production came to a deadlock (Mason, E. et al, op. cit.; Hamilton, C., op. cit.).
The students uprising protesting against the election-rigging, in April 1960, led to the
collapse of the Rhee regime. According to Hamilton, this was a product of the political
strains brought about by the inability of merchant capital to provide for the needs of the
people (Hamilton, C., op. cit.).
The Rhee government was succeeded by a new civilian government led by the former
opposition leaders in August 1960. The new government, however, failed to control the
chaos following the collapse of the Rhee regime. The government was troubled by all
sorts of street demonstrations: protest against unemployment and the high prices of
commodities; claims for higher wages and the improvement of working conditions; de-
mands for more financial support for small business. Most of the large entrepreneurs
were under indictment for illicit accumulation of wealth (Kim, K.D, 1976).
A group of colonels, under the leadership of Major General Park overthrew the new
government and seized power in May 1961. They advocated 'the elimination of poverty
and the establishment of a self-reliant economy' as a revolution pledge. They regarded
businesses based on such 'mercantile practices' as ruinous to the nation (Das, D.K.,
1992).
The military government adopted a series of measures to force the transformation of
merchant capital into industrial capital. They eliminated opporti.rnities to make profits
simply through trade and access to foreign exchange. The export-import link system,
introduced in 1962, was one of such measures (Hamilton, C., op. cit.). The government
assumed control of the commercial banks by confiscating the stock owned by those ac-
cused of corruption in 1961 (FKI, 1987a). By this means they subordinated financial
capital to industrial capital. Through the control of banks and development institutions,
the government could control a good 90 percent of the assets of organized finance
(Hamilton, C., op. cit.).
At the same time, the Supreme Council for Nation Reconstruction (SCNR: the military
junta) carried out an extensive constitutional and institutional reform. A highly central-
ized government system was established. A strong presidential system replaced the pre
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vious parliamentary one. The local autonomy system was suspended (Mason, E. et a!,
op. cit). They strengthened their control over the labour movement. Immediately after
the coup, the Supreme Council issued the Temporary Law Regarding Collective Labour
Activity (the SCNR Decree No. 6) to dissolve existing trade unions. Political activities
by trade unions were prohibited. Conveners of a General Conference of Unions were to
be appointed by the authority. Labour sabotage or strikes were prohibited in enterprises
regarded as important for the public interest (Kim, K.S, 1980).
For the large entrepreneurs, this became a momentum with which they not only
regained their former dominant position but also consolidated it under the patronage of
such a highly centralized and authoritarian government. Immediately after the military
coup in 1961, the military junta planned to reinvestigate into the illicitly accumulated
wealth and to punish large entrepreneurs. However, the junta had to join hands with the
large entrepreneurs as they put forward the industrialization programme at the top of
their priorities. The Democratic Republic Party, established in 1963, under the
leadership of General Park, was a political alliance of the military leaders and the large
entrepreneurs (Kim, K.D, op. cit.).
The Five-year Economic Development Plan, started in 1962, was the joint work of the
alliance. The successive economic development plans since have been guide-lines for all
economic activities. In implementing the plans, the government has taken a strong di-
rected credit policy: a policy to concentrate financial resources into the sectors of pro-
duction and trade of export goods (Renaud, B., 1989).
Plans for housing provision were provided in the development plans. Laws concerning
housing provision were enacted. The Public Housing Law was enacted in November
1963, to regulate public housing, i.e. housing built with the support of funds under gov-
ernment control. Public housing, for example, was to be sold or leased to low income
families who did not own homes. The Housing Fund Operation Law was enacted in De-
cember 1963, to regulate the raising and use of funds for public housing (MOC, 1987).
In terms of financing, however, no effective measures were taken. Figure 3.1 shows the
shares of the public sector and the private sector in housing investment. As shown in the
figure, in the 1960's, the public sector housing investment had been at much a lower
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level than the private sector investment. Between 1962 and 1971, the public sector in-
vestment accounted for only 13 percent of the total housing investment (KNHC, 1989).
As the result, public housing accounted for only a small portion of annual housing con-
struction. Figure 3.2 compares annual housing construction by the private sector and
the public sector. The figure clearly shows that housing provision had been dependent
upon the private sector in the 1960's. It was after the so called 'October Yushin'
(literally means revitalization reform) in 1972 that the government began to concern
itself more seriously with housing provision. This was the time when social unrest was
rising and national security was believed by the ruling elites to be at stake due to the
changing international situation.
3.2.2 Consolidation of Domination (Yushin Reform) and the First Long
Term Housing Construction Plan
In the early 1970's, the Park regime came to a crisis. First, the economy arrived at a
downturn after having achieved an unprecedented high degree of growth in the late
1960's. GNP grew by 11 and 13 percent per annum in real terms in 1968 and 1969 re-
spectively. In the beginning of 1970, along with the slump in the world economy, the
growth rate fell to 7.6 percent in 1970 and 5.1 in 1972 (The Bank of Korea, 1990; see
Figure 2.2, p78). Export growth began to fall as well (Kim, J.R, 1990). The rapid
growth in the late 1960's had been accompanied by an increasing trade deficit and for-
eign debts. The export growth had brought about a more rapid increase in the import of
capital goods and raw materials. The deficit increased from 18 million dollars in the
early 1960's to 1.1 billion dollars in the late 1960's. The increasing repayment of foreign
loans and the rapid increase in the import of capital goods and intermediary goods
increased burdens on finance. As a result, enterprises were increasingly faltering
(Suslina, S.S., 1988).
The international situation was also changing. The relationship between North Korea
and South Korea was at the highest state of tension since the Korean War at the end of
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1960's(4). Signs of changes in the cold war structure in East Asia strained the regime.
U.S. President Nixon declared that the U.S. would not be involved in military affairs
unless friendly nations in the region were threatened by nuclear weapons in July 1969
(Guam Doctrine). The United States was seeking a reconciliatory relationship with
China, a strong supporter of North Korea. Both agreed the recovery of China's legal
status in the UN as a full member of the Security Council in October 1971. Japan also
normalized its diplomatic relation with China. The United State withdrew one of its
infantry division from Korea by March, 1971, despite the objection of the Korean gov-
ernment. These directly raised doubts as to the willingness of the United States to sup-
port its allies in East Asia. These circumstantial changes raised a sense of national
security crisis within the military-minded ruling elites (Lee, B. C., 1987; Sohn, H. K.,
1989).
The domestic situation was not favourable to the regime either. Since the May 16 mili-
tary coup in 1961, the Park regime had been troubled by chronic protests and demon-
strations by the students. Human rights and democratic groups were actively involved in
opposition activities (Sohn, H. K., op. cit.). Major points of dispute were: the non-
democratic constitutional reform; General Park's assuming of presidency; what opposi-
tion forces claimed were humiliating negotiations with Japan to normalize the
diplomatic relationship; corruption associated with political fund raising in the govern-
ment control of financing; rigged elections; and the establishment of prolonged one
man's rule. The Park regime frequently had to declare martial law to maintain social
stability.
The opposition activities during the 1960's were basically oriented towards a liberal
democracy model (Ibid.). Their main concerns were participatory democracy and tradi-
tionally conceived liberal freedoms and rights. Members of the opposition groups were
former politicians from the conservative opposition party, pastors and priests, intellectu-
als, and professionals such as lawyers, professors, and writers. They were described as
4) On January 21 1968, 31 North Korean armed commandos infiltrated into the
very centre of Seoul to assault the presidential office. Two days later, a U.S.
intelligence ship was captured by the North Korean navy in the East Sea. In
November 1968, 100 armed guerilla landed on the east coast. On April 14 1969,
a U.S. reconnaissance flight was shot down by North Korean forces over the
East Sea (Seoul Shinmoon-Sa, 1979; Kim, J.K, 1987).
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lacking any real grassroots base (Ibid.) or had 'no link to occupational, regional,
sectoral or class interests at the popular level' (Choi, J. J, 1987: 312). However, at the
beginning of the 1970's, labour disputes and the urban poor's struggles began to emerge
as one of the central elements of social unrest. While the economy grew by 10 percent
on average per annum in terms of GNP growth rate, low wages and poor working
conditions persisted. This resulted in increasing labour disputes. The number of cases of
labour disputes was 130 in 1969 and 165 in 1970. It jumped to 1,656 in 1971 (Sohn, H.
K, op. cit.). In addition, at the beginning of the 1970's, the disputes began to take a
more violent form and attract the attention of students and the traditional conservative
opposition groups.
Although such labour disputes were not directly related to housing issues, they certainly
motivated the government to make a firmer commitment to housing provision. Two
incidents are illustrative of the situation which prompted the government to take a more
active role in housing provision.
In November, 1970, in a garment factory in Seoul, a young worker burnt himself to
death protesting against the governments ignorance of workers' grievances. The
incident was sympathized by students and opposition groups. The streets of Seoul were
again disturbed by workers and students' demonstrations, protesting against poor
working conditions and the government repression of the labour movement. Church
organizations, such as the Urban Industrial Mission and the Young Christian Workers,
became increasingly involved in labour disputes since then. The workers in the area
where garment factories were concentrated formed their own independent trade union.
This union came to serve as a centre of disturbance in the labour movement throughout
the 1970's (Kim, K.S, 1988a).
Another incident was Gwangju urban poors' riots in 1971. During the 1960's, there was
an extensive relocation of urban squatters in Seoul to develop commercial and office
district in the city centre. They were mostly formed by war refugees during the fifties
and still growing due to the massive urban immigration. Many squatters were relocated
to the outskirts of Seoul. There were still as many as 170,000 illegal shacks in Seoul,
accounting for roughly 30 percent of houses in the capital as of July 1971. The Seoul
city government was relocating some 350,000 slum dwellers to a neighbouring county,
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Gwangju, in 1971. However, people were moved to new housing estates without ade-
quate provisions for health, environment, and employment. They were moved 'as
though garbage was collected and thrown into barren land' (Sohn, H. K, op. cit). In
August 1971, some 50,000 people rioted, demanding provision of jobs, a reduction in
the price of land and exemption from taxes. The mayor of Seoul finally promised to
comply with all the demands. This was the largest uprising by the urban poor since
Korea's independence (Sohn, H. K, op.cit.; Choi, J. H, 1988).
These changing economic and political circumstances roused a sense of crisis among the
leading personnel of the Park regime. President Park initiated a radical change in the
political system toward a more authoritarian rule. The increasing popular unrest meant
the issue of popular welfare including housing was be seriously considered. Before the
examination of how the housing problem was dealt with in the process of political
change, changes in the political system will be described first.
In the presidential election in 1971, Park won by only a narrow margin. This marginal
win despite all the ftinds and manpower he had invested in the election campaign was
not enough for him. He deplored the 'rampant disorder and inefficiency' of the political
system. In his view, political liberalism was only wasting national energy in such inter-
national circumstance in which, he believed, rallying around a strong leader was neces-
sary (Sohn, H. K, op. cit.; Kim, J. R, 1990). President Park declared the state of emer-
gency in December 1971, claiming that 'because of changes in the international situ-
ation, national security was now at stake'. And thus, he asserted, it was necessary to
mobilize 'national strength and maximize efficiency towards the goal of stability and
prosperity ... by stemming the dispersion and waste which prevail under the political
institutions of the current constitution' (Sohn, H. K, op. cit.: 27). The President placed
the whole country under martial law in October 1972. The existing constitution was
suspended. The National Assembly as well as all political parties and organizations were
dissolved. All speech and press were placed under the strict control of government. The
Emergency State Council took the function of the legislative body (Ibid.).
Then the government carried out a comprehensive constitutional reform. The direct
presidential election system was replaced by an indirect one. An electoral college, the
National Conference for Reunification, was created. The new constitution vested the
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President with full powers to rule by emergency decree, the power to dissolve the
National Assembly, and the authority to prepare a slate of representatives making up
one-third of its membership. Neither court actions nor objections could be raised against
the special declaration issued by the president and the extraordinary measures taken in
accordance with the declaration. Since then the president had made full use of his emer-
gency powers. Political oppositions were firmly kept in check by a long series of prohi-
bitions against criticism of the government and other types of political action (Mason,
E. et al, 1980).
3.2.3	 The Ten-Year 2.5 Million Housing Construction Plan
The emergence of such highly centralized and authoritarian government represented the
way in which the dominant entrepreneurs-military elites overcame the crisis and consoli-
dated their position. In the process, the unrest among labour and the urban poor had
caused the new government to pay attention to the problems of popular welfare. In the
Yushin reform, 'Equal allotment of social well-being and improvement of living stan-
dard' were suggested as a direction of national policies. The then director of the
Housing Division, the Ministry of Construction, explained that the housing plan was
one of the measures to realize the slogan. To the government, it was necessary to
'improve the housing situation to a considerable degree' (one of the formal objective of
the plan) to maintain social stability (Kim, C.K, 1973).
It was in this circumstance that the government announced a long term housing con-
struction plan. Immediately after the Yushin reform, the Emergency State Council for-
mulated the Ten-Year 2.5 Million Housing Construction Plan. It planned to build 1 mil-
lion houses between 1972 and 1976, and 1.5 million between 1977 and 1981. Among
the 2.5 million houses, 1,108,500 were to be supported by public funds (MOC, 1987).
This meant doubling the previous annual housing construction. This can be considered
the first determined response by the government to the housing problem since the coun-
try's independence in 1945.
The institutional system was reinforced to support the plan. The function of the Korea
National Housing Corporation (KNHC) was strengthened. The I(NHC has since been
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the largest public housing development agency in the country. The Emergency State
Council enacted the Housing Construction Promotion Law (HCPL) in December 1972.
The HCPL empowered the government to control the development plan, construction
works and sale of new public housing and part of new private housing. Since the enact-
ment of the HCPL in 1972, public housing has been divided into National Housing and
Private-Managed Housing according to the source of funds. Public housing funds have
been divided into the National Housing Funds (NHF) and the Korea Housing Bank
(KHB) funds. The NIHF has been under the direct control of the MOC and provided
loans to public developers and certain large private developers for up to 20 years at a
favoured interest rate. The KI-IB has provided loans mainly to private developers. Public
housing using the NT-IF is called National Housing and that using the KI-IB funds is Pri-
vate-Managed Housing (Kang, M.S. and Kim, J.W., 1987). These two forms of public
housing should be in accordance with the regulations provided in the HCPL for their
planning, construction and sales. For private housing, those developers who built hous-
ing estates with 50 houses or more (20 houses or more after 1982) were to comply with
the same regulations.
Housing investment and construction in the public sector were considerably increased
during the 1970's. The public sector housing investment rose to 25 to 30 percent of the
total housing investment in the mid-1970's. This is compared to the average 13 percent
during the 1960's (Figure 3.1). The government increased the capital of the Korea
National Housing Corporation (KNHC) to increase its annual construction of housing
to a considerable degree. The KNHC was nearly doubling its annual housing construc-
tion every year from 1972 to 1975. It built 2,286 houses in 1972 but 27,840 in 1978
(KNHC, 1992a).
However, as shown in Figure 3.1, housing investment was still relying on the private
sector. Figure 3.3 shows the trend in government expenditure for housing in compari-
son with that of total housing investment. The annual government housing expenditure
rose at a higher rate in 1973, 1975, 1979-1980, and 1989. These were the years right
after the government underwent periodic political difficulties as will be seen later.
However, the government expenditure has little effect on the total housing investment.
In Figure 3.3, the two curves show different cycles of upturn and downturn running
counter each other. The annual rate of rise in the total housing investment has been
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Figure 3.3 Annual Total Housing Investment Relative to GNP and
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dependent upon the property market situation. Figure 2.1 (p37) shows the property
market situation. The curve of the total housing investment in Figure 3.3 roughly coin-
cides with that of land prices and building activities shown in Figure 2.1. This means
that, although the government launched the long term housing construction plan, its
realization has been dependent upon private housing development. There was little
change in the government financial policy to concentrate resources into industrial
development meaning low priority to housing in the allocation of financial resources.
Accordingly, residential land development also had to rely on private funds. The Land
Readjustment Project (LRP) had long been a major means of urban land development
since it was introduced in the 1930's by the Japanese colonial authority. In Seoul, for
example, 50 percent of built up areas had been developed by the LRP up to 1988 (Cho,
J.H., 1990).
According to the LRP, the city government subdivides and develops land with the land-
owners' agreement. The land is divided into three parts: compensation land, public land
and returned land. The compensation land is retained by the city government in order to
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finance, through sales, infrastructure development costs. The public land is kept by the
city government to facilitate public services such as roads, schools, parks and so on.
The remaining portion of land is returned to the original owners according to a
predetermined schedule. Here, the price for the compensation land depends on the in-
frastructure costs. If the costs are high, the city government must increase either the
price or the amount of compensation land. In either case, the price of land in the area, as
well as in the nearby areas, will go up (Hwang, M.C., 1985c)
This is a typical self-financing development system. It may inflict virtually no cost on the
government. However, higher land prices after development is essential for the success-
flil urban development in financial terms. Since the financing of the infrastructure costs
and the project's overall profitability depends on the sales of the cost-equivalent land in
the Land Readjustment Project, it is in the interests of all parties that plot prices remain
high. Thus, active speculative investment has often been a necessary condition for the
successful implementation of the LRP. Most housing development in the 1970's in large
cities had been carried out on land developed by the LRP (Cho, J.H., op. cit).
To sum up, the period between 1945 and 1972 had been characterized by the strong
state and weak labour relation and the subordination of finance capital to industrial
development. This resulted in the least priority to housing provision in the distribution
of national resources in the 1960's. Popular unrest in the early 1970's, made the govern-
ment pay attention to housing provision. The government had to meet two conflicting
necessities: that to expand housing provision and that to maintain the financial burden
on the government at a minimum level. As a result, housing provision was to rely on the
private sector; it had been in fact dependent upon firnds from the unregulated money
market. The goal of 2.5 million was not achieved. During the ten years from 1972 to
1981, 1,876,665 houses, 75 percent of the originally planned 2.5 million houses, were
built. It was only in 1978 when speculative investment in housing culminated that the
annual construction slightly exceeded 300,000 houses, which was the annual goal of the
2.5 Million Housing Plan (KNHC, 1992a). The development boom relying on specula-
tive investment however intensified the conflict between landowners and housing devel-
opers. The government was increasingly called upon to regulate the relationship
between landowners and developers. The following section will be an examination of
that process.
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3.3 Economy Property Market and Housing Development,
1973-19'M
It was mentioned in Subsection 3.2.1 that after the military coup in May 1961, the gov-
ernment took a financial policy to direct resources to the development of industry. This
directed financial policy meant minimal government expenditure on the consumption
sphere, including housing development. This had two effects. First, housing develop-
ment had to be carried out on a self-financing basis: each housing development project
had to be financed by its own development gains. Second, with little financial support
from the financial institutes, which were mostly under government control, self-
financing meant the reliance of urban and housing development mainly on money
circulating in the unregulated market and people's savings. It meant opening up housing
development to the circulation of speculative money. Housing development has always
had to rely on speculative investment, and thus to conform to the conditions of the un-
regulated money market. The following subsection will examine the effects of growth of
and the conditions of the economy on housing development characterized by the
growing unregulated money market.
3.3.1 Inflationary Policy and the Growth of the Unregulated Money
Market
The 1970's was a period of expansionary economic policy and of high inflation, except
during the early 1970's, when the government had to adopt a retrenchment policy. This
was primarily due to the economic policy to maximise growth through the development
of heavy and chemical industries.
President Park, in the annual news conference, declared that the government would
start the development of the Heavy and Chemical Industries (HCIs) in January 1973.
This was part of measures to reduce the trade deficit due to the increasing demand for
imported production goods. The development of HCIs was also necessary for the devel-
opment of the defense industry. The latter had already started in 1970 when the United
States began to withdraw part of its troops from Korea (Kim, J. R, 1990). The HCIs
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programme was, from the beginning, export-oriented and needed massive investment
(Kim, Y.H., Cho, B.B. and 0 Gawa, Y., 1989). The government established the
National Investment Fund in 1974 and lent two thirds of its fund to the HCIs. A great
deal of bank loans went to them, often at negative real interest rates. 40 to 50 percent of
the fixed investment in the HCIs came from external borrowing. All this had consider-
able inflationary effects (Das, D.K., 1992).
Along with this inflationary economic policy, the growth of the unregulated money mar-
ket characterized an economic situation which encouraged speculation in land and hous-
ing. As mentioned earlier, the government had been able to control most of the assets of
organized finance since the military coup in 1961. The government policy of a dual
structure of low interest rates brought about a growth of the unregulated money market
(known as Sache market). People's savings have been attracted by higher rates of the
unregulated money market rather than by the institutional rates offered by banks and
other government controlled financial institutes. The latter were much lower than the
former. What is called 'floating money' in Korea is that money capital flowing between
this unregulated money market, the property market and the stock market outside the
government's control. An estimate showed that, at the end of 1964, the unregulated
money market held some 43 billion won (169 million dollars) of outstanding trans-
actions compared to total bank loans of 53 billion won (208 million dollars) (Hamilton,
C., op. cit; Das, D.K., op. cit.).
In the early 1970's, the growth of the unregulated money market and its grip on industry
became so serious that the President had to issue an emergency decree to freeze the
debts of enterpnses from the unregulated money market.
When the government adopted a retrenchment policy to reduce foreign debts and the
growing inflationary pressure in the early 1970's, enterprises began to suffer from finan-
cial difficulties. Even large industrial concerns were bankrupted by discontinued credit.
Firms had to turn back to the unregulated money market (Hamilton, C., op. cit.; Mason,
E. et al, op. cit.). This had been a growing source of concern for the government. It was
told that the very high interest rates and the short-term nature of loans in the unregu-
lated money market might hinder industrial expansion and impair international competi-
tiveness. In a meeting with President Park to discuss the financial problems of large en-
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trepreneurs, the then chairman of the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI: a society of
large entrepreneurs) complained that all revenues were to fall to money lenders in the
unregulated money market under the current financial structures (Kim, J. R, op. cit.).
The unregulated money market generally lent for periods of no more than one month
and charged an interest rate of between 40 to 70 percent per annum (while inflation in
the period was about 10 to 15 percent) (Hamilton, C., op. cit.).
To break the tightening grip of finance capital on industrial enterprises, the President
decreed a presidential emergency order to freeze all debts from the unregulated money
market. This was the August Economic Emergency Measure, in 1972( i) (Ibid). Both
debtor enterprises and creditors were ordered to register the loans. The registered loans
were equal to 80 percent of the total currency in circulation (Kim, J. R, op. cit.), and 25
percent of total deposit money outstanding at that time (Das, D.K., op. cit.). The
unregulated money market was hard hit by the emergency measure. The government
established a third tier of banking institutions, including short-term financing companies,
mutual credit savings bodies, and credit cooperatives. It was an attempt to attract float-
ing money into the regulated financial system. However, their interests rates were still
below those in the unregulated sector and thus could not replace the unregulated money
market (Kim, J. R, op. cit.).
This continued growth of the unregulated money market has had significant effects on
government intervention in housing in two ways: administrative control of housing and
land markets (e.g., anti-speculation measures), and the regulation of the relationship
between landowners and housing developers. First, the housing and land markets
increasingly became a field in which the government had to battle for financial control
as the money capital in the unregulated sector continued to flow into the property
sector. Second, the continuous dependence of housing development upon floating
money in the unregulated money market had two-side effects on housing development.
The increasing speculative demands in the housing market contributed to a housing de-
5) The government freezed the debts of enterprises from the unregulated money
market. All the moneys borrowed from the unregulated money market were to
be redeemed by instalment in five years with a three year grace period at the
monthly interest rate of 1.35 percent or to be converted into investment. All
335.2 billion Won (840 million dollars) was reported as private liabilities (Kim, J.
R, 1990).
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velopment boom in the late 1970's. On the other hand, land speculation had strained the
relations between landowners and housing developers. The following subsections will
examine the second issue, why and how the government has come to regulate the
relationship between landowners and developers.
3.3.2 Compulsory Land Purchase for Housing, the late 1970's
3.3.2.1 Land Expropriation by Public Developers
In the early 1970's, when the economy slowed down, the government began to take
measures to invigorate the economy. The government gave incentives to large construc-
tion firms to participate in housing development. The government promulgated the Spe-
cific District Development Promotion Law in 1973, as part of the measures to stimulate
economic activities. In the district designated as the National Housing Development
Promotion Area in accordance with the law, all taxes associated with housing construc-
tion and land dealings were exempted for three years (Chosun-Ilbo, November 3 1972).
Large construction companies were almost forced to participate in housing develop-
ment in Seoul. As will be seen in Chapter 4, this became the impulse and created the
momentum for the emergence and growth of large housing developers.
This was followed by the boom in the new apartment market in Seoul in 1973. As men-
tioned before, the financial resources under government control were concentrated into
industrial development. Consumer credit, mortgage finance and a social security system
for households were almost non-existent. Households had to reserve a lump-sum of
their own savings for future use (Das, D.K., op. cit.). Thus, how to save or accumulate
their savings had been a major issue in the management of the household economy. It
was also said in the previous section that households' savings were attracted to the
unregulated money market which provided much higher interest rates than the formal
financial institutes. These moneys turned to the housing market as housing demand in-
creased. Moreover the government was reducing taxes related to property in order to
promote housing and urban development. New apartments became good objects for
investment as an hedge against inflation during the high inflation period of 1970's. In
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1973 in Seoul, for example, competition for new apartments among middle class house-
holds was fierce (ARI, 1989). Thanks to the growing speculative demand, housing con-
struction was expanding fast during the mid and late 1970's (see Figure 3.2).
In 1974 and 1975, due to the world oil crisis, the economy, which was showing signs of
recovery from the recession in 1973, temporarily stagnated. From 1976, however,
industries driven by export began to prosper and the economy showed strong signs of
recovery. In 1977, exports increased by 30 percent. Revenues from the export of con-
struction to the Middle East rapidly increased. Currency was expanded to support the
development of the Heavy and Chemical Industries (HCIs). All these helped to increase
liquidity and bring about a fast rise in prices in general. The increasing liquidity and
inflationary pressure stimulated the property market. Land and housing prices were ris-
ing rapidly (see Figure 2.1, p37). By early 1977, speculation was again most prevalent
in the new apartment market in Seoul (ARI, op. cit.).
In the new apartment sales in Seoul in April 1977, 40 to 70 applicants competed for an
apartment (Chosun-Ilbo, April 211977). A sample survey by the Ministry of Construc-
tion (MOC) revealed that more than half of the apartments were sold to speculators
(Chosun-Ilbo, January 11 1978). In 1978, during the three months from January to
March, prices rose by 40 percent for apartment, 30 percent for houses and 20 percent
for land respectively (Chosun-Ilbo, March 24 1978).
Thanks to the increasing speculative demand for housing, annual construction increased
sharply. However, as speculative money flew into the land market, developers began to
face difficulties in purchasing land. In the mid-1970's, the government was called upon
to regulate the relationship between landowners and developers. In April 1975, the
Ministry of Construction (MOC) announced that it would be considering the application
of the Land Expropriation Law, enacted in 1962, in housing development. The Land
Expropriation Law was first applied in the development of industrial estates in the
southern coastal areas. In the industrial development areas, some landowners refused to
sell their land at the price offered by the government. The government, worried that the
same would spread to other areas where the new heavy and chemical industrial (HCI)
estates were to be developed, invoked the eminent domain (Chosun-ilbo, August 9
1975)
108
The government decided to apply the same measure to public housing development as
public agencies found it increasingly difficult to purchase land through negotiations. The
mid- 1970's was the time when the Korea National Housing Corporation (KNHC) was
doubling its annual construction output according to the government policy to expand
low-income housing provision. The KNHC had purchased land hitherto through direct
negotiations with landowners. However, from the mid-1970's it had started to face in-
creasing difficulties in purchasing land. More frequently it failed to acquire land on time
for the planned housing developments. Thus the government, first, allowed the munici-
palities to expropriate land for housing development (Chosun-Ilbo, January 18 1976),
and, in a sweeping revision of the Housing Construction Promotion Law in 1977, the
KM-IC was entitled to expropriate land for housing development (KNHC, 1 992c).
However, the compensation cost for land expropriation remained a problem. To solve
it, the government introduced the Pegged Land Price System (PLPS) in housing
development. The PLPS had been first applied to the development of industrial estates
in April 1973 (Chosun-Ilbo, April 6 1973). The PLPS was a system to counteract
property speculation and the resulting sudden rise in land prices in the development of
industrial estates and public facilities. It aimed to correct abuses in terms of
compensation cost for land increasing to a excessive degree in public works. According
to the system, the Minister of Construction designated the area where the PLPS was to
be applied. Then the Minister selected standard spots, one in every 1 to 3 kilometres,
for which the prices were assessed by two or more licensed land price appraisers. The
assessed prices were readjusted by the Minister, confirmed by the Central Land
Expropriation Arbitration Committee and finally announced to the public. These became
prices on which the government or public developers purchased or compensated land
for public works. The prices themselves did not mean prices of selling or buying. The
actual prices were determined by adding normal price rises (i.e., proportional to the rise
in the consumer price index) for the period between the date of the announcement of
the standard prices and the time of the actual purchase of the land. The government
decided to expand the application of the PLPS to collective housing development areas
as a partial way of securing land for large housing estate development in 1977 (Chosun-
Ilbo, April 4 1973).
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This control of land prices for housing was extended to private housing development.
As previously mentioned, the government adopted a strategy to use large private devel-
opers in the implementation of government housing programmes by giving them incen-
tives. Large private developers had mostly built apartment estates during the 1970's. By
the late 1970's, they too began to face difficulties in purchasing land in time. Problems
of the hitherto dominant land development method, the LRP, in terms of its effects on
land prices after development, were brought to the fore.
In the Land Readjustment Project (LRP), there is no incentive to lower land cost. Thus
in some cases the government kept the number of houses or the amount of land below
demand to maintain a strong market to recover project costs resulting in the artificial
inflation of house or land prices. In this system, most of the development gains went to
the landowners(6). It is not surprising, therefore, that speculation on land before devel-
opment had been prevalent.
As mentioned in Subsection 3.2.3, in the LRP system developed land is returned to
original landowners after land for public use and compensation development cost is
deducted. Since landowners were mostly small landowners, returned land is subdivided
into relatively small plots after development( 7). This made it difficult for housing devel-
opers to get land for apartment development as they had to purchase plots of land from
a large number of small landowners and assemble them. The high prices of developed
land as well as the division of returned land in small plots became a great problem in
providing land for low income housing and apartment development by the late 1970's.
Thus the government began to take a series of measures (KNHC, I 987b).
6) According to data from the Korea Land Development Corporation, 84.1 percent
of the increased land value due to development fell to landowners in the early
1980's. This was contrasted to the new Public Purchase and Development
system in which,, according to the same data, landowners benefited little from
development (Cho, J.H., 1990).
7) In the Youngdong Land Readjustment Project carried out in Gangnam, Seoul,
between 1968 and 1974, each landowner held 356 pyongs of land and received
215 pyong of returned land on average (Hwang, M.C., 1985c).
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3.3.2.2 Land Expropriation by Private Developers
As said in Subsection 3.2.3, the government's strategy to rely on private capital for
housing provision remained unchanged in the 2.5 Million Housing Construction Plan.
The government planned to increase housing provision by fostering large developers. In
December 1977, the government introduced a registration system of housing develop-
ers. This was partly to control the irresponsible behaviour of some housing developers,
such as construction of poor quality housing and deceptive advertisements for housing
sizes and facilities. Such activities were prevalent in the period of the housing develop-
ment boom in 1977 and 1978. To be registered, developers had to fulfil certain condi-
tions in terms of capital stock, number of licensed engineers and experts and annual
housing construction. Among the Registered Developers, development companies who
satisfied certain requisites in terms of capital stock, annual housing construction and
skilled technical manpower were nominated as Designated Developers( 8). In May 1978,
46 developers were nominated as Designated Developers (Chosun-Ilbo, October 1
1978).
This was part of the government strategy to utilize private developers to increase hous-
ing supply. Designated Developers were given various incentives such as the right to is-
sue company bonds redeemable in housing and the right to develop Apartment Areas.
They were also given priorities and favours in housing loans and in purchasing devel-
oped land from public agencies. In return, they had to carry out certain government
instructions. For example, immediately after the designation of 46 large developers, the
8) The conditions to be fulfilled have been changed since the system was intro-
duced. According to the Housing Construction Promotion Law, as of the time of
this research, developers who build 20 houses or more a year should register
with the Ministry of Construction. To register, a company must have a capital
stock of 100 million won or more and employ two or more authorised experts in
construction (Article 6). To be a Designated Developer in Seoul, a company
should have a capital stock of 3 billion won or more and employ 10 licenced
engineers or more, and should have built 100 houses or more a year on average
for the past three years (Article 8).
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government then recommended that each of them build more than 1,000 houses,
making a total of 61,600 housing units by May 1979 (Chosun-Ilbo, October 11978).
The first policy to help private developers in the acquisition of land was the Apartment
Area System. At first, it aimed to prevent each plot from being developed at its own
convenience and to ensure the development of a certain block as a planned unit with
community facilities such as play-grounds, kindergarten and schools. It helped large
developers to acquire large units of land for apartment development as it restricted
other land use activities by individual landowners than those planned by a developer and
approved by the authorities. In fact land prices fell in some areas (Chosun-Ilbo, August
24, 1976).
In September 1975, the Ministry of Construction (MOC) announced that in order to
secure land for the long-term housing construction plan, it would designate certain areas
of the cities appropriate for apartment development as an Apartment Area. Once an
area was designated, building activities other than apartment development were re-
stricted. The Apartment Area System was formally inserted as a provision in the Urban
Planning Law in 1976. The MOC designated as Apartment Area 11 districts with
3,720,000 pyongs in Seoul including large parts of Yeouido and the Gangnam area in
August 1976 (Chosun-Ilbo, August 24, 1976).
However, the Apartment Area System in itself was not strong enough to help develop-
ers. There had been few large developers, and they had not worried much about com-
petition for land until 1975. However, as developers were growing larger and more
developers were involved in apartment construction, and apartment estates also became
larger, they started to compete fiercely for land (Dong-A-Ilbo April 14 1977). As the
competition among large developers for land in large units was intensified, monopoly
pricing by landowners became a problem. More and more landowners refused to sell
their land by reason of the low prices offered by the developers (ARI, 1989). In July
1977, an informal meeting was superintended by the Economic Planning Board (EPB)
for the promotion of housing construction. The participants included the Seoul city gov-
ernment, the Ministry of Finance, the MOC and the nine largest private housing devel-
opers. In the meeting the participants agreed that, in the fourth Five-year Economic
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Development Plan (1977-1981), housing provision was to depend on private develop-
ers. Developers then appealed for their difficulties in purchasing land to be solved. In
Seoul, developers complained, landowners, often of small plots of 100 to 200 pyongs,
demanded much higher prices than what they regarded as normal market prices. This,
developers argued, delayed housing development. They thus demanded the right to
expropriate land (Chosun-Ilbo, August 3 1977).
Two measures were taken to help Designated Developers. The first one was the intro-
duction of a system to develop Apartment Areas by a third party as proxy (Chosun-Ilbo,
October 15, 1977; December 3 1977). In the system, once an area was designated as an
Apartment Area, landowners had to develop the land within a certain time period.
Landowners had to apply for the development work within one year after the
announcement of the development plan and to start work within six months after the
approval for the development work. When landowners failed to do so large housing
developers(9) as well as the KNFIC and local government were entitled to develop
Apartment Areas as proxy developers. Since the development of the areas by
landowners were virtually impossible because of lack of firnds and know-how, this
became a great favour to developers. The amendment of the Housing Construction
Promotion Law (HCPL), approved in the National Assembly in December 1977, in-
cluded this proposal.
The second was a system which allowed Designated Developers to expropriate land for
housing development. When this proposal was submitted to the National Assembly,
however, it was opposed by many members. The late 1970's was the time when the
government was under criticisms for its preferential treatment of large entrepreneurs.
The idea of giving such right to large developers, some of which were growing to Chae-
9) During the 1970's, one of the government's strategies to promote private
housing development was to develop and utilize large private developers
specialised in housing. While giving them incentives in terms of taxation and
finance, the government assumed it could direct the developers to perform
government policy objectives. The obligation to allocate certain portions of
housing for rental or small apartments for low income households are the
examples.
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bols, was criticised as another privilege to large entrepreneurs at the expense of small
landowners (Kim, S.D, 1978).
Assembly members from the ruling and opposition parties compromised to reduce the
suggested legal power of large developers. The Housing Construction Promotion Law
was amended to authorize developers to expropriate land in Apartment Areas only
when the developers had purchased up to two third of the whole land to be developed
(SNA, 1977).
How these systems have since worked will be examined in detail in the following chap-
ters. The following subsection will be limited to an overview of changing economic and
property market situations in the late 1970's, characterized by a radical change in the
government policy towards economic stabilization and subsequent stagnation of the
whole property market.
3.3.3 Economic Stabilization and the Collapse of the Property Market,
1978
As house and land prices rose fast as mentioned in the beginning of the previous subsec-
tion, the government began to tighten its control of the property market. The govern-
ment responded to speculative activities, as before, first by administrative measures: the
investigation of the sources of money paid for new apartments; an increase in the
property transfer tax; a threat to open the names of speculators to the public;
reinforcing surveillance over real estate agents to prevent them bolstering up housing
speculation, practicing fraudulent brokerage and falsiing their account books. The
Ministry of Finance stopped temporarily the provision of housing funds and loans until
housing speculation subsided. However, property speculation continued until late 1978
(ARI, 1989).
The government began then to consider the restriction of private landownership. In June
1978, the Minister of the Economic Planning Board announced that the government
would consider restructuring all the laws concerning land under three principles: to re-
turn the rise in land value to society; to optimize land use; to prevent land speculation.
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The Hyundai Apartment scandal(1 0) broke out in July 1978 accelerating the adoption of
strong measures to control the property market. The scandal raised the resentment of
the public who were already critical of the morality of the government officials and the
upper classes under the Yushin system. Among the Government Departments and in the
National Assembly, a wide range of opinions were suggested and discussed including
the introduction of Landgonggaenium(1 1) Economic Ministers(' 2) on various occa-
sions suggested that the government would have soon to take all necessary measures to
root out speculative activities. In July 1978, President Park proclaimed that he would
take a revolutionary measure to regulate property speculation to clean up the economic
climate (ARI, op. cit.)
After deliberations by the government Departments, the Presidential Secretariat and the
ruling agencies, the Vice Prime Minister announced an unprecedented strong and com-
prehensive measure to control land speculation on August 8 1978. The main points
were: the introduction of a licensing system and a report system of land transactions in
specified areas; the application of the Pegged Land Price System to all urban planning
areas; the introduction of the licensing system for real estate brokerage; the imposition
of heavy taxes on non-business purpose land owned by cooperative bodies; the estab-
lishment of the Real Estate Policy Deliberation Committee, in charge of establishing a
comprehensive policy; the increase in the Property Transfer Income tax (ARI, op. cit.).
This was the August 8 Anti-speculation Measure and known as the most strong anti-
speculation measure.
10) According to the Housing Construction Promotion Law, a developer who built
50 or more houses on a site must have opened the house sale to the public at
that time. If applicants exceeded houses for sale, houses must be distributed
through lottery. The company, however, sold 600 units of apartments to 265
persons including government officials, members of the National Assembly,
journalists and professors. As the market price was nearly twice the selling
prices, the houses were regarded by the public as bribery (Chosun-Ilbo, July 7
and 8 1978).
11) See footnote 1, Chapter 2, p40.
12) Ministers of the government departments which undertake economic affairs are
called Economic Ministers in Korea. Included are the Economic Planning
Board, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the
Ministry of Agriculture and Fishery, the Ministry of Construction and so on.
They form a regular conference for a close inter-departmental corporation in
formulating and implementing economic policies.
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Until the announcement of the measure, due to speculative demand, housing construc-
tion had been rapidly increasing, as shown in figure 3.1. After the August 8 Measure,
the whole property market collapsed, and housing construction began to fall sharply.
The prices of land and apartments fell sharply in Seoul where speculation was most
prevalent. Land and housing transactions also fell sharply. Unsold apartments began to
accumulate (Chosun-Ilbo, October 20 1978). The annual rise in land prices fell sharply.
In 1980 and 1981, it became negative, i.e., land prices fell in real terms (see Figure 2.1,
p37). House prices also fell between 1980 and 1982 (see Figure 1.2, p14).
The August 8 Anti-speculation Measure was not solely for the restoration of the prop-
erty market order. It was part of the changing economic policies towards stabilization.
The collapse of the property market and following long stagnation was due to the sub-
sequent recession of the whole economy. According to Suslina, the Korean economy
was at this stage facing a over-production crisis. Over-production became a problem in
almost all the economic sectors in 1979, resulting in consecutive bankruptcies of small
and medium enterprises. In the late 1978, the government already needed to take a
series of measures to stabilize the economy. They included slowing down of the eco-
nomic growth and a stricter control of credit loans. It was the period when the govern-
ment increasingly found it was unable to control the activities of the whole financial
system. As a major part of capital was outside of government control, the effectiveness
of government finance policies was undermined (Suslina, S., 1988). The tight control of
the property market by the August 8 Measure was an attempt to regulate financial
circulation outside government control.
It has been mentioned in the previous section that the housing development system had
to rely on the unregulated money market as a consequence of the Directed Financial
Policy. The 2.5 Million Housing Construction Plan was formulated as a means of
appeasing popular unrest, but its implementation had to be subordinated to the eco-
nomic situations. The influx of speculative money into the property market helped
housing development to boom in 1977 and 1978. This influx of speculative money also
affected the land market. This began to strain the conflicts between landowners and
developers. The government, in the continuing necessity to expand housing provision
but with the strategy of minimizing the financial burden on itself, intervened in the rela-
116
tion in favour of developers. However, along with the economic crisis and consequent
change in economic policy, the whole property market and housing development boom
came to an end by the end of 1978.
This crisis was followed by a political crisis in 1979 and 1980. The importance of hous-
ing provision for political stability became even more apparent. Housing provision again
became a problem for the government to solve. And the relationship between landown-
ers and developers came to face a new situation. This is what will be examined in the
following section.
3.4 Political Crisis and the Second Long Term Housing Con-
struction Plan, 1979-1986
3.4.1 Change of Regime, Labour Unrest and Low-income Housing Pro-
grammes, 1979-1980
The Yushin reform was a consolidation of a pre-existing authoritarian political system
against the background of a security threat to the Park regime, both from inside and
outside the country. Despite the brutal repression of its political opponents, church and
human rights organizations, and student groups continuously challenged the system
throughout the 1970's. During the 1970's, labour issues grew steadily to become a cen-
tral concern of the dissident movement. Consequently the opposition movement was
increasingly radicalized (Sohn, H. K, 1989).
The economic growth was creating huge pools of labourers working for low wages.
According to an estimate, based on census information and labour survey data, the pro-
portion of manual wage workers employed in production-related occupations increased
from 7 percent in 1960 to 20.6 percent in 1980 (Koo, H., 1987). In Korea, there has
been a tendency within the state elites to view organized labour as dangerous because of
'being easily injected with leftist leaning ideology' (Choi, J.J., 1987: 315). The labour
struggle during the 1970's was not only for inmiediate wages and working conditions
but also for the workers' right to form their own trade unions, other than the officially
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controlled one (AMRC, 1987). Control of labour unions was one of the major task of
the Korea Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), one of the most elaborate, powerful
structures of state machinery (Choi, J. J, op. cit.). Between 1972 and 1977, there were
20 cases of hunger strikes by workers protesting against low wages and bad working
conditions. Workers' occupation of working places and sit-in demonstration on site
were also increasing (AMRC, 1987).
Towards the late 1970's, the government had to give some concessions to the working
class (Suslina, 1988). As seen in the previous section, the government was tightening its
control on the property market. However, the late 1970's was also the period in which
the government was under increasing pressure to expand low income housing provision.
In fact, from the mid- 1970's, the government was showing growing concerns over
housing provision for low-income families including industrial workers. For example, in
July 1977, the government enacted the 'Special Law for National Housing Stabilization'
to increase rental apartment supply for low-income families. The funds were to be
raised through an special excise tax, grants to local governments, national housing
bonds and housing lottery tickets (Chosun-Ilbo, September 20, 1977). In accordance
with the law, the government was planning to construct 15,000 units of rental apart-
ment annually. In previous years, only 5,000 to 7,500 units were annually constructed
for low income rental housing (Chosun-Ilbo, September 23, 1977). These apartments
were one-year rental housing. After one year of rent, they were to be sold to the tenants
because of lack of funds to keep them at cheap rent, since the public agencies in charge
of rental housing had to recover the cost in short period of time to continue the housing
programme (KNHC, 1992c). Yet, these were the main public housing provision to low-
income households at subsidized rent until the early 1980's. The government also began
to provide rental housing for workers in newly developing industrial estates in the
southern coastal area (Chosun-Ilbo, December 10 1978).
The effort to increase the supply of rental housing for low income families was rein-
forced during the period of political turmoil following the assassination of President
Park. The Ministry of Construction (MOC) formulated a plan to build 204,000 units of
permanent rental apartments for 7 years, from 1980 to 1986, with loans from the Asia
Development Bank (Chosun-Ilbo, April 5, 1980). The MOC strongly recommended
large private developers to allocate 10 percent or more of their houses for rental hous-
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ing. However, as the property market had collapsed after the August 8 Measure, all the
plans to expand low-income housing supply could not be realized (Chosun-Ilbo, August
28, 1979). This concern over low-income housing reappeared in the form of another
long-term housing construction plan after the new military government was established
in 1980.
The economic crisis in the late 1970's was followed by a political crisis. The Yushin sys-
tem collapsed along with the assassination of President Park in October 1979. A series
of incidents leading to the assassination started with women workers' fighting against a
factory closure(1 3) When the workers staged a sit-in demonstration at the headquarters
of the opposition party (New Democratic Party), armed police stormed the building
killing one woman. Many opposition politicians as well as workers were arrested. This
happened in August 1979. The opposition leader, Kim, Young-Sam, took the hardest
line. He declared his intention to initiate a movement to overthrow the Park regime.
This was widely supported by opposition groups. (AMRC, 1987).
He was, however, suspended from his party's presidency by the Korea Central Intelli-
gence Agency (KCIA), and subsequently expelled from the National Assembly charged
with the desecration of the state. This expulsion brought about civil riots in the cities in
his home province in October 1979. The government barely managed to repress the
riots after committing paratroopers in the region under a garrison decree. The riot
agitated the public and brought about a split between the director of the KCIA and the
director of the Presidential Security Service over the repression of the opposition
activities. Both had already been engaged in a power struggle against each other. The
collision between the two resulted in the assassination of President Park by the director
of the KCIA (Kang, I.S., 1988). The country came into a power vacuum and soon came
under the influence of army circles as it was placed under martial law. A group of army
generals, headed by the Commander of Military Security, General Chun, was the
emerging new power. They were called the New Military Group, distinguished from
those who took power through the military coup in 1961.
13) In a wig-making factory (YH Industries), some 1,000 women workers were
fighting against factory closure in 1979. When the workers began to form their
own trade union, the owner closed the factory. He transferred all assets to the
United States and disappeared. The workers appealed to the government to
reopen the factory but without success (AMRC, 1987).
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After the assassination of President Park, Prime Minister Choi succeeded to the presi-
dency. Opposition forces in the meantime were urging the interim government to carry
out a constitutional reform. However, the government, under the civilian President Choi
was already losing its power to the New Military Group, who were reluctant to change
the previous authoritarian government system. Dissatisfaction with the interim govern-
ment for its hesitation to carry forward the constitutional reform towards democracy
exploded among students and politicians. In April 1980, tens of thousands of students
occupied the streets of large cities every day.
In May 1980, the military authority arrested leading politicians both in opposition and
ruling parties. Some were accused of illicit wealth accumulation and some of conspiracy
and rebellion. The arrest of Kim, Dae-Joong, one of the most famous dissident under
the Yushin system, brought about a violent civil uprising in Gwangju, the capital of his
native province. This resulted in the May 1980 Gwangju massacre( 14). Opposition
activities were frustrated. Many political opponents were imprisoned. Some politicians
were bullied to withdraw from political life or to give up their assets.
The New Military Group forced the civilian president Choi to establish the National
Defence Emergency Measures Board, a virtual military junta. President Choi was
removed in August 16 1980. General Chun was elected President in September 1980 by
the existing electoral college, which was established by President Park in 1972. The
Board formulated a new constitution, which was not different from the previous one ex-
cept that the presidential term was limited to 7 years to prevent a prolonged one man
rule.
14) A brutal repression by paratroopers of students demonstrations infuriated
people in Gwangju, the capital of one opposition leader's home province.
Students and citizens rose against the government, which was supported by the
Martial Law Command, and seized the whole city on May 18 1980. The rebel
citizens and students, armed with weapons they captured from military camps
and police stations, held the city until May 26, when they were finally defeated
by the Army under the Martial Law. The Martial Law Command announced
that 170 citizens and students were killed and 478 were injured in the battle to
regain the city (Lee, K.W, 1988).
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3.4.2 The Ten-Year Five Million Housing Construction Plan and the
Control of Land Development Gains, 1981
During the period of power vacuum in 1980, the labour situation became chaotic. The
number of labour disputes sky-rocketed. A miners' uprising in a small mining town,
Sabuk, in January 1980, was an example showing the labour situation. The miners took
control of the town and mines. The uprising could be subdued only through a harsh
military operation (AMRC, 1987). Such social unrest by the workers and lower income
strata was the background in which a new long term housing construction plan was for-
mulated(' 5)
In August 1980, the Legislative Council of the National Defence Emergency Measures
Board superintended the formulation of a plan for public housing construction and land
development to solve the urban housing shortage problem. It aimed to enhance the
housing supply ratio to 90 percent from the then 77 percent by constructing 5 million
houses from 1981 to 1991 (MOC, 1987). In a briefing by the Minister of Construction
at the Presidential official residence in September 1980, President Chun ordered the
construction of 5 million houses over the following ten years to improve the housing
situation in a revolutionary way. The 5 million meant the equivalent to the then total
housing stock of the country.
One of the most significant measures to support the plan was the enactment of the Resi-
dential Land Development Promotion Law (RLDPL). As we shall see later, it provided
the legal basis for Public Purchase and Development (PPD). The Korea Land Develop-
ment Corporation (KLDC), established in January 1979, was used as a specialized
agency to develop land for the plan. It was given the authority to expropriate land for
housing and priority rights over non-business purpose land. It could also preempt idle
land held by individuals and corporations. Land acquired by the KLDC was to be pro-
vided for collective housing development.
15) The KNI-IC staff were given a lecture explaining the purpose of the plan. In the
lecture, it was told that intelligence agencies had reported that if North Korea
invaded again, a good one fifth of Seoul inhabitants, the lowest income strata,
would side with the enemy. It was explained that the plan was one of the
measures to soothe the frustrations of the low-income strata about their poor
living conditions.
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In this process of reorganizing laws and regulations concerning housing provision, a
radical change in land development methods for housing was made. The Land Read-
justment Project began to be replaced by a new development system.
3.4.2.1 Public Purchase and Development System
Towards the late 1970's, the government began to take measures to obtain land for low
income housing in the LRP areas. In February 1978, the MOC instructed local govern-
ments to allocate all compensation land in the LRP projects for apartment development
except those for public use (Chosun-Ilbo, February 8 1978). It instructed the Korea
Land Development Corporation (KLDC) to carry out the LRP as proxy for local gov-
ernment and made it obligatory to reserve 50 percent of compensation land for low-in-
come housing development. Most local governments so far sold off compensation land
in small plots to individuals. Particularly, local government with very poor financial
capabilities sold these off even before the projects were completed. Most local govern-
ments sold compensation land through public sale (auction) resulting in even higher land
prices (Chosun-Ilbo, May 4, 1980). The government later ordered local governments to
develop land for housing by other methods than the LRP to avoid a sharp rise in land
prices.
The New Military Group inherited from the Park regime high inflation, a deepening
trade deficit due to a slump of exports and enterprises with weakened competitiveness
due to excessive investment in heavy and chemical plants. The new government was
strongly advised by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD) on the structural readjustment of the economy. The IBRD criticised the former
president Park's Heavy and Chemical Industrial (HCI) development plan for its in-
efficiency. It recommended the new government to take new measures to remedy the
distorted economic system as conditions for its loans; the recommendation included the
reorganization of the HCIs, opening up the domestic market to international
competition and a freeze of wages (Suslina, S., 1988). Tight monetary control, reduced
government budget, price stabilization, the tight control of wages, the improvement of
international competitiveness and the reduction in foreign debts, became the prime
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objectives of economic policy (Kim, Y.H. et al, 1989; Uhm, J.D., 1992; Lee, H., 1991).
In this policy situation, the LRP could not be active while a large scale land
development was required to support the new Housing Construction Plan.
Thus the LRP was declared inappropriate for the implementation of the Five-Million
Housing Construction Plan. To back-up the plan, 'a revolutionary way of land develop-
ment' was necessary (Chosun-Ilbo, October 3 1980). A draft of the Residential Land
Development Promotion Law (RLDPL) was prepared in December, 1980 (Chosun-
Ilbo, December 6, 1980). In the new system, housing land was to be provided largely
through re-zoning of agricultural land into residential land. On the authority of the
RLDPL, the government designates a certain area for residential development and then
purchases the land by force at prices assessed by a public agency. The determination of
the price is based on the price of the existing use. Land price is to be assessed by au-
thorized agencies according to the base price, to which the normal rise is to be added.
The normal rise is calculated from rise in consumers prices and average price rise in land
in the area. When landowners do not comply with the assessed price, the land can be
expropriated in accordance with the RLDPL and the Land Expropriation Law (Chosun-
Ilbo, April 15 1981). Development plans are formulated by public institutions such as
the Korea Land Development Corporation, the Korea National Housing Corporation
and local government. After development, the lots are sold to both public and private
housing developers or directly built by the KNIL-IC or local governments.
This development method is formally named the Residential Land Development Project
on Designated Area (RLDPDA). It is commonly called the Public Purchase and Develo-
pment (PPD) in that in this method, public developers purchase the whole land and then
develop it. This is compared with the LRP, in which public developers develop land
without buying it from landowners beforehand.
Thus PPD began to replace the LRP. The PPD means direct control by the government
of land price for housing; so the determination of the land price for housing became
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increasingly a political issue. Since the Farm Land Reform( 16) in 1949, there have been
no distinctive landlord class in Korea. This means that there has been neither a concept
of class nor an organization representing landowners. There have been of course land-
owners. They have fought for their own right individually on a one to one basis. The
regulation of land prices thus could be carried out without any organized resistance
from landowners. Landowners could not stand against the authoritarian regimes during
the 1970's and early 1980's, except for protesting against land expropriation on sites.
The political change in 1987, however, brought about certain changes in such a strong
state and weak landowners relation in housing development. This will be discussed in
the next section. While the PPD means direct control of land rent to landowners, new
house price control means the control of development gains.
3.4.2.2 The Control of New House Prices, 1981
Price control first applied to public housing. However, it began to apply to private
housing built in accordance with the Housing Construction Promotion Law (HCPL) in
Seoul in 1977 when rising new house prices became an issue. Public criticisms on the
profiteering by apartment developers began in the beginning of 1977. The Seoul city
government announced that the selling prices of private apartments were higher than
those of apartments built by Seoul city government by 80 to 100 percent, those of the
Korea National Housing Corporation (KNHC) apartments by 40 percent and those
assessed by the Korea Appraisal Board by 100 to 150 percent in April 1977. Thus it an-
nounced its plan to control such profiteering through administrative guidances and to
consider setting a price ceiling, in accordance with the Price Stabilization and Fair Trade
Law (Kyounghyang-Shinmoon, April 22 1977).
16) The Farm Land Reform was carried out in 1950 after a long struggle between
peasants and the landlords class. The Farm Land Reform Act, enacted in
February 1951, in the first place, outlawed tenancy in agriculture and land was
distributed to tillers with an upper limit of three hectares for each households.
Former tenants were to pay for their land 1.5 times the nominal annual out put
of the main crop, payable over five years to the government. Landlords were to
receive the equivalent in government bonds. Since the government was not able
to redeem bonds, the market price of the bonds fell and often sold for almost
nothing (Hamilton, C., 1986).
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According to the HCPL at that time, housing development plans which built more than
50 houses at a time on a site had to be approved and supervised by the Minister of Con-
struction or the Heads of municipalities. Not only physical plans but the plans for hous-
ing sales, including prices, must be approved. Developers were to submit data to justify
their price determination, including land cost and construction cost.
Views on price control were different according to government departments. The gap
between controlled selling prices and market prices widened up to half of the original
prices in 1977. This was believed due to the imbalance between housing demand and
supply. The Ministry of Construction (MOC) considered abolishing the price approval
system to promote housing construction (Chosun-Ilbo, August 13 1977).
The late 1970's was, however, also the period when the government had to keep basic
prices low in order to reduce inflationary pressure on wages (Suslina, S., 1988).
Between April and October in 1977, prices rose by 30 to 60 percent. The Economic
Planning Board (EPB) warned that the rapid rise in house prices stimulated inflation
and, in a situation in which the prices of most manufactured goods were under regula-
tion, apartment prices could not be left unregulated. The MOC minister followed by
claiming that it would consider applying the standard construction cost used for national
housing to the private housing sector (Dong-A-Ilbo, October 11977).
Developers were under increasing public criticism. In early 1978, selling prices were
around 480,000 won/pyong. In May it was 500,000 won/pyong and in July it went up
to 700,000 won/pyong. A common criticism was that developers profiteered too much
with the various favours given to them in accordance with the Housing Construction
Promotion Law. They payed only 10 percent of VAT and a special corporate tax (25
percent of capital gain from the transfer of apartments) when they sold completed
apartments. If the apartments were small, with less than 25.7 pyong in floor space, even
the VAT was exempted. When they built housing on the corporation's own land, the
transfer tax was also exempted. Further, corporate tax was determined on the basis of
assessed land prices at the time of apartment sale rather than the prices they actually
paid. With all these favours, developers appropriated excessive profits from the people,
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as the authority approved their selling plans without checking the actual development
costs (Chosun-Ilbo, August 10, 1978).
Hence a dilemma for the government: in order to promote housing development, price
liberalization was preferred; however, there was also a concern over the negative effects
of the liberalization on prices in general. This became again a policy issue in 1981, when
the Ten-Year Five Million Housing Construction Plan was launched. The government
attempted to promote housing development both to stimulate the economy and to sup-
port the Five Million Housing Construction Plan in 1981. The Seoul city government
eliminated price control for housing with 85m2
 or more of floor space in May 1981.
The selling prices of new apartments immediately began to rise very rapidly. The price,
hitherto kept under 1,000,000 Won/pyong (see Figure 4.4 in p185 and 4.6 in p207),
went up to 1,380,000 Won/pyong in only a few months in Seoul (Chosun-Ilbo, Decem-
ber 13 1981). As there were a flood of applicants for the apartments despite the
increased price, all other developers began to raise new house prices. This stimulated
the prices of existing houses too. The sharp rises and falls in prices in the housing
market had been of common occurrence since the early 1970's. However, this was the
time when the government put the first priority in economic policy into price sta-
bilization. This rise in house prices also raised public criticism of housing developers for
their excessive profiteering. The Korea Housing Association (a society of large housing
developers) apologised for the rise and promised to regulate the prices for themselves.
After this event, the Seoul city government set up a price ceiling at 1,340,000
won/pyong, and the Price Ceiling System replaced the approval system (Chosun-Ilbo,
January 28 and 29 1983). These control systems remained almost unchanged until 1989.
3.4.3 Stabilization-first Economic Policy and Housing Development
1981-1986
The freezing of the government budget and tight monetary policy made it difficult to
implement the 5 Million Housing Construction Plan. In the early 1980's, the government
was trying to revitalize housing activities and the economy. Thus it relaxed regulations
on the property and housing market. In 1981 and 1982, the government suspended the
investigation of sources of finds invested in property transaction and discontinued the
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monitoring of speculative activities in specified areas. Interest rates were cut. The real
estate transfer tax was reduced. However, except in a few areas in Seoul, the housing
market remained in stagnation. Developers were suffering from accumulating unsold
apartments in provincial cities (KHAB, each month 1981 and 1982). These measures to
promote housing development and economic activities were, however, limited ones.
This could be seen in the government response to the temporary property boom in
1983. However, the first priority was given to stabilization rather than to expansionary
economic growth. Thus when there were signs of a property boom in 1983, the govern-
ment was quick to respond to it.
Towards late 1982, there were signs of housing and land speculation. Housing prices
were rapidly rising (see Figure 1.2, p14). Beginning in 1983, the prices of housing land,
and forest land in the outskirts of Seoul and provincial cities, began to rise rapidly. The
govenmient announced 'comprehensive measures to deal with the land and housing
problem' on April 18 1983. These became known as the April 18 Measure (K}-IAB,
August 1988). Regulations of the housing market were strengthened. It increased
supervision on speculative activities. It strengthened the investigations of illegal resale
of new apartments, the source of the money paid to purchase new apartments and the
real estate agencies, checking their involvement in illegal housing transactions. The
housing market again came to stagnation which continued until the mid-1980's. Housing
development had to yield to economic stability policy.
In consequence, the plan had to be revised several times. A revised plan to build
1,460,000 units until 1986 became again impossible. According to the plan, for exam-
ple, the country had to build more than 340,000 units every year from 1984. Yet, due to
the lack of financial support from the government the amount planned in 1984 was
reduced to 290,000 units. Even this reduced amount turned out to be unrealistic. The
MOC demanded 50 billion wons (44 billion wons in 1983) for housing construction.
The demand was dismissed by the Economic Planning Board (EPB) due to the budget-
freeze (Choongang-Ilbo, August 27 1983). Between 1982 and 1986, the target was
finally reduced to 1,431,000 units but actually 1,166,819 houses were built. Private
sector housing development was particularly poor compared to 1970's (see Figure 3.2)
despite the policies to promote housing development as a means to activate economic
activities.
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The contradiction between the increasing political necessity to promote housing develo-
pment and the financial constraint in housing became acute. This resulted in more direct
involvement of the government in housing development, that is, the increasing replace-
ment of the Land Development Project (LRP) by the Public Purchase and Development
(PPD). This means the increasing politicisation of the distribution of development
gains among actors in housing development. In the early 1980's and the mid-1980's,
when the property market had remained depressed due to the retrenchment economic
policies, the conflict associated with such politicisation did not come into the open. This
began to change in the late 1980's, when democratization and the property boom came
together. The following section examines the situation in the late 1980's.
3.5 Democratization and Rent Relation( 17), 1987-1990
3.5.1 Change of Regime and the Third Long Term Housing Construc-
tion Plan, 1987-1988
Since the Gwangju massacre, in May 1980, the opposition activities disintegrated. Stu-
dent activists and some radical dissidents went underground. They became increasingly
sophisticated in terms of ideology and organization. They were mostly guided by a
'concoction of Marxism and nationalism' (Lee, H., 1990: 7). It was in this period that
the nature of the Korean social formation was debated intensively among groups of stu-
dents and young scholars. The student movement was broadly divided into two camps:
National Liberation Movement (NL) and People's Democratic Revolution (PD). The
NL, the mainstream camp, defined the Korean society as a 'colonial semi-capitalist
society'. It argued that the Korean society had been subordinated to the U.S both politi-
cally and economically. Thus it called for a struggle for national liberation from U.S
imperialism. Their prime objective was to establish an independent and unified national
government. The PD defined the nature of Korean society as 'new colonial state
17) Rent relation here is defined as the relation between landowners and
developers, mediated through social institution, in the creation and appropria-
tion of development gains.
128
monopoly capitalism'. It argued that although Korea had been subordinated to the U.S
and Japanese capitalism, it had developed its own monopoly capitalism to a certain de-
gree. To them, the monopoly capital and its patron, the fascist regime, rather than for-
eign imperialist forces, were the first objects to be overthrown. (Kwon, H. C, 1990;
Lee, J.H, 1990).
Nevertheless, they broadly shared a common premise: that Minjung' (connoting
oppressed people) must be the central force for social change. To help them to organize
and be conscious of what to struggle for, became a major objective of the student
movement. Many students, either leaving school by their own will or expelled from
universities, went to work in factories to help organise the labour movement. They were
also increasingly involved in the struggle of urban squatters. The student movement
aimed not just at a 'liberal democracy', a traditional objective of opposition movements,
but to change the whole social system into a socialist one. Their increasing involvement
in the labour movement and the urban poors' struggles alerted the government ministers
to a possible revolution. This influenced the government to attempt economic reform in
the late 1980's.
The radicalism of the students was not filly supported by the public nor by the tradi-
tional 'liberal democratic' opposition groups. However, the unpopularity of President
Chun provided a common ground on which different social movements allied in an
opposition coalition. The death under torture of a student in January 1987, was an inci-
dent which reunited the divided opposition movements. It led to rallies and demonstra-
tions urging immediate constitutional reform in which not only students, dissident relig-
ious and human right groups and politicians participated but it also included
independent civilian protesters (AMRC, 1987).
Opposition groups were united in demanding constitutional reforms toward a more
democratic political system involving direct presidential election, free trade unions and
local autonomy. Faced with the increasing pressure to reform the constitution at nearly
the end of his presidential term, President Chun reluctantly agreed to consider the
reform if the ruling and opposition party jointly proposed a new plan. He imposed a
moratorium on constitutional debates on popular presidential election until after his
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term of office expired, in February 1988(18). President Chun's announcement to
postpone constitutional reforms, in April 1987, became a crucial moment leading to the
collapse of the old ruling system. In June 1987, the ruling party nominated its
presidential candidate to be elected by the existing electoral college. The nomination
brought about demonstrations demanding the cancellation of the nomination and to
reform the constitution. During the three weeks following the nomination, popular
resistance was intensified. Anti-government demonstration spread across the nation.
President Chun prepared to declare martial law against the protest. This option was
opposed by some field commanders and also by the United State government (Dong,
W.M., 1988; Ahn, B.Y., 1988; Lee, M. W, 1990).
The government finally surrendered to the demands of opposition forces and a compre-
hensive revision of the constitution was carried out. The power of the President was
reduced: The direct presidential election, abolished in 1972, and the local autonomy sys-
tem, suspended in 1962, were restored. The National Assembly was given the authority
to inspect the government offices. Press censorship was abolished. Regulations on the
publication of papers and magazines and journals were removed. Free trade union
movement was ensured.
Following the concessions announced in the Democratization Declaration on June 29,
1987, the workers' movement began to develop rapidly. Supported by the student activ-
ists, the labour movement had been well organized since the first half of the 1980's.
Political struggles oriented and developed consequently They occasionally rallied for the
overthrow of the regime and the change of the social system. In 1987, from January to
September, there were 3,334 cases of labour disputes, of which 3,311 took place after
the June 29 Democratization Declaration. The wave of labour disputes began in the
heavy and chemical industrial estates in the South East coastal areas in July and August
in 1987. Then it spread to light industries in the central area by the end of August in the
same year (Kim, K. 5, 1988b).
18) The ruling party was proposing a parliamentary system in which President Chun
could exert a great influence as the party leader, after his retirement of the
presidency. This was, however, rejected by the opposition leaders and was not
adopted (Kim, S.H, 1992).
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As seen in the examination of political circumstances in 1972 and 1980 in which the
previous two long term housing construction plans were formulated, the establishment
of the country had come to understand that in times of political crisis housing provides
certain stability and acts as a deterrent to social unrest. This time too, housing provision
became a political issue. In the presidential election campaign in December 1987, the
candidate of the ruling party, Rho, pledged to build four million units of housing during
his presidential term of six years if he were elected. Included in the plan was the con-
struction of 300,000 units of rental housing for low-income people (Choi, J.W., 1988).
However, when Rho won the election and took office, the plan was reduced to a much
more modest one. The Two Million Housing Construction Plan was thus formulated.
The implementation of the construction plan was to rely on private finds as before. Of
64,283 billion won (94 billion dollars) of total estimated expenses, 67.7 percent was to
be met by lump-sum payments by the house buyers; the remaining 22.3 percent was to
be financed loans from the National Housing Funds and the Korea Housing Bank
Housing Funds. 57 million pyongs of land were needed for the implementation of the
plan. Out of that, 35 million pyongs, for large housing estates, were to be developed by
the method of Public Purchase and Development (PPD) mentioned in Subsection
3.4.2.1. All the land development, all the development expenses were to be paid from
development gains (KNHC, 1989). There was no change in the self-financing housing
development system for this 2 Million Housing Construction Plan. This means that the
plan again has to be dependent upon speculative investment. Thanks to the property
boom in the late 1980's and the construction boom in 1990 that will be examined in the
next subsection, the target was achieved by 1991 one year before that originally
planned. However, the property and construction boom opened up a new phase of
conflicts associated with the rent relation.
3.5.2 Property Boom and Political Unrest, 1988-1990
After a slow-down in the economy in 1984 and 1985, the GNP growth rate picked up
again in 1986. In that year, the GNP grew by 12.2 percent. Exports grew by 28.1 per-
cent due to the so called 'three lows': low oil prices, low raw material prices in the in-
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ternational market and under-valued Won against the dollar. The balance of payments
for the first time turned to surplus (FlU, 1987a). In 1987, despite intensifying labour
disputes, the economy was in a booming stage. The GNP grew by 12 percent and the
trade balance exceeded 10 billion dollars in 1988 (Uhm, J.D., 1992).
Along with the trade surplus and the consequent monetary expansion, the property
boom revived. Land prices rose by 14.7 percent in 1987, the largest rise since the
property boom in 1983. In the summer of 1988, prices of real estate began to rise rap-
idly. In 1988 and 1989 land prices in large cities rose by 30 percent annually (see Figure
1.2, p14 and Figure 2.1, pY7). House prices also rose rapidly, as shown in Figure 1.2.
The government adopted anti-speculation measures. In a briefing to the President on the
recent economic situations on August 10 1988, the Vice Premier suggested a series of
measures to root out property speculation. This is known as the August 10 Anti-specu-
lation Measure. Included were: the control of the increase in total money supply; the ex-
tension of specific areas under speculation surveillance; the imposition of heavy
property transfer tax; the strengthening of tax investigation on speculators and real
estate agencies; and finally, the introduction of Landgonggaenium (KHAB, September
1988).
Due to the anti-speculation measures taken on August 10 1988, property transactions
temporarily declined, and the rise in land and house prices slackened (KHAB, December
1988). These measures discouraged private housing development. Views were not con-
fident among developers and experts on the possibility of achieving the Two Million
Housing construction Plan goals (KHAB, October 1988).
Housing and land prices were not the only problems. As mentioned before, the increas-
ing involvement of the ideologically motivated students and activists raised a sense of
crisis among the government ministers. It was the time when tenants' struggles in
squatter areas and industrial workers' demands for the rising housing cost to be ac-
counted in their wages began to attract public concern. The tenants struggle in squatter
areas against the redevelopment projects were increasingly organized and intensified.
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Since the Mockdong case in 1984 and the Ssanggye Dong case in 1986(19), the tenants'
struggles had been joined by students and human right organizations. Political parties,
government agencies and human right groups competed to hold public meetings and
conferences to debate low income housing and to criticise the government policies in
1988. Industrial disputes were reaching a peak in December 1988 and January 1989,
when thousands of workers occupying heavy machinery and plant clashed against riot
police forces in Hyundai Heavy Industry and Daewoo Shipyard (Uhm, J.D., 1992).
Wealth distribution and social welfare emerged as major political and economic issues
for the government.
The new team of Economic Ministers, newly appointed in the cabinet reshuffle in
December 1988, put emphasis on 'a stable economy, the improvement of social welfare
and structural adjustment' rather than growth maximization. (Lee, H., 1991). Economic
Ministers raised four issues for the stabilization of economic reform in December 1988:
the reform of the land system through the introduction of Landgonggaenium; the
enforcement of the Real Name Banking System(20), the reformulation of the economic
system to foster the small-medium size firms and to control the further concentration of
economic power into the Chaebols; and the reform of the tax system in such a way to
impose heavier taxes on asset-based earnings while to reduce that on wage earnings.
The medical insurance system, the citizens welfare pension system and the minimum
wage system were introduced against this background (Uhm, J.D., op. cit.).
Regarding housing the government adopted a series of policy measures to increase low-
income housing while controlling the rise in house prices. In April 1989, the
government revised the Five-year Housing Construction Plan to increase the allocation
19) These are the areas where the struggle by tenants against squatter redevel-
opment, for the first time, was joined by the students and anti-establishment
organizations and gained some concessions from the governments. See Chapter
6.
20) In Korea it has been common practice for rich people to have accounts in
psuedonyms instead of real names. It was used as a way to evade taxes such as
income, inheritance or donation tax. Not only that, psuedonym accounts were
widely used as a means to conceal illicitly earned money such as bribery. Since
1980, it became an issue to eradicate such pratices as public opinion was
aroused.
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of low-income housing. 900,000 units out of the two million were converted to low-
income housing. Of this 250,000 of the Permanent Rental Housing were allocated for
the lowest income urban households, for the first time; 250,000 units were planned for
industrial workers at subsidized rents and prices (Lee, D.S., 1990).
Secondly, the government had to take a radical measure to increase housing supply to
stabilize the fast rising house prices mentioned in Chapter 1. It is on this background
that the government announced the development of two New Towns in the outskirts of
Seoul in April 1989. The two New Towns, Ilsan and Bundang, were planned to accom-
modate 100,000 and 200,000 people respectively. These were in addition to three New
Towns which were already under construction. The two new towns were to be built by
1992 (MOC, 1989).
However, many experts doubted whether the goal of the two Million Housing Plan
could be achieved by these measures under the Stabilization First Economic Policy and
strong anti-speculation policies. However, new events led a change of economic policy
towards an expansionaiy one which promoted both economic and property booms.
As it happened, the Economic Ministers, who advocated the stabilization policy, came
to face a stubborn resistance from the Chaebols, who were persistently demanding that
government take measures to stimulate the growth of economic activities. They were
demanding cuts in interest rates, relaxation of the tight money policy and devaluation of
the Won. The economic ministers persisted in their view that for a stable and balanced
growth it was not yet the time to accept such demands. Thus conflict between the Chae-
bols and the government deepened. The Chaebols also opposed the idea of Landgong-
gaenium and the Real Name Banking System, which, they argued, would discourage
economic activities (Uhm, J.D., op. cit.).
Economic growth began to show signs of slowing down in 1989. The growth of GNP
fell from 12.4 percent in 1988 to 6.8 percent in 1989. The trade balance sharply
decreased to 900 million dollars from 11.5 billion in 1988. Entrepreneurs began to
attack openly the tight monetary control by the government. Even the ruling Party put a
brake on government policies. This economic situation made it difficult for the Eco-
nomic Ministers to proceed with their plan to readjust the economic system (Ibid).
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Under the increasing pressure of the ruling party politicians and Chaebols, in March
1990, the Economic Ministers were replaced with those who advocated 'the growth
first policy'. The new team adopted measures to promote economic growth. Debates on
the Real Name Banking System was suspended. A financial aid of additional 1,000
billion won for special plant/equipment funds was released. Restrictions on credit for
investment in equipment were removed (Lee, H., 1992). Along with this expansionary
policy, the economy grew fast.
The GNP grew by 9 percent in 1990. The new Economic Planning Board (EPB) Minis-
ter argued that the alleviation of the shortage of infrastructure must be the first priority
in economic policy. Consequently, the government began to expand public works (Ibid).
Along with the development of New Towns in the capital region, large scale public
works led to the unprecedented construction boom in 1990. Between 1988 and 1991,
2,140,000 houses were constructed. Out of that 1,430,000 units were built by private
developers (Yang, G.M., 1992). However, as was the case in the late 1970's, such
boom was accompanied by an increasing conflict between landowners and developers in
housing development. But it took place in different forms.
3.5.3 The Government in Social Conflict over Land and Housing
Now it is possible to summarize the current political economic situation in the late
1980's resulting from the historical process examined so far. The introduction of
Landgonggaenium and the enforcement to sell non-business land opened up a conflict
between the state and landed interests in general. In the New Town development, con-
flict over the price control and land rent control between landowners, developers and
the state entered into a new phase. A change in the power relation between the state
and landowners brought the PPD to a crisis. Price ceiling was replaced by a new form
of price control.
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3.5.3.1 The Government and Large Firms
The price boom in 1988 and 1989 raised a sense of crisis within the ruling elites. The
then presidential chief economic Secretary warned: 'the endemic unjust economic prac-
tices deepened during the past 30 years of economic growth are worse than what is
commonly known to us. Thus unless problems of the widening gap in wealth between
the rich and the poor, between regions, between classes, between the urban and the
rural are corrected, we may meet a much more disastrous situation that we have ever
experienced in the past' (Uhm, J.D., op. cit: 335).
President Rho, T.W., in his policy statement for 1990, proclaimed that the first priority
would be given to building a fair society in terms of wealth distribution. In a State
Council meeting superintended by the President, it was agreed that without control of
'nation-ruinous' property speculation, it would be not possible to govern the country
(Thid: 151). One of the major steps was the introduction of Landgonggaenium: the
implementation of institutional reform to embody the concept of land as public property
and tax reform to remedy inequalities in the distribution of wealth by stamping Out
property speculation and by properly taxing profits derived from land holdings and
financial assets (Rho, T.W., 1990).
Although the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI) and some politicians opposed the
Landgonggaenium, the Economic Ministers succeeded in having the bills legislated
though not without a degree of compromise (Uhm, J.D., op. cit.). The bill involve three
laws: the Law Regarding the Ceiling on Land Holding for Housing, the Law Regarding
Social Possession of Land Development Gains and the Excessive Capital Gains Tax for
Land. At the same time, the conflict between the government and enterprises intensified
over the possession of non-business land.
The practice of large firms to invest in land began in the late 1960's. Since then the gov-
ernment has put pressure on large firms not to invest in property for speculative pur-
pose, as shown in the May 29 Measure in 1974, the August 8 measure in 1978 and the
September 27 Measure in 1980. The government again forced entrepreneurs to dispose
of real estates they possessed for non-business use in May 1990 (known as May 8
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Measures, Choi, C. K, 1991). Some described this as 'a declaration of war against
Chaebols by the President' (Uhm, J.D., op. cit: 337).
As of the time of survey for this research, April 1992, the tension between the govern-
ment and large entrepreneurs was at its height. The Chairman of Hyundai Group organ-
ized its own opposition political party and became a candidate for Presidency. After his
dismal defeat in the presidential election in December 1992, however, large entrepre-
neurs seems to have been cautious in cultivating a new relationship with the new Presi-
dent who had long been an opposition leader.
3.5.3.2 The Government and Housing Developers
Housing developers have also been under a strict regulation for their land banking and
have become liable to development taxes. Thus the legislation of the Landgonggaenium
and the control of the enterprises' possession of real property have certain effects on
housing development. These will be examined in some detail in Chapter 5.
The price ceiling system was maintained despite the occasional calls from developers for
liberalization. In the late 1980's, when the attainment of the Two Million Housing was
at stake, the issue of price control was raised again within the MOC. In 1987, various
suggestions were raised on the necessity to abolish price controls or, alternatively, for a
considerable increase in the price ceiling (See Hankookkyongje-Shinmoon, April 5
1987, Mailkyongje-Shinmoon, October 20, 1987, Hankook-Ilbo, October 21, 1987;
Dong-A-Ilbo, January 5, 1988; Dong-A-Ilbo, January, 13 1988; Choongang-Ilbo, Janu-
ary 1, 1988). Minister of MOC announced that he was considering liberalizing prices in
December 1987. Immediately after his announcement, prices of existing apartments in
Southern Seoul, began to rise rapidly. In the southern part of Seoul, apartment prices
rose by 25 to 40 percent in a month. This alarmed the Economic Planning Board (EPB),
whose first priority was price stabilization. The EPB Minister immediately denied the
announcement (Seoulkyongje-Shinmoon, February 19 1989).
At the same time the ruling party politicians, some of whom were entrepreneurs in the
construction business, were pressing the government to abolish price control. The
Korea Housing Association (KHA), a large housing developers association, was also
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appealing to the president to liberalize prices, threatening the possible failure of the Two
Million Housing Construction Plan. In October 1989, the government finally decided to
reconsider the Price Ceiling System (Seoul-Shinmoon, February 12 1989; Hankook-
Ilbo, February 12; Chosun-Ilbo, February 1989; Chosun-Ilbo, March 23, 1989).
In 1989, when it started the development of New Towns around Seoul, the government
could not provide land at prices at which private developers could build housing for
profit under the old Price Ceiling. Afler some controversies between developers and the
government, and between government departments, price control was transformed into
a new form in 1989: 'the Factor Cost Linking System'. Under the new system, prices of
new houses built under the Housing Construction Promotion Law are to be assessed
and approved by the government based on land cost and the standard construction cost.
Land costs are to be assessed by the government every time the developers are selling
new houses and the standard construction cost are to be announced by the government
publicly every year. (Mailkyongje-Shinmoon, October 7 and 14 1989; Chosun-Ilbo,
October 14 1989; Hankookkyongje-Shinmoon, October 14 1989; Seoulkyongje-Shin-
moon, October 25 1989; Kyounghyang-Shinmoon, October 25 & 31 1989; Chosun-
Ilbo, October 28 and November, 5 1989; Dong-A-Ilbo, November 4 1989).
New conflicts arose between developers and the government over the Standard Con-
struction Cost and the assessment of land prices in 1990. The issue of liberalization was
raised again in 1990, but opposed by social organizations such as the Citizens Federa-
tion for Economic Justice (CFEJ) and the Federation of Korea Trade Union (FKTU).
They criticised the liberalization plan as giving too much favour to private developers.
The Economic Planning Board (EPB) also opposed the liberalization idea because of its
price stabilization first policy (Hankookkyongje-Shinmoon, April 2 1990; Chosun-Ilbo,
April 28 1990; Mailkyongje-Shinmoon, May 19 1990).
Controversies over the Standard Construction Cost were intensified in late 1990 when
wages and material costs rose rapidly due to the overheated construction boom. The
government was troubled by the frequent demand for increase in the standard cost. The
assessment of land prices became another source of conflict as developers had to pay
development gains according to that assessment (Mailkyongje-Shinmoon, May 19;
Mailkyongje-Shinmoon, November 7; Choongangkyongje-Shinmoon, November 7
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1990; Mailkyongje-Shinmoon, October 18 1990; Hankookkyongje-Shinmoon, January
6 1991; Seoulkyongje-Shinmoon, January 6 1991).
What frustrated developers the most was the control by the government of the amount
of houses to be built in 1991 as a measure to stabilize the economy. In the latter half of
1990 the economy overheated due to the increase in domestic demand. The export and
trade balance began to fall sharply. Housing developers suffered a severe labour short-
age. They had to import building materials from abroad contributing to aggravate the
trade deficit. In 1991, the government began to take active measures to control con-
struction activities. In May, in the cities where new apartment sales were falling, the
start of new apartment construction was suspended until the end of the year. In Septem-
ber, the redevelopment and rebuilding of existing houses and multi-family housing and
multi-household housing was all suspended until June 1992. Later in the same month,
September, the government reallocated the amount of housing to be constructed by the
end of 1991, and instructed local governments to suspend approval of new housing de-
velopment plans. In February 1992, the government restricted the amount of housing
construction at the level of 500,000 units (Yang, G.M., 1992). At the time of an inter-
view for this research with a director of a department of the Korea Housing Association
(the society of Designated Developers), representatives from large developers were
having difficulty distributing their portion of housing construction among themselves.
The interviewee said: 'Large developers have increased staff for housing develop-
ment in cooperation with the Two Million Housing Construction Plan and have
paid some 22,000 billion won (2.8 billion dollars) for land in the PPD areas in
advance. Developers are now hardest hit by the restriction of the quantity of
housing construction' (interviewee, G). Thus most large developers were planning to
expand business in public works such as the construction of express ways and harbour
construction works while reducing housing development (Hankookkyongje-Shinmoon,
January 1992).
3.5.3.3 The Government and Landowners
There have always been conflicts in Korea between landowners and the government
when housing land was expropriated. During the 1970's and the first half of the 1980's,
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the conflicts were between a strong government and weak landowners. However, in the
two New Town developments the government had to meet strong resistance from land-
owners. Students, human rights organizations and opposition politicians were involved.
The government had to provide the landowners with compensation such as priorities in
buying commercial land in addition to land prices. Landowners in other areas began to
demand land prices and compensation at higher levels than that in the New Towns. In
many cases landowners even preferred their land to be expropriated. The PPD no longer
necessarily means the provision of cheaper land for housing than the market. This will
be examined in Chapter 6 in detail.
Thus political democratization has increasingly opened; social conflicts associated with
land and housing and disclosed the inability of the government to mediate them: the
conflict between individual enterprises and the interest of social capital represented by
the government over non-productive use of capital; that between housing developers
and people over price control; and that between landowners and developers over the
control of land prices. The changing forms and effects of the government intervention to
mediate the realtion between landowners and developers, the main concern of this
thesis, must be understood in this context.
3.6 Conclusion
The task of this Chapter in the empirical test of the main hypothesis of this thesis was to
identift how the social relations responding to the conflicting interaction between land-
owners and developers have been historically conditioned resulting in rising land cost
for housing. For this, this Chapter examined first the historical political and economic
circumstances which have dictated the government to increasingly intervene, without
making financial contributions, to regulate the conflict between landowners and
developers, and then the way in which policies on housing and land development have
been affected by that conflict.
Successive governments in Korea have dealt with two conflicting necessities: the politi-
cal necessity to expand housing provision and the economic necessity to save financial
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resources on consumption including housing. The government has been obliged to pay
attention to housing provision because of the necessity to appease popular unrest. This
has been evidenced in the examination of the historical background of the long term
housing construction plans in 1972, in 1980 and in 1988.
Housing development has, however, had to rely on private funds; and housing develop-
ment was to be carried out by self-financing. These have been invariant element in gov-
ernment policies for housing development.
It has been identified that two historical events were responsible for such self-financing
housing development system. The first was the strong state and weak labour relation. It
was formed about the time of the Korean war and was sustained by the successive sei-
zure by the army of the centre of power. The second was the subordination of finance
capital to industrial development. This was established in the early 1960's when the first
military government took power.
Housing development has thus been dependent upon speculative investment. Govern-
ment policies and plans, without financial support from the government, have only been
effective in an economic situation in which the influx of speculative money into the
property sector has been free or encouraged. The early 1970's and the early 1980's were
the periods in which the authoritarian government tried to expand housing provision
promoting housing development by increasing government expenditure as shown in Fig-
ure 3.3. However, as shown in Figure 3.2, due to the retrenchment economic policies
and the overall depression in the money market, housing construction was at a low
level. It was in the late 1970's and the late 1980's that housing construction was most
actively carried out. These years were characterised by expansionary economic policies
and an inflationary economy. It was in these periods of property boom that the govern-
ment was able to achieve its goals of annual housing construction.
Such development booms, largely indebted to growing speculative investment, have
been accompanied by intensifying conflicts between landowners and housing developers
over development gains. The conflict increasingly became a constraint on government
policy to promote housing development from the mid-1970's.
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In the mid-i 970's, when the government was obliged to increase housing provision for
low-income families, public developers such as the KNHC were facing increasing diffi-
culties in purchasing land. Public control of land rent began in 1976 by introducing the
land expropriation system and the Pegged Land Price System (PLPS) for public housing
development. The government had to extend the same measure to private housing
development soon after.
To reduce its financial burden, the government adopted the strategy of utilising large
private developers to achieve its goals of housing plans. The strategy seems to have
been successiful. Large developers played an important role in housing and urban devel-
opment in large cities, particularly in Seoul, throughout the 1970's, although not
without periodical ups and downs in their performance. The success was mainly due to
expansionary economic circumstances and growing speculative investment in land and
housing. A speculative investment became prevalent also in the land market. This
intensified the conflict between landowners and developers and raised a policy issue. In
the late 1970's, when the property boom culminated but the government still attempted
to promote it, private developers began to face difficulties in purchasing land. The Land
Readjustment Project (LRP), the major urban land development method at that time,
began to cause problems to the government. As explained before, the LRP is a system
in which landowners do not sell their land but hold ownership on developed land with
reduced size but increased value. To ensure a significant increase in land rent after
development was pivotal for the success of the LRP. To prevent landowners becoming
a barrier to housing development, the government introduced the Apartment Area
System, in which large developers were given priority and partly endowed with eminent
domain. Yet, such control of land rent in favour of developers was not sufficient to
support the 5 Million Housing Construction Plan, which required a large quantity of
land at cheap prices. The Public Purchase and Development System (PPD) was thus
introduced in 1981. The state stepped in directly between landowners and developers by
means of the PPD, a system in which the government purchase land by force at
appraised value and then provide the same land for housing development.
As the conflict between landowners and developers over development gains outside the
PPD intensified, more and more large developers came to rely on land provided through
4.
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the PPD. Thus the determination of rent, in the PPD, moved from the relation between
landowners and developers to that between landowners and the state. That is, from the
market to politics. It is a system based on weak land ownership and a strong state. Dur-
ing the 1970's and 1980's, when the country was under authoritarian rule, all the legisla-
tion to regulate land rent was carried Out with virtually no collective resistance from
landowners as there has been no a distinctive landowning class since the land reform in
1950.
Thus government interventions and policies on housing and land, particularly those
regulating the relation between landowners and developers have been influenced by
conflicts at two levels: (i) conflicts between the political necessity to increase housing
provision as a way of appeasing labour, and economic impossibility to devote resources
to this endeavour given the necessity to concentrate them into industrial development;
(ii) conflicts between landowners and housing developers over development gains,
which have also been affected by changing overall economic situations.
These have been the political and economic circumstances in which the relation between
landowners and developers has been defined. These circumstances influenced the inter-
ests, strategies and behaviour of the agents involved. At the same time, they are reacted
to, challenged and acted upon by both developers and landowners. The rising portion of
land cost in new house prices as shown in Figure 1.8 (p 25) is a consequence of these
conflicts. Following chapters will examine the ways in which landowners and developers
interact with each other in the actual housing development process acting upon such
changing situations.
CHAPTER 4. HOUSING DEVELOPMENT
BOOM, PROFITS AND LAND
PRICES, THE 1970's AND
THE EARLY 1980's
4.1 Introduction
This chapter addresses Research Question One and Two as designed in chapter 2.
Research Question One was whether developers were responsible for the rising land
cost for housing. It was hypothesized that developers have realised large surplus profits
and thus provided room for land prices to rise. Research Question Two was whether
landowners have been merely passive in the determination of land cost and new house
prices. The answer was hypothesized that they have not been mere interceptors of parts
of surplus profits created by developers. By fixing increasingly larger surplus profits
into land rent, landowners have affected the way hosing was developed as such that
once a new way of increasing surplus profits was invented, which usually required more
intensive capital investment, it soon became the normal way of development.
The apartment development in the Gangnam area during the 1970's and 1980's provides
a good empirical case in which these hypotheses can be evidenced. The area was rap-
idly and constantly developed into apartment estates during the 1970's and 1980's. The
development was accompanied by an extensive conversion of farm land into residential
land, and brought about a rapid growth of large developers. The changes in develop-
ment gains can be observed in an amplified form and on a consistent basis for the past
twenty years. Conflicts between landowners and developers have accordingly devel-
oped in the most acute form in the country. The Gangnam area has been the place
where government policies on housing development have been formulated and expen-
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mented with. In other words, social relations responding to the increasing conflict
between landowners and developers can be clearly observed.
The empirical examination in this chapter concentrates on the first phase of the devel-
opment of the Gangnam area as suggested in Chapter 2. It covers the period from the
early 1970's to the mid-1980's. The study in this chapter proceeds in three phases. The
first will be an examination of the circumstances and the ways in which large housing
developers have emerged and grown rapidly. The second will be an analysis of the
material source of that rapid growth. It is in this analysis that Hypothesis One is
quantitatively tested. The third phase addresses Question Two. It examines the chang-
ing attitudes and behaviour of landowners as development gains in housing have been
growing.
Section 4.2 takes on the first phase study. It examines the circumstances of the housing
market and the urban development in the Gangnam area which had enabled the emer-
gence and growth of large housing developers. Housing market situations and policy
environment were favourable to these newly growing developers during the 1970's. In
the early 1970's, the government necessitated the participation of large companies in
housing development to finance the urban development projects in Gangnam. In the
mid and late 1970's, the role of private developers in housing provision was emphasized
in government housing policy. Various incentives were given to large private develop-
ers in terms of taxation and land acquisition. There had been periodic ups and downs in
housing market situations. However, on the whole, the housing market in Seoul, char-
acterized by rapidly growing demand for apartments, had been favourable to developers
during the 1970's.
Section 4.3 analyses the material source of the rapid growth of large apartment devel-
opers. It first compares price trend of new apartments and that of land, and then analy-
ses the development gains for the period from 1974 to 1985. In the latter analysis, the
changes in the relative shares of land cost, construction cost and surplus profits in new
house prices are examined.
A simple regression analysis using rates of changes in land prices and new apartment
prices shows that the common argument that land prices have caused high house prices
is unfounded. The analysis of development gains shows that developers were able to
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realise a high rate of surplus profit until 1985. These surplus profits were the material
source for the rising land prices.
Section 4.4 examines changing attitudes and behaviour of landowners in housing devel-
opment. Until the mid-1970's, land had not been a serious problem to developers in
terms of its availability and prices. The increasing surplus profits and consequent fierce
competition among developers for land resulted in a radical change in the attitudes and
behaviour of landowners. Towards the late 1970's, speculative investment and all forms
of irregular market behaviour became prevalent. Land withholding and monopoly pric-
ing demands for higher prices became common practices. The changing behaviour of
the land market and landowners facilitated the conversion of surplus profits into land
rent. Further, such behaviour, by fixing land prices at increasingly high levels, affected
the way in which developers produce housing in such a way as to permanently force the
increase of surplus profit. This chapter, as well as the following two chapters, relies on
information obtained through interviews that took place between February and April
1992. All 13 persons, 3 from the Korea National Housing Corporation, the largest pub-
lic housing developer, 1 from the Korea Housing Association, the association of Desig-
nated Developers( i ), 2 from small developers, and 7 from the largest three housing
developers in 1990 and 1991, were interviewed for this research. The three large devel-
opment companies built 32,698 and 26,332 houses in 1990 and 1991 respectively,
which accounted for 6.8 and 5.4 percent of total annual private housing construction.
The KINHC built 79,702 houses in 1990 and 66,531 in 1991, acounting for 30 and 40
percent of total public housing construction.
As the research needs an extensive historical survey, overall information on the history
of housing development in Gangnam had to be obtained from veterans in housing
development. Three persons, one from the KHA and two from Hyundai have provided
an overview of the history. Others provided information on land purchasing process
and their development methods based on their or their company's own experiences. The
interviews did not provide precise and detailed figures such as land prices and house
1) Large developers satisfying certain required conditions in terms of capital stock,
the amount of annual housing construction and technical manpower. Details are
indicated in Subsection 4.4.3.
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prices. However, guided by these informations, documents were consulted for further
details, particularly statistical data and figures.
4.2 Urban Development in the Southern Part of Seoul and the
Growth of Large Housing Developers
4.2.1 The Growth of Seoul and the Gangnam Development
Seoul is the capital city of Korea. It had a population of over 10 million within an area
of 627 km2
 in 1990. In 1960, the population was 2,445,000 in an area of 270 km2
(SMG, 1991c). By the early 1970's, when the population increased to 5,536,000, most
people lived in the old urban district, the area north of the Han River, as shown in Fig-
ure 4. Ia. The rapid economic growth during the 1960's was accompanied by a concen-
tration of central administrative and managerial functions as well as population into the
capital city. In terms of the portion of its population in the whole nation, Seoul
accounted for 10 percent in 1960 and 17.6 percent in 1970 respectively. 80.7 percent of
the increase in Seoul's population during the ten years was due to migration (see Table
1.2, pl'7).
From the mid-1960's, in response to demographic and economic changes, the city gov-
ernment began to implement a series of urban development and redevelopment projects.
The most important were the redevelopment of the central area of Seoul for commer-
cial and office districts, and the development of a new residential area southward across
the Han River. Until the early 1960's, the Han River had been a southern border with
neighbouring rural counties. In 1963, part of the areas south of the river came under the
jurisdiction of Seoul city. This area remained agricultural land until the 1970's when it
became the target of residential development in the new master plan for the city devel-
opment. In the plan, formally established in 1971, the city government planned to locate
45 percent of the population in the new area (SMG, 1991a).
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The deconcentration of key administrative functions and population seemed important
to the ruling elite particularly from the point of view of national security. Seoul is
located within half an hour distance by car from the military demarcation line with
North Korea. The Park regime was concerned about the weakness of the capital city,
with its important political and economic functions as well as huge population concen-
trated just a few minutes distance time of air raids from the North. Since the open hos-
tility launched by the North in the late 1960's and the partial withdrawal of the U.S
Army from South Korea in 1971 mentioned in Subsection 3.2.2, the defense of the
unfortified capital city became a political issue. In 1968 President Park ordered the
development of the area in the south of the Han River as a way to deconcentrate popu-
lation and administrative and economic activities (Kim, J. R., 1990).
A series of development projects were thus planned and carried out to disperse popula-
tion into the southern area. The development of the Han River began in the mid-1960's.
It aimed to locate the Han River at the centre of Seoul geographically. More bridges
crossing the river connecting the two sides began to be constructed since 1962. The
city government started to reconstruct the embankments on both sides of the river and
to construct an intra-city express way along the embankment. Riverside roads on both
sides were completed by the early 1970's. In the process of constructing the embank-
ment roads, large areas alongside the river were filled in to make housing land. These
filled-in areas became the first sites for high rise apartments, which stood in a row along
the riversides. Among these, the development of Yeouido was important. It was the
area where private housing development took place for the first time in the form of
large scale apartment estates, and new private housing development companies
emerged and began to grow rapidly.
Yeouido is an island in the middle of the Han River. It had been an airfield from the end
of the Japanese colonial rule. The embankment construction started in December 1967,
and was completed in June 1968. It provided some 900,000 pyongs of land with a
length of 3 km from east to west and a width of 1.4 Km from south to north. It was
developed for both a new financial office district of Seoul and a new residential area
(Sohn, J. M., 1988).
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The development of the Gangnam area( 2) began in the late 1960's and continued
throughout the 1970's and 1980's. The south of the river had been agricultural land.
Until the end of 1962, the area belonged to the neighbouring rural counties. In the
master plan for the city development in 1966, the area was designated and planned for a
new subcenter of Seoul. The Land Readjustment Project of the First district of Young-
dong started in January 1968. The development plan for the second district was
approved in August 1971. The development of both districts with more than 8 million
pyongs took approximately 10 years to complete. The areas became later the Gang-
nam-Gu. At the beginning of the development, the area had a population of 41,428.
The population grew to 106,590 in 1975, to 475,030 in 1980, and 772,212 in 1985
(Thid).
Figure 4. lb shows the geographical expansion of built-up areas in the Gangnam Area.
In fifteen years from 1970 to 1985, the whole area of Gangnam was built up. As of
1988, the area had 158,832 houses, of which 112,689 units were apartments account-
ing for 71 percent of the total housing stock in the area. This is compared to the por-
tion of apartments among the total housing stock in Seoul which was 32.6 percent in
the same year (SMG, 1989).
This rapid urban development in the Gangnam Area has been led by large apartment es-
tate development( 3 ) and brought about the rapid growth of new types of large housing
development companies.
2) The area which the study refers to has various names. At first it was called South
Seoul, and then Yongdong (literally means the east of Yongdeungpo-Gu, a
neighbouring old borough) when the development plan was formally proposed
and later Gangnam, after the name of the borough administering the area. The
Gangnam Area was divided into two districts, the Gangnam-Gu and the Seocho-
Gu in January 1988. In this research, Gangnam refers to both districts.
3) According to the Korean Building Law, collective housing with more than three
stories is defined as apartment and that up to three stories as row houses. Large
apartment estate indicates those with 500 or more apartments in them.
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4.2.2 The Growth of Large Housing Developers.
Little has been recorded about private housing developers who had been active before
the 1970's although information on the patterns of development, housing types and so
on have been handed down orally. A feature article in a real estate magazine
(Wolganhyundaijutaek, August 1984) gathered such information based on recollections
of selected elders in the housing development business circle. The information was cor-
roborated by an interviewee from the Korea Housing Association. According to that
article, the origin of private housing development can be found in the rebuilding of
lower quality thatched roof houses into new Korean style housing that begun in the
1930's in Seoul. Such practices developed into business in the 1940's. The chief work-
man, usually a master carpenter heading several workers, often built houses for sale.
They were however very casual and in small scale activities (Ibid).
In the late 1950's and the early 1960's, such small scale private housing development
became dominant in housing provision. In the late 1960's and the early 1970's, housing
development became a profitable business. The small house builders usually bought old
houses and replaced them with new ones. Until the early 1970's, the new housing mar-
ket was dominated by detached houses. These detached houses were mostly built by
these small developers. Entering the 1970's, such commercialized detached houses
began to increase rapidly (Ibid).
Most houses were single or two storied with 20 to 50 pyongs of floor space in a plot of
30 to 40 pyongs. Developers purchased land for housing with an area of around 300
pyongs on which they built 5 to 10 houses. As few developers had enough funds to
afford such land, it was common practice that several developers jointly bought the land
and divided it into small plots according to each contribution to the investment. They
also often cooperated in purchasing major building materials, such as cement, to save
costs (Ibid).
Entering the 1970's, when high rise apartments became popular among new middle
class families, such commercialized enterprises began to increase rapidly and new types
of large housing developers began to emerge.
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When the KNT-IC was established by the military government in 1962, an ideology of
increasing housing supply by employing low-cost mass production methods was rife
among the KNHC and government personnel. Apartments were thought of as a housing
type which could reduce land cost. It was also regarded as a housing type ideal for
applying various standardized and mechanized building techniques. Particularly, pre-
fabricated building systems were considered the best way to achieve mass production of
low-cost housing. Thus, the corporation began to build apartment blocks (KNHC,
1992c). The Seoul city government also began to build apartments in large quantities
from the late 1960's, particularly to accommodate squatters relocated from the redevel-
opment projects in the inner city areas (Sohn, J.M., op. cit.).
The apartments built up to the end of the 1960's were far from being luxurious. As of
the end of 1969, there were 750 apartment blocks with 34,331 units in the whole
country. Out of this, 480 blocks were the Citizens Apartments, built by the Seoul city
government in the late 1960's, 68 by the KNHC and 44 by the Ministry of Government
Administration (Chosun-Ilbo, April 14, 1970). The citizens' apartment were of small
size and of lower quality. The city government provided only major frames and facili-
ties. All interior finishing works were left to the occupiers. A unit had only 8 pyongs of
floor space and residents had to share storage and toilet with other families (Sohn,
J.M., op. cit.). Those built by the KNHC were for low income households and only
slightly better than the Citizens Apartment in terms of size and facilities (KNHC,
1992c). The image of 'apartments' was thus that of 'lower quality' and of 'low income
housing'.
Toward the end of 1960's, this pattern of apartment development began to change.
Public developers began to construct larger and higher quality apartments for the
growing new middle class. The demand for apartments rapidly increased due to the
growing popularity of apartments among middle and higher income households and the
influx of speculative money into the new apartment market.
From the early 1970's, apartment houses became popular among middle and higher
income households. According to a survey conducted by the KNHC, apartments were
popular particularly among the western-educated younger generation of around 30
years of age and with attainments equal to or higher than those of upper secondary
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school graduates (KNHC, 1970). A major reason for the increasing popularity was the
conveniences and comforts which traditional detached houses were lacking. Central
heating was very rare for traditional detached housing, because of its high costs. Each
room had an individual outdoor fireplace using charcoal briquettes( 4), which had to be
changed every 6 to 12 hours in winter. This was one of the most troublesome routines
for housewifes. Someone always had to keep his or her eyes on the house since security
was loose. Apartments, equipped with central heating system and janitors at the main
entrance, eliminated all the problems. Conveniences such as hot water supply, flush
toilets and garbage chutes were also not available in the traditional detached houses. In
large apartment estates, one could use shopping centres, schools, security guards, and
play-grounds within walking distance (KNHC, 1970; Chosun-Ilbo, July 15, 1970).
The growth of the new middle class in the capital was a major source of the growing
popularity and demand for apartments in the housing market. New middle class here
refers to those classified by the Census as managers in private companies, government
officials, supervisory clerical workers, and professional self-employed such as scientists,
educators, journalists, writers, authors, literary men, artists, religionists, and high order
occupations such as high ranking government officials and high ranking managers. They
are what Seo, K.M. defined as wage earning middle class and intellectual classes (Seo,
K. M., 1985). According to the Population and Housing Census, carried out by the
Economic Planning Board (EPB) every five years for the whole nation, the portion of
such new middle class people among the economically active population in Seoul
increased from 10.4 percent in 1970, to 13.2 percent in 1975 and to 18.7 percent in
1980. 39 percent of new middle class people of the whole country were in Seoul in
1970. This portion increased to 48.4 percent in 1975 and to 60 percent in 1980 (EPB,
1970; 1975; 1980). It has been this ever-growing new middle class which have main-
tained a great demand for housing, be it speculative or for actual use, and contributed
to cause the apartment development booms in the 1970's. A public opinion survey
agency, Hyundai Research, carried out a survey on housing speculation by middle class
housewives in 1988. According to the survey, 23 percent of the interviewees, 505
4) This is called 'Ondol', the traditional underfloor heating system in Korea. In the
system, hot air flows through under the floor of rooms from outdoor fire places
to chimneys heating up the floor of rooms made of flat stones or hollow cement
blocks.
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Figure 4.3 Annual Housing Construction by Types, Seoul, 1973-1990
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housewives living in houses with 17 to 60 pyongs of floor space, had an experience of
property speculation. For higher income households earning a monthly income of 1 to
1.5 million won, 57.4 percent had an experience. And 61 percent of the respondents
who had speculated replied that they could realize good capital gains (Seoulkyongje-
Shinmoon, August 21, 1988). Figure 4.3 shows the trends of the 1970's and 1980's,
i.e., the growing portion of apartments within total housing built in Seoul. It has been
accompanied by the emergence and development of large housing developers. At first,
apartment development for this new middle class was initiated by public agencies. The
KNHC started to build larger apartments for upper-middle income households in the
late 1960's. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the early 1970's was the time when
the government attempted to rapidly increase housing provision. The KNHC was in-
creasing its annual housing construction output and, as it operated on the basis of a
self-supporting system, it was moving towards the higher income housing market. It
thus began to develop large apartment housing with 18 to 40 pyong in floor space. The
first large apartment estates appeared in a northern riverside area, Dongbuichon-Dong
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(see Figure 4.2). The land was developed by the Korea Water Development Corpora-
tion by filling in the riverside after the new bank was constructed. The KNHC built
several apartment estates in the area: the Government Officials Apartments in 1968,
Hangang Mansion Apartments in 1970, Hangang Foreigners Apartments in the same
year and Hangang Apartment Estate in 1971. These were relatively luxurious apart-
ments and gained popularity among upper-middle income households (KNHC, 1992c).
In Yeouido, the city government developed the first apartment estate in 1971. The
apartments were 12-storied and equipped with modern facilities such as elevators. The
Seoul city government constructed the Sibum (literally means 'a fine example') Apart-
ment Estate in Yeouido as part of the measures to stimulate the development of the
area. This was completely different, in terms of quality, from the apartments hitherto
built by the city government. The new apartments were luxurious compared to the pre-
vious Citizens Apartment. They were larger in floor space and equipped with modern
mechanical systems such as elevators which was rare in Korea up to that time. This
period represented the beginning of high rise apartments.
When the KINHC built the Hangang Mansion Apartments, it had difficulties with the
sale. All staff of the corporation were ordered to sell one or more units to their friends
or relatives as a last resort. However, in a few months time, the apartments began to be
traded with a large sum of premiums( 5). The popularity of Hangang Mansion Apart-
ment stimulated a private apartment development boom in 1970 and in 1971 (Chosun-
Ilbo, July 15, 1970).
Large scale development of high rise apartment estates implied a radical change in the
housing development industry: the emergence and growth of large housing developers.
Although detached house builders do not necessarily mean small developers, apartment
developers must be large in terms of capital stock and manpower. In Yeouido, for
example, all 18 apartment estates were built by 1978. They were all built in 11 to 15
5) Premium here means the difference between new apartment prices which the first
buyers pay and the prices paid for that apartment when they are resold in the
market. The new apartments built by the KNHC were priced based on the cost
prices. When there was excessive demand, the gap between the new sales prices
and actual market prices became considerable. Hence the prevalence of new
housing speculation. Later, when the new price ceiling sytem was imposed, the
premium became even more considerable.
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storied apartments. An estate had 470 apartments on average (KNHC, 1990). Such
high rise and large scale apartment estates needed large amounts of capital investment,
modernized technology, equipment, and organization. This could not be done by the
traditional small scale builders. Thus it was new housing developers which began to
build apartments for the middle and high income families in the private sector.
For example, Yonsei Development Co. and Namhangang Tourists Development Co.
are known as the first two companies which began to develop such apartments in a
relatively large scale. They were building 28 to 70 pyong type luxurious apartments
with swimming pools and libraries within the estates. For both companies, housing
development was new business (Chosun-Ilbo, July 15 1970).
As seen in the previous chapter, the policy environment of the early 1970's was in
favour of such large apartment developers. The government needed the involvement of
large private capital in housing development both for housing provision and for prop-
ping up the economy in general. The Seoul city government urgently needed the par-
ticipation of large companies in apartment development in order to finance and expedite
development projects around the Han River. In Yeouido, the city government strongly
recommended large construction companies to participate in apartment development to
expedite the development of the area. Existing prominent construction companies were,
however, not too promptly involved in apartment development because of the uncer-
tainties in the housing market.
The trend in the housing market in Seoul was characterized by rapidly growing demand
for apartments throughout the whole period from 1970 to 1978. This trend, however,
covered occasional ups and downs. As mentioned above, in 1970 and 1971, there was
an increasing demand for apartments in the riverside areas in Seoul. In 1972, the
speculative demand for apartments dwindled. New apartment sales came to difficulties
in 1972 along with the economic recession. Prices were falling and new apartments
were not sold as expected (Dong-A-Ilbo, May 12 1972). Some companies which were
newly involved in housing development such as Yeonsei Development Co. were finally
bankrupt in 1972 (Joongang-Ilbo, June 17 1972). The KNI-IC had also difficulties with
house sale in the Banpo area in 1972 and had to increase the housing loan and the
period of repayment. However, in the spring of 1973, six months after the sale began,
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the KNHC apartments began to be resold in the market with a considerable amount of
premium. Apartment prices in Yeouido and Banpo began to rise fast again. Competi-
tion among applicants for new apartments became fierce (Chosun-Ilbo, May 17 1973).
By 1973, companies were involved in apartment development in a large scale. In
Yeouido, following the city government, Samick Housing Co., Ltd. and Hanyang
Housing Co. Ltd. started to build high rise apartment blocks from 1973. In 1975, Life
Housing Co., Ltd. began to build apartment estates. Samboo Construction Co. Ltd.,
not a specialist in housing but a prominent construction company, joined later. Most
early apartments in Yeouido were built by these companies.
This changed the image of the apartment as lower income housing. Apartment estates
developed by these companies were advertised by real estate agencies and regarded by
new middle class families as prestigious housing estates. During the 1970's, apartment
estates in Yeouido became one of the most disturbing centres of housing speculation
for the government.
Yet, because of the fluctuations in demand for new housing, large construction compa-
nies did not readily enter into the housing development business. The above forerunners
in apartment development were newly established firms or those that had moved into
housing from other business.
Among the housing development companies, only Samick had been a construction
company. It was established in 1968. With the apartment development in Yeouido, it
began to concentrate on apartment development. Hanyang, on the other hand, had been
running a business supplying timber for apartment construction. It established the Han-
yang Housing Co., Ltd. in 1973 when it became involved in the Yeouido apartment
development. Since then it grew rapidly along with the apartment boom in the 1970's.
Life Housing & Construction Co., Ltd. was established in 1975. It started its business
with the apartment development in Yeouido. Before that, it had been a commercial
agent of household electronic appliances.
It was from later 1975 that construction companies began to involve themselves in
apartment development on a large scale. The Hanshin Construction Co. started apart-
ment development in the Banpo area in 1975 and since then have built there more than
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10,000 units. During the period of the apartment development boom, in 1977 and 1978,
many prominent construction companies such as Daelim Construction Co., Lotte Con-
struction Co. and Keungnam Enterprises Co. came into the area to build apartments.
To the south, in Seocho, Samho Housing and Construction Co., Keungnam Enterprise
Co. and Samick Housing and Construction Co. developed a huge high-rise apartment
complex. The Hyundai Construction Co. began their first large scale apartment devel-
opment in the Apgujeong area and had developed the area into apartment estates by the
mid-1980s (Sohn, J, M., 1988: 280).
These later participants in apartment development were mostly from construction com-
panies. Hanshin Construction Co. was established in 1950 to engage in a variety of
boiler products. It was reestablished as a construction company and changed the com-
pany name into the present one in 1967. With the acquisition of large land in the Banpo
area, the company became one of the leading housing developers in the 1970's and
1980's. Samho Housing was established in 1956 as a construction company. The owner
acquired a large quantity of land in the Gangnam area as early as the 1960's. It became
a leading housing development company in the 1970's. Hyundai Construction Co. has
been a central company of the Hyndai industrial conglomerate. It ranked as the sixth
largest company in terms of sales in 1976 (KCCI, 1987) but was not involved in hous-
ing development until 1975. In 1974 the company built apartments on a site used for a
station of heavy construction machinery. This was the first apartment development by
the company. In the early 1970's, when the company acquired a large piece of land in
the Apgujeong area, it established a subsidiary company specialized in housing devel-
opment, Hyundai Housing and Construction Co. Ltd. (Interviewee, C).
By the late 1975, the boom again came to depression (Kyonghyang-Shinmoon, Novem-
ber 5 1975). 1976 was one of the worst year for the new apartment developers. At the
end of the year, discount and additional loans were common to attract new apartment
buyers. Even Hanyang Housing and Construction Co. Ltd., which was emerging as a
new Chaebol through apartment development, suffered delays in apartment sales (Kim,
S.D, 1978).
However, 1977 to 1978 became a peak period of the apartment boom again. In the sale
of the Mockhwa apartment built by Samick in Yeouido in 1977, 45 applicants com-
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peted for one apartment. In the following sale of the Hwarang Apartment, built by the
same Samick, 70 competed for one. Apartments were allocated through lottery to a
limited number of applicants and the winning numbers were traded with a lump-sum of
premium: 1.5 to 2.5 million won for a Hwarang apartment. Such keen competition was
primarily due to the growing speculative demand for new apartments. Apartment
speculation brought public criticisms and their activities became a political issue. In
April 1977, the National Tax Administration investigated the winners of lucky numbers
in the lottery for apartments in Yeouido and revealed that one third of them were un-
qualified (Chosun-Ilbo, April 21, 1977).
Figure 4.4 Changes in Apartment Prices, Gangnam, Seoul, 1971-1990.
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Since then such fierce competition became a common scene in new apartment sales in
Seoul, particularly in the Yeouido and the Gangnam Area. This situation continued
until 1978 when the whole property market collapsed once again as a result of the
August 8 Anti-speculation Measure mentioned in the previous chapter (ARI, 1989).
Until then, however, the existence of such speculative demand formed one of the most
favourable conditions for private housing development.
Figure 4.4 shows the changes in market prices of apartments in Yeouido and prime
locations in Gangnam during the 1970's and 1980's. This price trend can be taken as an
indicator of housing market situations in Yeouido and Gangnam. Although there had
been ups and downs, the long term trend clearly shows the booming market situation
during the 1 970s. Owing to these favourable conditions, these housing development
companies grew very rapidly. Figure 4.5 shows the sales performance of some leading
apartment developers. It shows that the 1970's was the period of their fastest growth.
No recorded data on the share of housing in the total sales performance are available
until 1979. However, all interviewees from Hyundai, Hanyang, and the Korea Housing
Association, an association of large housing developers, agreed that their rapid growth
during the 1970's was mainly due to apartment development.
In 1965, no housing development companies were listed among the 100 largest firms in
Korea. Samick came up to the 89th rank in the list of the 100 largest firms in Korea in
terms of sales in 1976. In 1984, Hanyang, Samho, Life and Samick marked 20th, 73rd,
74th, and 88th ranks in the list respectively. These firms developed into business con-
glomerates by 1984 (KCCI, 1987).
Hanyang Housing and Construction Co. became a hard core company of the Hanyang
Business Group, which is composed of 6 firms. Hanyang Business Group was listed as
the 14th largest Chaebol in 1984. Its total sale was 1,900 million won (39 million
dollars) in 1974. This grew to 959.1 billion won (1,600 million dollars) in 1984. Samick
Housing became a main business in the Samick Business Group. It became the 43rd
largest Chaebol in 1984. Life Housing also grew to form a conglomerate by 1984,
heading 6 subsidiary companies in the field of building, commercial trading and the tour
industry. Hanshin Construction Co. was the 53rd largest conglomerate in 1984. It had
four other subsidiary firms. Their total sale was 5 billion won (10 million dollars) in
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Figure 4.5 Sales Performance of Leading Housing Development Com-
panies, 1975-1990
1000
.......................
..............Hartshin
/
.........................
I	 .'	 .'
V-'-.....'.....................................
10 
100
1 0
1
75 76777879 80 81 8283 84 85 8687 88 89 90
Year
Source: Produced for this thesis based on data from the Korea Pro-
ductivity Centre, 1976-1990, each year.
1974 but this grew to 202.4 billion won (245 million dollars) in 1984. Beside these,
Hanbo and Woosung, another construction companies engaged in apartment develop-
ment during the late 1970's and the early 1980's, formed conglomerates marking the
54th and 74th ranks in the list of large Chaebols in 1984 (KCCI, 1987).
Gangnam has been the principal place where these developers realized such rapid
growth through apartment development. According to the survey of apartment estates
carried in the KHA Bulletin (January to May, 1988), in the Gangnam Area there were
93,552 apartments in 1987. Out of this, 65,593 had been built by private developers, of
which 61,585 were built by Designated Developers which will be discussed in Subsec-
tion 4.4.3. The nine developers referred to above have built 44,493 units, approxi-
mately 70 percent of the privately built apartments in the area.
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4.3 Development Profits and Land Prices
This section examines how these favourable market conditions have been materialized
into development gains, the material source of the rapid growth of the large developers.
Development gain here is defined as the 'difference between house price and the cost of
constructing the dwelling including site servicing'. This is divided into land prices and
development profits between landowners and developers. This analysis provides quanti-
tative evidence in support of Hypothesis One-i. It is hypothesized that high house
prices provided room for land prices to rise. This section first compares the trend in
new apartment prices and land prices in Gangnam.
4.3.1 House Price and Land Price
Simple comparison between house prices and land prices in aggregate terms such as
that shown in Figure 1.2 (p14) tells us little about which among house prices and land
prices have led the other. What is needed is a comparison of the price trend of new
houses and that of land used for those new houses in actual housing development proc-
esses.
This study therefore attempted to compare selling prices of new apartments built in
Yeouido and Gangnam with the prices of land developed for those apartments. The
prices of apartments are known since the sale of these apartments were open to the
public and thus the prices had been made known to the public mainly through newspa-
per advertisement. Prices for all 64,748 apartments were obtained from three sources:
Apartment Encyclopedia (Sejin-Gihweck, 1990), major daily newspapers (1974-1987)
and the Korea Housing Association Bulletins (1979-1986, each month). This covers all
the 6,385 apartments in Yeouido (Chungbosung Real Estate Bank, 1992) and 89 per-
cent of apartments in Gangnam built by 1987 (Ki-IAB, March, April and May, 1988)
and covers all the large apartment estates with 500 or more apartments in them.
163
Land prices had problems. First, there was no way of knowing actual prices paid for all
these apartment developments. There is no recorded information on land prices actually
paid for apartment development in Gangnam. Documents on past developments are
scarce for most companies. Even when one could get some documents, credibility
becomes a problem. It is well known in Korea that firms keep a double accounting
system, one for official purpose and another for actual accounting for the owner. The
latter are kept secret and accessed only by key personnel since it affects the very exis-
tence of the firm(6). Some data could be obtained through interviews. However, they
were fragmented and anecdotal.
Secrecy was not the only problem. How to measure land prices at the time of compari-
son also became a problem. The period between the time of land purchase and that of
the start of housing construction had infinite variety ranging from three months to sev-
eral years. To value land prices for the comparison with house prices at a certain point
in time, one must count the capital cost of the investment in the land. However, interest
rates were also diverse according to the sources and amount of borrowing. They vary
according to whether the borrowing was from bank loans or from the unregulated
money market. Developers often used loans from the unregulated money market at
much higher rates than those of bank loans. The rates also varied according to the
amount of borrowing and the credibility of borrowers. What made it more complicated
was that land was often purchased lot by lot from each landowner at different times at
different prices even in the same estate.
Thus in this study, the Korea Appraisal Board (KAB) land prices were used. The Korea
Appraisal Board has surveyed land prices based on actual trading prices as of April
every year since 1972. Land in each Dong (a district) is categorized into three grades in
terms of the price level: high, middle and low. In this study, the prices at middle grade
were used as data on land prices actually paid for some apartment developments
obtained through interviews and documents were close to the KAB prices at middle
grade (e.g., Yeouido in 1972, Hyundai Apartment in Apgujeong in 1976, Hanshin
6) This is why the assessment of land cost has been one of the most controversial
issues in the new house price control. In the price control system, fair prices
have been assessed on the basis of the appraised land prices rather than that
actually paid by the developers.
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Apartment in Banpo in 1981, Hanyang Apartment in Apgujeong in 1982). Thus land
prices actually paid for individual development projects were not counted. Actual land
prices may be of an infinite variety even among apartment estates developed in similar
location and periods. Some developers might have realised windfall gains while others
suffered from losses in land dealings. The use of KAB data means that all these are
neglected and the data can be used only as average prices. Thus it is only possible to
compare house prices with land prices in terms of the average land value of each
district, Dong. Accordingly the following analysis of the composition of house prices
simply demonstrates the patterns of changes in development gains in average terms.
Now, the time of comparison of house prices and land prices had to be considered.
According to the Enforcement Regulation of the Housing Construction Promotion Law
(HCPL), amended in September 1976, private developers were allowed to sell new
houses when 20 percent of the construction works had been done( 7). This corresponds
to 3 to 4 months after the construction works started. It is at this time that new house
prices are determined. The time of land purchase is different from that of housing sale.
According to the information obtained in the interviews, the time difference between
land purchase and the start of construction works varied from three months to two
years. And the time difference between the start of construction works and the sale of
house is between three months and one year. In this study, it was assumed that there
was a one year time lag between land purchase and housing sales. The land prices of
one year before the time of house sale were thus matched with the selling prices of
housing.
Table 4.1 is the collection of data on the selling prices of apartments in Yeouido and
Gangnam. In the table, housing size is measured in gross floor area, which includes
public spaces such as corridors and stair cases. Dong indicates district. Each Dong has
an administration office which is overseen by the borough office. There were 22 bor-
oughs and 713 Dongs in Seoul in 1990; each borough had 15 to 90 Dongs (SMG,
1991c). The reason that location is here indicated by Dong is that the KAB land prices
are available by Dong.
7) The Regulation was amended in November 1984, to allow the designated
developers to sell houses after 10 percent of the construction work to promote
housing development.
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Figure 4.6a Changes in New Apartment Prices and Land Prices,
Yeouido and Gangnam, Seoul, 1974-1987.
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Figure 4.6b Indices of New Apartment Prices and Land Prices, Yeoui-
do and Gangnam, Seoul, 1974-1987.
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Figure 4.6c Average Annual Changes in New Apartment Prices and
Land Prices, Yeouido and Gangnam, Seoul, 1974-1987.
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House prices are those per unit floor area, pyong. Original data were given in prices per
a unit of apartment. Thus prices per a pyong of floor area were obtained by dividing the
prices given in the original data with floor space of each apartment. This is for the con-
venience of comparison. House prices are given by month while the KAB land prices
are available by year. In this study, land prices for other months than April, the basis
month for the KAB land prices, were obtained through interpolation.
Table 4.1 is presented into a chart, Figure 4.6a. Empty square marks represent the
prices of apartments while hourglasses represent land prices corresponding to the
house prices. It should be noted that the time scale on the X axis is for the time of
house sales and not for that of land purchase. In other words, a land price at a certain
point in time on the X axis is not land price at that time but what is supposed to have
been paid a year ago.
Figure 4.6b is the same plot graph in which data are presented in price indices while in
Figure 4.6a, they are plotted in prices. Figure 4.6b shows that land prices have risen
faster than house prices since the late 1970's. The pattern is similar to that in Figure 1.2
(p14) that shows the nation-wide trends of land and house price indices. This implies
that the trends of land and house prices in Gangnam are not a peculiar case although
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Table 4.2 Linear Regression Model for the Rates of Change
in Land and New Apartment Prices, Yeouido and
Gangnam, 1974-1987
Constant	 11.07936
Std Err of Y Est	 19.42562
RSguared	 0.033127
No. of Observations	 13
Degree of Freedom	 11
X Coefficient	 0.090785
Std Err of Coef	 0.147882
* Y= House price, X= Land price
the divergence between the two indices is becoming greater than that of the whole
country.
Figure 4.6c is a comparison of land prices and house prices in terms of the annual rate
of change. These rates of change were used for a regression analysis to see to what
extent changes in new house prices can be predicted by those in land prices. Table 4.2
shows the result of a simple linear regression analysis. As shown in the table, the model
is not statistically significant. In other words, the rate of increase in land prices is
statistically insignificant in explaining the changes of house prices. This implies that the
argument that land prices had steadily pushed up house prices is not supported. Now in
order to see whether there was room for land prices to rise in new house prices, it is
necessary to analyse the composition of house prices.
4.3.2 Surplus Profit and Land Prices
To calculate surplus profits, it is needed to know house prices, construction cost, land
costs and the social average rate of profit. Before the examination of these constituents
of house prices, it should be considered whether to take all the apartments listed in
Table 4.1 for the analysis of development gains. To take the arithmetic mean for prices
from all apartments is not appropriate. Locational differences mean differentials not
only in land prices but also the marketability of new houses which has great effects on
overall capital costs and overhead costs. Housing development moves onto areas with
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more favourable conditions such as lower land prices and better marketability. The
arithmetic mean does not take account of this point.
For consistency in identifjing a trend in the creation and distribution of development
gains into land prices and profits, it is desired to trace the trend of development gains
for the same type of apartments developed by the same company in the same location.
However, as housing development moves from place to place as the conditions of the
housing market and land acquisition are continuously changing, this is not possible.
Thus it is inevitable to select certain development projects from several locations, types
and development companies. Thus in this study, apartment estates which had been suc-
cessively developed by one developer were preferably selected.
Figure 4.7 shows changes in major housing development areas. Yeouido was the major
development area and land prices were higher than in any other area by 1978, when
housing development in the area was almost completed. Apgujeong and Banpo became
major development areas during the late 1970's and the early 1980's. Land prices were
lower than in Yeouido until 1978 but soon rose very rapidly. Then major development
activities were extended to Gaepo where land prices were slightly lower than in Apgu-
jeong until 1983.
Thus from Figure 4.7 and Table 4.1, for the period from 1974 to 1977, apartment
estates developed by Samick and Life were chosen from Yeouido. Since 1977, Hanshin
Construction Co. Ltd. had constructed apartments steadily there until the mid-1980's.
Thus apartment estates built by Hanshin Construction Co. Ltd. in Banpo were chosen
for the period from 1978 to 1982. From 1983, data from apartment estates built by
Hyundai and Woosung Construction Co. Ltd., were used for Gaepo.
Table 4.3 is an estimate of development gains for selected apartments in Gangnam.
House prices in the table appear differently from the figures in Table 4.1. Prices in
Table 4.3 are average prices for each development project which includes several types
of apartments while those in Table 4.1 are the prices of each type of apartments classi-
fied by housing size in pyong. It is common that the unit prices (price per a pyong of
floor area) of apartments vary according to housing sizes within the same development
project in Korea. For example, larger apartments are sold at higher prices
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Figure 4.7 Changes in New Apartment Prices and Land prices,
Selected areas in Yeouido and Gangnam, Seoul, 1974-
1987.
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Figure 4.8a Changes in Development Gains in Apartment Development,
Gangnam, Seoul, 1974-1985.
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per pyong than smaller ones although actual construction costs per a pyong of floor
area for the latter is higher than that for the former. This is largely due to the govern-
ment policies which recommend or oblige private developers to maintain the prices of
smaller apartment (not larger than 25 pyongs in floor area) at a much lower level than
those of larger ones. Since development profits must be counted by each development
project, these prices of each type of apartments should be converted into average unit
price for each development project. Each housing estate shown in Table 4.1. forms an
independent development project, the average price for a project is obtained by
weighting the prices of apartments in the estates with both the unit sizes (floor area in
pyong) and the number of apartments. House prices shown in Table 4.3 are the average
prices obtained this way.
Construction costs are not so clear. There is an infinite variety in the quality of con-
struction and efficiency in construction management which affects actual construction
costs. The former affects direct costs while the latter indirect costs. Contracting cost
itself fluctuates. In bad times for housing development, such as in the first half of the
1980's, the contract price for Korea National Housing Corporation (KNHC) apartments
fell to 70 percent of the originally estimated construction costs or even below (KNHC,
1983, 1984, 1989, 1 992c). Moreover it is known that construction site managers must
have completed the works at 70 percent or less of the originally contracted prices if
they wanted to gain recognition by their own construction companies. This means that
in such bad times, apartments were constructed at nearly half of the cost originally
estimated by the KNHC. Reductions in profit due to such low contracting prices were
transferred to subcontractors and construction workers. Poor quality construction was
a common consequence. In booming periods, such as in the late 1970's and in the late
1980's, the ratio of contracted prices to estimated ones went up to nearly 100 percent.
Thus there was a variation of up to 30 percent in actual construction cost.
In this study, construction costs, estimated annually by the KNHC were used. As seen
above, the KNHC estimates are not less than actual construction costs. Thus by using
them, the possibility of overestimating development gains can be avoided. Consistency
is another advantage of using the KNHC data.
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In this cost, overhead expenses were not included. The overhead costs was approxi-
mately 10 percent or less of the direct construction cost according to the KNHC data.
Thus in Table 4.3, the construction costs includes the overhead costs equivalent to 10
percent of the net construction costs. These are presented in won per pyong.
Land prices are those of a year before the time of housing sales for as explained for
Table 4.1. Thus capital cost must be considered when that land price is accounted into
the cost of production. However, the capital cost itself is often unclear because of the
variability of interest rates. The interests rate varied according to the source of money,
i.e., whether it was a bank loan or borrowing from the unregulated money market.
Many developers use at least partly loans from the unregulated money market at much
higher interest rates than those of banks. These also varied according to the amount of
money and the credibility of borrowers. For this, average interest rates on total borrow-
ings (including bank loans, company bonds and borrowings from the unregulated
money market) in the construction industiy were used. The data were obtained from
the Financial Statements Analysis published by the Bank of Korea (1981, 1986). As
mentioned before, apartments were selected for every half year. For apartments sold in
the first half year, land prices were multiplied by the interest rate of the previous year
while for those sold in the latter half year, by that of the year when the apartment were
sold.
The land prices are unit prices, that is, prices per a unit of land area, pyong. For the cal-
culation of production costs of apartments, these prices per a pyong of land have to be
converted into that per a pyong of floor area of apartment. The latter becomes land
cost. For the conversion, building density must be considered. According to the regula-
tions of the Seoul city government, the Floor Area Ratio (FAR: the ratio of total floor
area of buildings to the site area) was regulated not to exceed 180 percent until 1986.
In this 180 percent, underground floor space is not counted since its aim is to regulate
building density on the ground. However, all the high-rise apartment buildings have
underground spaces which are counted into the gross floor area of each apartments.
Thus in the calculation of costs, this space has also to be counted.
For this research, the actual FAR, that with underground space taken into account, was
calculated for the apartment estates built by the Hyundai Ho. during the 1970's and
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1980's. Data on total floor space of apartments and site area were obtained from the
company. The FAR was between 190 and 200 percent throughout the period between
1975 and 1985. For the table 4.2, 190 percent was used for the FAR. By dividing the
price per pyong of land with this FAR, land costs were obtained. The construction cost
plus land cost becomes the total cost. Finally, development profits were obtained by
subtracting this total cost from the house price.
Figure 4.8a is created from Table 4.3. The figure shows changes in the distribution of
development gains into land cost and development profit. The curves of development
profit and land cost are not smooth. That may be due to short term fluctuations in the
market situations affecting new house prices and land prices. For example, in the latter
half of 1977 and 1978, prices were relatively steady due to the anti-speculation meas-
ures. It is, however, partly due to differentials between development projects in terms
of the number of dwelling units, their composition by housing sizes, with which house
prices were weighted to make average prices for each development project. The
unevenness of the house price curve between 1982 and 1985 is due to this.
Nevertheless, it shows the long term trends in the structure of new house prices. Rap-
idly rising house prices had been the major factor for increasing development gains until
1981 when the price was finally put under a ceiling. Exception was in the late 1970's
and the early 1980's, when construction costs were rising at the same rate as that of
new house prices. The latter was the period when the country had suffered a severe
shortage of labour as skilled constmction workers were exported to the Middle
East(8). In 1978, there was also a severe shortage of major building materials such as
steel bars and cement (KNHC, 1 992c). These caused a rapid rise in the construction
costs during the period.
In Figure 4.8a, land cost was rising faster than house prices throughout the period of
comparison except in 1977 and 1981. Land cost is calculated by dividing price per
pyong of land with the Floor Area Ratio and adding to them interest for the period of
land holding and thus does not directly represent land prices. However, the Floor Area
8) Korea was exporting 18,000 skilled workers to Saudi Arabia alone in 1976. It
increased to 100,000 in 1978. (Meed, March 1981, Special report: Korea,
Korean companies in the Middle East: Winning battles in construction war, in
Shim, Ui-sup ed., 1984).
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Ratio had been constant throughout the period from 1974 to 1985. Interest rates were
between 12 and 19 percent. Thus, by and large, the trend of land costs represents that
of land prices. Now from Figure 4.8a, it can be said that land prices had been encroach-
ing more and more into development profits. In order to support the hypothesis that
house prices have provided scope for land prices to rise, it is necessary to show that
that part of development profits which had been converted into land cost are surplus
profits.
Figure 4.8b shows the ratio of development profits, land cost and construction cost to
house prices. Development profits in the figure are divided into surplus profits and
normal profits. Normal profits here are those in the whole construction sector. It should
be a social average profit if a free flow of capital from one production sector to another
can be assumed realistically. However, it is very difficult to imagine that capital can
easily flow from, for example, car manufacturing to housing development. Thus, in this
study, the average profit rate in the construction industry was used. The data came
from the annual Financial Statement Analysis conducted by the Bank of Korea. The
ratio of annual normal profits to net sales in the construction industry, shown in the
Statement, was converted into rates for 20 months, the average period of high rise
apartment construction (KRIHS, 1989). In this figure, development profit rate showed
a temporary decrease in 1976 and 1979. As mentioned in the explanation of Figure
4.8a, this was due to the slow-down in the rise of new house prices rather than to the
rise in construction costs or land costs.
The figure shows that developers had been able to realize a considerable amount of sur-
plus profit in the apartment development in Yeouido and Gangnam until the early
1980's. This had been the material basis for the rapid growth of large developers as
seen in the previous section.
The development profit shown in the figure does not necessarily indicate the whole
profit to development companies. Not counted in the figures are the profits from the
development of shopping centres in apartment estates and the amount of total sales and
capital costs due to delays in apartment sales. Further, the leading developers were not
engaged solely in apartment development as will be seen in the next chapter. Many
development companies expanded their business into overseas construction in the
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Middle East from the late 1970's. However, it is undeniable that developers had real-
ized enormous development profits during the 1970's. Some veteran staff interviewed
from the Korea Housing Association and Hyundai Ho. thus called the 1970's a 'golden
age for apartment developers' (Interviewee, C; G).
These surplus profits at the same time had provided the material basis for the increasing
land cost, that is, land prices. In the longer term trend, Figure 4. 8b shows that increas-
ingly larger portions of surplus profits had been converted into land cost. The conver-
sion rate was lower until the early 1980's but was very sharp in 1982 and in 1983.
Hypothesis One that developers have created high surplus profits and provided room
for land prices to rise has thus been supported for the period between 1974 and 1984.
However, for the evidence to be conclusive, further examination of what has happened
after 1985 is required. From 1983, surplus profit began to diminish rapidly while land
cost rose sharply. Despite the Price Ceiling imposed in 1981, land cost steadily rose to
encroach on the whole profit by 1985; the rate of development profit appears to have
fallen even below the normal profit rate.
This part needs an examination of how developers actually have acted upon the chang-
ing situations in which surplus profits were rapidly diminishing. Before this examina-
tion, the following section will see how landowners actually behaved in the conversion
of surplus profits into land prices causing increasing conflicts with developers. This was
Question Two.
4.4 Role of Landowners
4.4.1 Easy Land Acquisition Period
As mentioned earlier, until the early 1970's, the Gangnam area was largely farm land
with paddy fields, orchards (mainly pears) and hilly forests studded with small rural vil-
lages. Landowners were mostly small farmers. The area was incorporated into the
administrative district of Seoul in 1963. According to the 1970 Agricultural Census
published by the Ministry of Agriculture in December 1972, 99 percent of the farm
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households in the boroughs including the newly incorporated Gangnam area were small
farmers with less than 3 hectares of land each. Moreover 98 percent of the total farm
land was owned by these small farmers (MOA, 1972).
Land prices were very low. The prices of dry and paddy fields were barely several tens
of won/pyong in the early 1960's. Those of residential land were several hundreds
won/pyong. It was in the mid-1960's that the government started various development
plans in and around the Gangnam area and accordingly land speculation began to arise.
At the news that a new bridge, connecting Gangnam to the existing northern urban dis-
trict across the Han River, was due to be constructed by 1969, land prices rose by 15
times from around 100 won per pyong in 1965 to 1,500 won in April 1966. This is
compared to that of the consumer prices in Seoul during the same period, which was 12
percent (KRIHS, 1979). In April 1967, the then president Park announced the plan to
build Kyongbu Express Way, connecting Seoul and Pusan, the second largest city at the
south eastern end of the peninsula. In December 1967, the route of the first section of
the express way was fixed, originating from the southern end of the Gangnam Area.
Speculators gathered into the area driving up land prices up to 7,000 won/pyong
(Chosun-Ilbo, July 12 1978).
In January 1970, the government announced the development plan for Gangnam. This
announcement accelerated land speculation in the area. In February 1970, the Deputy
Prime Minister announced a series of measures to curb the increasing land speculation
in the area. He warned of investigation of the sources of speculative money and that
heavy taxes would be imposed on them. Also that bank loans and the government-
guaranteed foreign loans would be restricted to those who were involved in land
speculation. This was the beginning of the battle against speculators in the area (AR!,
1989).
During this period, however, land hoarding for housing development was scarce. As
seen in the previous section, traditional developers were not large enough to hoard land
in large quantity. Construction companies were reluctant to enter into housing devel-
opment yet. According to information obtained from interviews, the only exception was
Samho Housing Co. who was known as having purchased several hundreds thousands
of pyongs in the area during the 1960's. There were two cases in which individuals
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hoarded land and then turned it into housing development or the construction industry
later in 1970's(9). These were, however, only exceptional cases.
For the new large housing developers mentioned in Section 4.2, land acquisition was
not a problem in tenns of land availability in the early 1970's. In the areas such as
Yeouido, Banpo and Apgujeong, where high rise apartments were first constructed by
large private developers, land was provided by the city government in a large quantity.
As stated in Section 4.2, the city government was conducting development works along
the Han River including the development of Yeouido and the construction of the
embankment road. In this process a lot of land was created alongside the river. It was
the city government's plan to make up for the construction cost by selling housing land
created in the process of development (b0)
In the early stage of the Yeouido and Gangnam development, the city government had
difficulties in selling developed land and consequently in financing the successive devel-
opment works. Housing land in Yeouido and the riverside areas were not sold in time.
The city government urgently needed to activate construction activities in the area
(SNA, 1969). Thus as one interviewee recollected, the city government had to allocate
land to construction companies almost by force (interviewee C).
Land in the Banpo area was largely developed by filling in during the process of con-
structing the embankment road. It was developed by the Kyongin Development
9) The chairman of "S" Enterprise had been a commission agent in a wholesale
market. He hoarded about one million pyongs of land during the 1960's in the
area. As the prices went up to several hundred thousands won per pyong and
apartment development boom was touched off in the mid 1 970s, he established a
construction company and involved in apartment development. "A" Construction
Co. also became a case in which a person established a firm by selling land he
hoarded in the past and became involved in apartment development (Chosun-
Ilbo, July 12 1978).
10) Ground rent is the concept which explains how land, not produced by human
labour, can have value. However, use value of land can be improved or created
by capital. When such improvements or created use value become permanent,
the improvement or creation has the same effects as natual properties of land.
Thus rent is a payment not necessarily for original raw land but also for created
land such as the riverside land in this study (Harvey, 1982). Thus the created
land does not disturb the use of the concept of rent in this study.
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Co.( 11 ). The land was sold to the Korea National Housing Corporation (KNHC) in
1971 at 18,700 won/pyong (KNHC, 1992a) which was much lower than land prices in
residential areas in the neighbouring boroughs, such as Yeongdeungpo (KBA, 1972). A
very similar case was the Hyundai Construction company which undertook the con-
struction of a section of the riverside road called the 2nd Gangnam Road. In the proc-
ess, a large area of riverside reeds and sand fields were filled in. Hyundai received this
land from the city government in exchange for a part of the construction costs. The
area was approximately 50,000 pyong. Thus land was provided at almost cost prices.
In addition, some 8 million pyongs of land had been under development by the Land
Readjustment Project (LRP) since 1968 (SMG, 1991). To promote the Land Readjust-
ment Projects, the government had to give incentives to attract large developers to par-
ticipate in apartment development in the area. Various measures were adopted. In
December 1972, the Designated Area Development Promotion Law was enacted as
part of a programme of economic stimulatation. According to the Promotion Law, in
the areas designated as the National Housing Development Promotion Area, extensive
tax incentives were given to those who develop or trade land and housing. The Real
Estate Speculation Control Tax, the Business Tax on Real Estate Transactions, the
Real Property Registry Tax, the Property Tax, the City Planning Tax, the Tax on
Licensed Business etc. were exempted until the end of 1975. It aimed to stimulate eco-
nomic activities since it was believed that housing construction utilizing idle private
capital creates employment and stimulates other sectors of the economy. Yeouido and
the whole Gangnam area were designated as a housing development promotion area in
1972 (Chosun-Ilbo, November 3, 1972)(12).
As mentioned in Subsection 3.3.2.2, in Chapter 3, in 1975, the Apartment Area System
was introduced to help large private developers to acquire land. Large developers were
given various privileges in Apartment Areas including the right to expropriate land.
11) A consortium of construction companies involved in the construction of express
ways, as part of measures to compensate for their loss in the construction of the
express ways (interview with a former KNT-IC executive).
12) As of the end of 1972, it was estimated that for a 20 pyong apartment, de-
velopers could save 190,000 won per unit in Seoul due to these tax incentives
(Chosun-Ilbo, November 3, 1972). This means some five percent saving in
production cost to developers.
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Land purchase from private landowners was relatively smooth. Until the mid-1970's,
though land alongside major roads was in the hand of speculative investors, a large area
of land still remained farm land and could be purchased from the original farmer land-
owners. All interviewees from the KNT-IC and the three large private development
companies mentioned in the beginning admitted that farmer landowners in that period
were, what they call, 'cooperative' to development. Thus an interviewee from Hyundai
Ho. called the time a 'romantic period of apartment development' (Interviewee, C).
This situation began to change radically from 1977; landowners attitudes and behaviour
began to change and speculative investors began to replace farming landowners. Before
examining these changing landowners and their attitudes, this section will show a
glimse of the changing land market situation in the period of property boom in late
1977 and 1978.
4.4.2 Changing Land Market
As discussed in Chapter 3, 1977 and 1978 were the years when the country experi-
enced an unprecedented property development boom. Considerable amount of floating
money flew into the real estate market nationwide. Gangnam was the place where
urban land speculation was most prevalent. The sharp rises in land prices as shown in
Figure 4.4 were the results. The housing market was characterized by keen competition
among buyers of new apartments in 1977 and 1978 as mentioned in section 4.2.
Some features of the housing and land market have been described in the previous sec-
tions but in fragments. It is difficult to give an entire picture of all those irrelevances
and irregularities in the market systematically. An examination of the behaviour of real
estate agencies enables us to get a glimpse of the changing market situation. Informa-
tion on the behaviour of the real estate agencies exists by word of mouth. No written
studies are available except reports of investigations by police and tax offices of sus-
pected illegal land transactions and tax evasions.
A series of feature articles in Chosun-Ilbo in November 1977, when land and housing
speculation became an issue of public criticism, give a description of the behaviour of
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the real estate agencies in Gangnam based on such investigation reports (Chosun-Ilbo,
November 8 and 9 1977).
Traditional real estate agents were, what was called in Korea, Bockduckbahng, which
literally means 'good fortune shop'. They were small self-employed jobs run by native-
born elderly men. The territorial boundaries of their activities were hardly beyond their
personal and geographical acquaintances. Their income came from commissions re-
ceived on the mediation between sellers and buyers, which was around 1 percent of the
prices of the properties they mediated. Their shops were also places for gatherings of
elderly people in the villages (Ibid.).
Since the late 1960's, such types of real estate agents had been increasingly replaced by
new types of agents in the rapidly developing areas. Real estate brokerage was becom-
ing business enterprise. They were located in major development areas or newly deve-
loped apartment estates in Gangnam, attracting customers, mostly upper-middle income
families, and introducing them to new ways of wealth accumulation through speculation
in real estates. Their activities were not limited to a local territory. They provided
information on other development areas including those in provincial cities (Ibid.).
A typical agent had 3 to 4 specialized staff members around a financier who was the
actual owner and manager of the organization. Some large agencies had up to thirty
staff. Staff were usually paid on the basis of an efficiency wage system. In most cases,
commissions were distributed to owners and staffs in the proportion of 7 to 3. Some
staff who achieved excellent sale results were rewarded by sharing equally the commis-
sions with the owner (Ibid.).
Some agents maintained multiple shops, usually with five or more branches in major
development areas. They were well-informed about new development projects and
capable of mobilizing large sums of money. Some served simply as personal offices of
financiers, who themselves had other professions, such as medical doctors. In this type
of agency, staff were to inform the financiers when there were good objects for specu-
lative investment while they were operating the offices and receiving commissions on
brokerage. Some carried out studies on the trend of real estate transactions, on prices
and development plans by the government, and published bulletins. Some were called
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'migratory', since they did business where speculation began to arise and disappeared as
the culmination of speculation passed (Ibid.).
These new real estate agents were not simply mediators. They themselves were buying
and selling properties, realizing both commissions on brokerage and marginal profits.
They were mostly engaged in short-period buying and reselling to quicken the turnover
of their funds. The amount of money one could mobilize in time was thus a key to the
successful business of these real estate agents. This meant that they had to hold not
only a lump-sum of their own operational funds, but also access to secure customary
clients with significant sums of speculative money (Ibid.).
Accordingly, many irregular activities became prevalent in the business of real estate
agents. These agents always kept informers in government departments in charge of de-
velopment projects. They secured regular customers who were usually speculative
investors. They often manipulated markets by taking advantage of their inside informa-
tion. An example was the circulation of a property among customers who were only
vertically contacted by the agency, without the clients themselves knowing each other.
They induced one person to buy certain property by convincing him/her that the prices
would rise soon rapidly. Then they introduced the property to another customer at an
increased price. This way, they circulated it among their own customers while they real-
ized commissions. However in this chain of resales, there must be one who loses. The
latter is called in Korea 'a rider of the last train'. To compensate him, he was frequently
given an opportunity to be the first time buyer next time (Ibid.).
Real estate agents themselves often intervened in the buying and selling to appropriate
marginal profits through short term transactions. With 1 billion won, for example, they
did not spend all the money to buy up 1 billion worth of land. Instead they contracted
ten times such land by paying only contract money, and resold it to others before they
paid the full prices. When the property market came to a depression either by the gov-
ernment's anti-speculation measures or general economic changes, the final buyers often
cancelled the contract for the land. This resulted in a series of contract cancellations
back to the former sellers of the land. When speculation fever on real estate cooled
down, such practices became social problems (Ibid.).
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The most fraudulent practice was to create artificial price booms. A group of specula-
tors bought land at cheap prices in an area where there was no reason for land prices to
rise. Then they circulated the land among themselves buying and selling at increasing
prices. As the prices were suddenly going up and rumours of windfall gainers spread,
many other investors gathered to buy land in the area. Often false rumours were set
saying, for example, that government offices would move into the area or a new market
would be established. When the prices reached a certain level, the professional specula-
tors sneaked away from the speculative market they had created. In provincial areas,
they were able to buy and turn over up to 100,000 pyongs of land before slipping out of
the area after appropriating several billions of won. Left behind were clumsy specula-
tors and investors. Some of them borrowed money from the unregulated money market
at a very high interest rate. After the original speculators disappeared, the market col-
lapsed as there was no real demand for land in the area at such highly inflated prices
(Lee, H.B, 1978).
These activities brought about public criticism in the late 1970's. It became common
practices for the authorities, such as the National Tax Administration, the city govern-
ment and the Public Prosecutor, to investigate real estate agents and punish them when-
ever the government needed to control property speculations (ARI, 1989).
These activities of the real estate agents may, at first sight, seem irrelevant to the ques-
tion of the relation between landowners and developers. However, they played impor-
tant roles in the transformation of development gains into land prices. It was they who
calculated potential development gains and tried to materialize increasingly larger por-
tions of the gains into land prices. They did it either by exploiting any real development
prospect of an area or by artificially creating a situation attractive to speculative
investment. Where certain development gains were expected, they themselves bought
or had others buy the land in advance. Then through continuing turnover of the prop-
erty, they facilitated the transformation of development gains into land prices. This had
two effects: by circulating information on future development gains and arranging
speculators to invest in land, though often with problems as seen above, they promoted
speculative investment in land. They also contributed to popularizing knowledge on the
property market.
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4.4.3 Monopoly Pricing
It is in this context that changing landowner behaviour can be understood. This subsec-
tion examines the changing behaviour of landowners. The examination relies on infor-
mation obtained through interviews with nine persons from Hyundai, Hanyang,
Samsung and two small developers. The interviews provided primary information on
the behaviour of landowners. But the interviews had a limitation; they could not give
figures. Thus in this study, the primary information obtained from interviews had to be
confirmed in recorded materials such as official documents, bulletins and newspapers.
Interviewees from the KNT-IC and the three large private development companies coin-
cided to point out that it was from 1977 that the changing attitudes of landowners
began to be barriers to the smooth performance of their business in housing develop-
ment. In the early 1970's, landowners, particularly farmers, were not well informed on
real estate market situations. However, since the late 1970's, many things happened in
the property market, such as the ones seen above, and information on real estate was
reported through newspapers and television. As a result, landowners were no longer
soft in selling their land for housing development. The following is the description by
the interviewees of new attitudes and behaviour of landowners by the early 1980's.
First came the increasing practice of monopoly pricing by speculative investors. By the
early 1980's, most important locations fell into the hands of speculative investors.
Developers had to deal increasingly with monopoly pricing by landowners in their
negotiations. Developers usually bought up an area of land, plot by plot, through nego-
tiations with each individual landowner. In this process a few landowners refused to sell
land demanding much higher prices. This resulted in delays of the whole development
project. This began to happen as early as in 1977. Life Housing Co., for example, began
to purchase land for its third Misung Apartment project in Yeouido in 1977 but could
finish the land purchase late in October 1979 (K}TIAB, February 1982).
The increasing disputes between landowners and developers led to the intervention of
the government. As mentioned in Subsection 3.3.2.2 in the previous chapter, it had
been the government's strategy to increase housing provision by fostering large devel-
opers. It nominated certain large developers as Designated Developers and gave them
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various incentives including the right to expropriate land in Apartment Areas. However,
this measure was not strong enough to cope with the increasing monopoly pricing for
land.
By the early 1980's, monopoly pricing became a common problem to most developers.
For example, in 1980 Hyundai did not obtain approval for its development plan for the
10th Project in Apgujeong as it failed to purchase just one plot of 160 pyong out of the
whole 3,900 pyong needed for the project. Samick had to spent six months to come to
an agreement with a landowner on the sale of the remaining one plot of 317 pyong after
it purchased all the other land needed for 444 units of apartments. Hanyang, in Apgu-
jeong, had to postpone the start of construction of an apartment estate for one year due
to the failure to acquire one plot of 450 pyong. In 1980 and 1981, the prices of housing
land in prime locations in Gangnam, were 700,000 to 800,000 won/pyong. However,
some landowners demanded 1 to 3 million won/pyong for their land. Since those land
were often located in the middle of a planned estate, without them the whole develop-
ment project could not be carried out (KI-IAB, February 1982).
Hanshin, for example, was the first to exercise the eminent domain in Banpo-Dong. The
company had failed to come to an agreement in a negotiation to purchase four plots,
only 280 pyong in total. The company submitted an application for the approval of the
eminent domain for the land in May 1981. It was in May 1982 that the Central Land
Expropriation Arbitration Committee justified the application and the company applied
for a decision from the Seoul City Land Expropriation Committee. Landowners were
demanding 2 million won/pyong in consideration of the prices of land in a neighbouring
commercial area, while Hanshin offered only 500,000 won/pyong on the ground that
the land had no alternative use but for apartment since the area was designated as an
Apartment Area (KI-IAB, October 1982). Hanshin was able to purchase this small plot
of land in dispute. However, it had to give up buying the remaining land in the Apart-
ment Area, which could have been developed as late as 1991 for cooperative housing
to which price control was not applied (Interviewee B).
Ordinary farmer landowners, who were believed not to have a good knowledge of the
land market, also became no longer so meek to deal with. An interviewee described:
'They did not care how much developers could gain on their Land but cared about
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how much other nearby landowners were paid. They insisted that they had to be
paid at least more than what others were paid. Thus land prices went up as one
proceeded buying up land for continuous development. In some extreme cases of
buying land by stages, prices for the latest purchase became twice that of the first
purchase' (interviewee F).
In some cases, when a developer wanted to buy land in an area, landowners responded
with suspicion as to whether they were selling their land at cheap prices. The result was
withholding land and waiting. This practice was different from that of professional
speculators who were well aware of how much they could be reasonably paid for their
land. This made housing development extremely difficult (interviewee F; I).
As seen before, land purchase in short periods of time is important to developers:
'When a development company begins to purchase land through negotiations
with landowners, this needs preferably to be finished within three months. How-
ever, in some cases it takes two to three years. When it takes more than one year,
the development will be no longer profitable. First of all, the capital cost of the
investment already made in purchasing the land is expensive since most develop-
ers use borrowing from the unregulated money market at much higher interest
rate. Secondly, when more details of the development plan are exposed to land-
owners, they claim higher prices. Thus it is a rule to keep the plan secret while
purchasing land. If it takes more than a year, the plan is inevitably exposed and it
becomes difficult to buy land smoothly' (interviewee E).
The practices of land withholding and waiting are particularly serious when large devel-
opers rather than small ones are going to buy land. It is because landowners realize that
large housing estates with luxurious apartments yield high profits. In fact, land prices in
the vicinity of such large and luxurious estates are rising faster than those in land
around smaller, low income housing estates.
In response to these changing landowner behaviours, the developers' tactics in land pur-
chases became more and more important. As to the increasing monopoly pricing, an
interviewee, a land expert, emphasized a rule in starting any land purchase: 'When one
buy a certain area of land owned by a number of landowners, one must consider
that there must be someone who will claim extraordinary prices for his land.
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Thus, if one want to buy certain area of land at, for example, 1 million won per
pyong on average, one must begin to buy land when it is assured that he or she
can buy up to 80 to 90 percent of the land at 600,000 to 700,000 won. For the
remaining land, for which landowners might claim extraordinary prices, one
must be ready to pay 2 or 3 million won, to finish the land purchase in a short
period of time. Otherwise one can be in difficulties in obtaining the entire land at
the planned prices' (interviewee F).
To cope with land withholding and waiting for unreasonably high prices (from the point
of view of developers), developers used an irregular method: to buy land secretly, i.e.,
without exposing that they would carry out a large housing estate development in the
area. In this process development companies bought land in the personal name of the
members of their staff or their relatives rather than using the corporate one. Once the
purchase was completed, the land was transferred to the corporation (interviewee F).
This method was widely used as a means by which to evade taxes under the pretext of
'keeping development in secrecy'. When one buys land in a personal name, the sellers
and buyers can keep the actual prices secret. They report different prices to the tax
administrations instead. Tax offices calculate taxes on the basis of officially assessed
value, and as the latter are often much lower than the actual ones, both land purchasers
and sellers pay much less taxes than they should do. This raised strong public criticism.
When the purchase of land is in the corporation's name, developers cannot but report
the actual prices they paid and had to pay fill taxes. Accordingly, landowners are fre-
quently reluctant to sell to corporations since their actual gains are exposed to tax
administrations (interviewee F).
In the 1980's, to eliminate such irregular practices, the government increased the
assessed value of land itself, closer to the actual market values. In the past, the officially
assessed value was only 10 percent of the actual value. Now the official assessment
value, known as the Public Notice Land Price, represents nearly 90 percent of the mar-
ket value although for forests in provincial regions it is still only 30 to 40 percent. In
the past, when a development company bought land in the personal name of its staff,
the expenditure was regarded as necessary corporate expenses. However, since the
Anti-Speculation Measures in 1989, such expenditure was regarded as misappropria-
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tion of corporate money and heavier taxes were imposed on it. However, some inter-
viewees suggested that many developers were still buying land in secrecy (interviewee
F).
The changing behaviour in the land market such as increasing land withholding and
hoarding, speculative transactions and monopoly pricing were practical forms in which
landowners actively converted part of not only present but also future surplus profits
into land prices. Thus landowners were not passive in the determination of land cost for
housing as suggested in the Hypothesis Two. The effects of this active role of land-
owners, the permanent transformation of surplus profits into land prices, on hosing
development will be examined in the next chapter.
4.5 Conclusion
The examination so far has provided evidence to support the two hypotheses restated in
the beginning of this chapter. Section 4.2 has shown that the growing demand for
apartments, though not without occasional ups and downs, had enabled the rapid
growth of large housing developers in the Gangnam area. The analysis of the material
basis of that rapid growth of developers in Section 4.3 has evidenced that developers
realized high surplus profits until the early 1980's. These surplus profits have been the
material basis for land prices to rise. Thus Hypothesis One is supported for the period
between the early 1970's and the early 1980's. Yet, the analysis, as presented in Figure
4.8a and 4.8b, is incomplete. A question of how land cost could rise beyond the point
where development profit seems to disappear in Figure 4.8a and 4.Th remains to be
examined. At this point, one could still be misled to assert that land prices have pushed
up housing prices. Thus final conclusion must be reserved until the examination of what
happened after 1985 when development profits began to almost disappear.
Section 4.3 has shown changes in the attitudes and behaviour of landowners and
increasing replacement by speculative investors of farming landowners. It has shown
that landowners have not been passive by merely appropriating already created surplus
205
profits. They had continually converted future surplus profits into the present land
prices. Land withholding and waiting and monopoly pricing, and irregular land dealing
and market manipulation were the practical forms in which landowners and speculative
investors had converted increasingly larger portion of future surplus profits into present
land prices. Hypothesis Two is yet only partially evidenced. For the hypothesis to be
fully supported, it must be further shown that landowners, by fixing land prices at
higher and higher level, have conditioned the creation by developers of surplus profits.
In conclusion, Hypothesis One has been supported by evidence taken until 1985.
Whether the hypothesis could be sustained by what has happened to house prices, sur-
plus profits and land costs afterwards, is left for further examination in Chapter 5. The
patterns of housing development began to change from the early 1980's when the price
ceiling was imposed. This further examination involves the increasing influence of land-
owners on the patterns of housing development as suggested by Hypothesis Two.
These are what will be done in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 5. NEUTRALIZATION OF THE
PRICE CEILING SYSTEM AND
RISING LAND PRICES, THE
1980'S
5.1 Introduction
This chapter addresses two Research Questions: Question One for the period after the
early 1980's, that is, whether and how developers were able to realise surplus profits
under the Price Ceiling and Question Two of what has been the role of landowners in
the process by which the proportion of land cost has been rising.
Regarding to Question One, the Price Ceiling on new houses must have restricted
developers' realisation of surplus profits and thus an effect in limiting land prices for
housing. However, as seen in Figure 4.6a (p181), Figure 4.8a and 4.8b (pl8'7), towards
the mid-1980's, land prices were rising beyond the level at which housing could be
profitably developed under the Price Ceiling. It is because of this that scholars as well
as developers have criticised 'the irrationality of fixing new house prices while allowing
land prices to rise uncontrolled'. In fact, land prices were rising faster than any other
prices as seen in Figure 1.2 (p14). The figure showed that land prices have risen much
faster than any other cost. The Price Ceiling was thus blamed for having discouraged
housing development in Seoul. This chapter examines how far this argument is valid.
As to the Question Two, landowners' behaviour in transforming surplus profits into
land prices has been described in the previous chapter. Yet, its effects on housing devel-
opment have not been examined. This chapter examines these effects in order to pro-
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vide evidences in support of the Hypothesis Two that landowners have affected the way
in which housing is developed.
The study in this chapter relies, first, on information obtained from all ten interviewees:
6 from large developers (Hanyang, Samsung and Hyundai) and 2 from small develop-
ers, I from the Korea Housing Association (KHA) and 1 from the Korea National
Housing Corporation (KNHC). Then documents have been consulted to confirm the
information obtained from interviews and to get numerical data.
Section 5.2 is an overview of the housing development environment in the early and
mid-1980's which had been characterised by slow-down in economic growth, overall
depression of the housing market, diminishing designated Apartment Areas and conse-
quent overall retreat of large developers from housing development.
Section 5.3 examines the changing strategies of large developers to cope with the new
situation. It shows that they have adopted new development methods such as luxurious
row houses( 1 ) and cooperative housing to evade the Price Ceiling. They have thus real-
ised surplus profits in Gangnam and Seoul. This has provided the material basis for
landowners to claim higher prices for their land. In other words, developers have pro-
vided room for land prices to continue to rise as they have neutralized the possible
effects of the price ceiling to bind land prices.
Section 5.4 examines the effects of the landowners' actions on housing development. It
shows that the continuous transformation by landowners of part of future surplus prof-
its into present land prices have dictated production methods. Increasingly high density
development is a case in which the level of capital investment in land has increased
because of the existence of landed property; once cooperative housing was used as a
way of increasing surplus profits in the particular circumstance of price ceiling, it
became normal way of housing development. Relaxation of density regulations and
direct control by the government of land prices through the PPD system have been the
1) Row Houses here indicate what is called in Korea, 'Yeonhip-jutack', literally
meaning 'a number of houses attached side by side in a row'. However, it
increasingly became a general term indicating all types of low rise multi-dwelling
housing. In the Korean Building Law, Row Houses are defined as multi-dwelling
housing which is of no more than three stories as noted in Footnote 1, Chapter
4.
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measures to overcome problems of the conflict associated with that process. Develop-
ers have increasingly turned to the government for land. These are the consequences of
the landowners' role in housing development in Seoul in the late 1980's.
Section 5.5 summarises the evidence which has been found in the previous sections
supporting Hypothesis One and Two.
5.2 Stagnation of Housing Development
Entering the 1980's, housing developers in Seoul faced a new situation characterized by
a depressed housing market and diminishing Apartment Areas. This brought about an
overall withdrawal particularly of large developers from housing.
5.2.1 Depressed Housing Market
As seen in Chapter 2, the property market collapsed along with the August 8 Anti-spec-
ulation Measures in 1978. The dull market situation continued until 1986 except in
1983. All the indices presented in the previous chapters indicate the dullness of the
housing market in the early and mid-1980's. Annual housing construction (starts) began
to fall sharply. It fell to 150,000 houses in 1981, the lowest level since 1974, from
300,000 houses in 1978. It was as late as in 1987 that housing development was
restored to the 1978 level (see Figure 3.2, p93). Land prices and house prices fell by 16
and 33 percent respectively in real terms between 1980 and 1982 (Chun, Cl-I. 1989;
KNHC, 1989; see Figure 1.2, p14).
Developers began to face difficulties in housing sales. In the late 1970's, when competi-
tion for housing land in Seoul was keen, many developers expanded their business in
provincial cities. It was in these provincial cities that they were hard hit by the dull
housing market after the August 8 Measures. New apartments, for which there had
been keen competition among buyers until 1978, were not sold in time as before. Even
in Seoul, those who won new apartments in a sale lottery often cancelled their applica-
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tions as expected capital gains from the resale of the apartments became insignificant.
Only in some prestigious areas in Gangnam, competition for new apartments was still
keen (KHAB, January 1981). Throughout the country, unsold apartment piled up to
7,000 units in 1979 (KHAB, January 1980). Large developers, i.e., Designated Devel-
opers used to have 6,000 to 7,000 unsold apartments annually between 1980 and 1986
except during the short period of property boom in 1983(2).
As the result, housing developers began to suffer financial difficulties. Financing in
apartment development had relied on prepayments made by purchasers. It had been
common practices that developers sold apartments when they reached 10 to 20 percent
of the construction works. Purchasers paid 20 percent of the price at the time of con-
tract; 50 percent by the time of completion; the rest at the time of occupation. When
apartments under construction were not sold in time developers often had to procure
operating funds from the unregulated money market at higher interest rates( 3). Thus
the accumulation of unsold apartments meant increasing financial difficulties to devel-
opers. The retrenchment economic policy in the early 1980's made the situation
worse(4).
This situation worried the government which launched the Ten-year Five Million Hous-
ing Construction Plan to pacify popular unrest in 1980 as mentioned in Chapter 3. The
government adopted a series of measures to promote housing development. In June
1981, the obligation of developers to build half of their houses in smaller sizes (with no
more than 85 m2
 in floor space) for low income families was eliminated; the investiga-
tion of speculators was suspended; the rate of property taxes were cut. In January
1982, taxes were further reduced; administrative procedures for building permission
and land development permission were simplified; loans for housing development were
increased. On May 18 1982, taxes were even further reduced. (KHAB, February 1982;
2) See 'monthly state of apartment sales' in KHAB (1981-1982, each month) and
KRIHS 1992.
3) The annual interest rates on loans from the unregulated money market were 30
to 40 percent, three or more times that of city banks, in the early 1980's (Son, J.
Y., 1991; BOK, 1990).
4) The increase in official interests rates on January 12 1980, known as January 12
Measure to tighten up monetary control, for example, hit developers hard
(KHAB, January 1980).
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August 1982; August 1983; August 1988). However, the housing market was not yet
out of the depression until the mid-1982. This situation turned into a short term prop-
erty boom in 1983.
At the same time, the government was also trying to revitalize the economy. As seen in
Chapter 3, the whole economy had been in deep recession during the period of political
and economic crisis in 1979 and 1980. Thus although the retrenchment of finance was
the keynote of economic policies in the early 1980's, the new government tried to stim-
ulate the economy in as far as it did not aggravate trade deficit and foreign debts. Inter-
est rates were cut several times. The rate of annual bank loan was 25 percent until
1979. By June 1982, this was reduced to 10 percent (ARI, 1989; FlU, 1987). In 1982,
find raising for the stimulation of the economy brought about currency inflation.
Money supply (Ml: currency in circulation plus deposit money) in 1982 increased by
45.6 percent while that in 1981 increased by only 4.6 percent (BOK, 1990; FKI, 1987).
This expansionary economic policy not helped only the economy to grow fast but also
the property market to boom again. The GNP grew by 12.6 percent in 1983 (BOK,
1990). At the same time, money began to flow into the property market; and there were
signs of the revival of land and housing speculation from late 1982 (ARI, 1989). As
various price indices in Figure 1.2 (p1 4), Figure 2.1 (p3 7) and Figure 4.4 (p1 59) sug-
gest, 1983 became a year of property boom. There were signs of price inflation as well
and this worried the government for its possible adverse effects on foreign debts and
export competitiveness. Thus the government began to take again a strong retrench-
ment policy from the end of 1982 (FKI, 1987).
Along with this return to the retrenchment policy, anti-speculation measures were
taken. In December 1982, stricter application requirements for new apartments were
enforced and the obligation of developers to build small houses for low income families
was revived (KHAB, January 1983). In February 1983, the government strengthened
the investigation of speculators and adopted a licence system for real estate agencies
(KHAB, March 1983). In March 1983, the Bond Bidding System (discussed later in
Section 5.3.2) was adopted to discourage housing speculation. In April 1983, the
property tax rates were increased (KFIAB, August 1983). Along with these anti-specu-
lation measures, the property market began to slip into stagnation in the late 1983.
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Between 1984 and 1986, the annual rate of rise in land prices fell to low levels (see Fig-
ure 2.1, p37); house prices were falling again (see Figure 1.2, p14 and Figure 4.4.
p159). Housing developers again began to suffer from stacks of unsold houses. In
1985, for example, all 59 Designated Developers had 4,678 unsold apartments with
some 120 billion won (135 million dollars) of capital tied up in them (KHAB, July
1985). In 1986, out of the newly constructed 288,000 houses, 55,000 were unsold with
800 billion won (929 million dollars) tied up (Wolganhyundaejutaek, May 1987). It was
as late as in 1988 that the housing market moved out of the stagnation.
In sum, the early and mid-1980's were a downturn period of housing development
throughout the nation. Only in Seoul, particularly in Gangnam, there had been still a fair
demand for new apartments. However, in Seoul, land acquisition was increasingly
becoming a problem.
5.2.2 Diminishing Apartment Areas.
Despite the nationwide depression of the housing market, in Gangnam, gaps between
the prices of existing apartments and those of new ones were still wide as shown in Fig-
ure 4.4 (p159). Except the short period immediately after the August 8 Measures in
1978, new apartment prices were still rapidly rising as presented in Figure 4.6a (p181).
The land situation was, however, deteriorating from the point of view of developers.
First of all, Apartment Areas, where developers had been given certain privileges in
buying land, were diminishing. As mentioned in Subsection 3.3.2.2, the Ministry of
Construction (MOC) designated 13 districts with 3,850,668 pyongs of land in all as
Apartment Areas in Seoul in 1976 and 1979. Included in the Areas were 2,363,000
pyongs in Gangnam and 178,175 pyongs in Yeouido. All these Apartment Areas, but
321,438 (214,662 in Gangnam) pyongs, had been developed by the end of 1982
(Chosun-Ilbo, December 7 1982).
Leading development companies such as Hyundai Ho., Samick, Hanyang, Woosung,
Hanshin were still able to build apartments on land which they had purchased before in
Apartment Areas. But it became difficult to acquire new land in other areas than those
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designated as Apartment Areas. As seen in the previous chapter, developers came to
face increasing monopoly pricing in the early 1980's (Hankookkyongje-Shinmoon,
November 28 1984).
It is since this time that land shortage for housing has become a subject of discussion
(Chosun-Ilbo, December 7 1982; November 28 1984). However, the difficulties in land
purchase were not due to absolute shortage of land. Occasional surveys have revealed
that there was still a large amount of land for housing in Seoul. A survey by the city
government showed that, in residential areas in Seoul, some 6 million pyongs of land
were idle and could be used immediately for housing development as of 1983
(Hankook-Ilbo, June 2 1983). A MOC survey in 1987 reported that there was 8 million
pyongs of idle land while developers complained of land shortage in Seoul. This land
was held by those who were expecting long term price rises. The land was mostly in
disguised uses such as tennis courts, lumberyards and temporary buildings to avoid the
heavy Idle Land Tax (Mailgyongje-Shinmoon, September 30 1987). Another survey
conducted by the city government between September and December 1988, disclosed
that there were still 2.2 million pyongs of land in Seoul in which 65,000 units of apart-
ments could be built. The Gangnam area had the largest portion, about 600,000 pyongs
(Chosun-Ilbo, December 10 1988).
Thus, as an interviewee stated, 'there has always been land available for housing
development. The problem has been high land prices' (interviewee A). The com-
plaints about land shortage meant, first, increasing difficulties for developers to secure
land in large units at cheaper prices in Gangnam and Seoul. Large estate development
with more than 500 apartments, so lucrative in the 1970's, became no longer possible.
More significantly, it meant that landowners were no longer easy for developers to deal
with. In the 1970's, speculators aimed at capital gains through resale in a short period
of time. By the early 1980's, vacant land fell into the hands of those who were expect-
ing long-term capital gains (Maeilkyongje-Shinmoon, September 30 1987).
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5.2.3 Retreat from Housing Development
These unfavourable housing market conditions and land situations made large develop-
ers reduce business in housing in the early 1980's. Figure 2.1 has shown sharp falls in
annual housing construction by leading development companies in the first half of the
1980's. Most companies instead expanded business in overseas construction in the Mid-
dle East, risking their future on it(5).
Figure 5.1
	
Annual Housing Construction by Major Development
Companies, 1978-1991
1
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Year
Source: Produced for this thesis based on data from KHAB (1992).
5) In 1984 Korea became the worlds' second largest overseas construction con-
tractor following the United States. 85 percent of its contract was in the Middle
East. Most leading housing developers mentioned in the previous chapter were
participating in construction works in the region. However, the boom in
construction ended with the fall in oil prices in the early 1980's. Korean firms
began to suffer losses due to the mounting overdue bills. Unpaid bills reached
2.3 billion dollars by 1984 (Far Eastern Economic Review, August 9 and 23,
1984, and January 17 1985). This brought about a reshuffle in the construction
industry in Korea. Many prominent construction companies came under en-
trusted care of other more financially sound companies or put into receivership
by their prime banks during the mid-1980's (KHAB, August 1985).
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Thus the early and mid-1980's had been characterized by a dull housing market, in-
creasing difficulties in land acquisition and the consequent overall withdrawal of large
developers from housing. Large developers remained in the housing business only on a
small scale in this period. The development of luxurious Row Houses and Cooperative
Housing began as a way of maintaining housing business in a reduced scale in such un-
favourable conditions in the early 1980's. This, however, did not mean that developers
were simply assuming the defensive in the changing market situation. They were
changing to the offensive by using these types of housing as a means to evade the Price
Ceiling and thereby to maximize development profits. These types of housing have had
a significant effect on new house prices and consequent land prices. They have neutral-
ized the possible effect of the Price Ceiling to bind land prices. The next section exam-
ines these two new types of housing development prevailing in Seoul, and particularly
in Gangnam, in the 1980's. The examination will provide an answer to Question One
of how land prices could rise under the price ceiling.
5.3 Neutralization of Price Ceiling
5.3.1 Luxurious Row Houses
As noted in Footnote 1 in this chapter, according to the Korean Building Law, multi-
dwelling buildings of single to three stories are defined as row houses and those of
more than three stories as apartments. Row houses are thus distinguished from apart-
ments by the building height. They are no different from apartments in terms of the in-
door structure of housing.
Row houses had been built by small developers while apartments had been mostly con-
stmcted by large developers. Apartments had been built in five to sixteen storied
blocks, in large housing estates with community facilities such as shopping centres,
schools, playgrounds and public gardens. Row houses had been built in small numbers
in small sites often cramped, without such community facilities. The prices had been 60
to 70 percent of those of apartments until the early 1980's. In 1980, when the prices of
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new apartments were over 1 million won per pyong, those of row houses were between
600,000 and 700,000 won (K}{AB, March 1981).
Row houses thus had denoted 'poor quality or cheaper housing'. As row houses had
mostly been built by small developers with poor financial and technological capabilities,
they had often caused trouble in terms of construction quality, financial reliability and
after-sale repair service.
Advance payment by house purchasers had been common for new row houses. A typi-
cal trouble had been that developers simply disappeared with prepayment for the houses
which were only at the initial stage of construction. There were also cases in which de-
velopers sold a house to more than one buyer (Chosun-Ilbo, September 11 1980).
As row houses had caused such trouble in Seoul since 1979, the government began to
regulate their development. In June 1981, the Ministry of Construction (MOC)
amended the Housing Construction Promotion Law (HCPL) to reinforce the control of
row house construction. Up until 1980, housing development plans to build 50 dwelling
units or more in a site had to be approved by the authorities in accordance with the
HCPL. Those for less than 50 units needed only building permission in accordance with
the Building Law. The latter controls only technical aspects of the building and con-
struction works while the former does the methods of housing sales, selling prices,
after-sale repair services, occupancy and as well as building design and construction
process (Chosun-Ilbo, September 111980).
According to the amended HCPL, development plans to build 20 units or more had to
be approved in accordance with the HCPL. This was a response to the increasing
complaints by occupants of row houses of poor quality and the negligence of after-sale
repair works (KHAB, July 1981). In 1983, the Seoul city government increased the
find to be reserved by developers for repair works to 3 percent of the total construc-
tion costs. This was to alleviate the increasing dispute between developers and occu-
pants over the cost of repair services after occupancy (KHAB, May 1983).
The dull housing market and diminishing Apartment Areas in the early 1980's had made
large development companies move into these row house developments. The involve-
ment of large companies in row house development was part of their strategy to cope
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with the declining market and to utilize small pieces of land remaining after the devel-
opment of apartment estates. These companies began to develop higher quality row
houses changing their 'low quality' image. In the conventional row houses, each dwell-
ing unit had its own individual heating system using coal briquettes or an oil boiler.
Housing size were mostly between 20 to 30 pyongs in floor space (KHAB, January
1980; March 1981). Large developers instead provided a central heating system, i.e., a
system which supplies heat and hot water to each dwelling unit from a single boiler
plant centralized for the whole estate. They used higher quality building materials.
Houses were more spacious. By 1983 and 1984, luxurious row houses with 70 to 80
pyongs in floor spaces became common (KHAB, April 1984).
In the period of the apartment development boom in the 1970's, an apartment estate
often included up to several thousands dwelling units. As the prospect of the housing
market was discouraging after the August 8 Measures in 1978, large developers had al-
ready been reducing the scale of development (KHAB, January 1981). Row houses
were the right housing type for developers who wanted to reduce the scale of housing
development. The Price Ceiling for new apartments had made row houses even more
attractive for developers. As the Price Ceiling increasingly became a major barrier to
maximizing development profits, the development of luxurious row houses became a
way of evading the price ceiling.
Row houses had not been put under strict price control until 1983, as they had been
built mostly at lower prices. Thus prominent housing developers could sell luxurious
row houses at much higher prices than those of new apartments which were under the
price ceiling. Row house prices were rising beyond 2 million won/pyong in 1983 when
those of apartments were under the ceiling of 1.34 million won/pyong (KHAB, April
1984). As mentioned before, the early 1980's was the time when price stabilization was
the first priority in government economic policy. Thus the rising prices of luxurious row
houses began to worry the government.
In 1984, Hyundai Construction Co. was building 90 luxurious row houses with floor
areas of 57 to 88 pyongs in Gangnam. The company applied for its plan to sell the
houses at a price of 2.4 million won/pyong. This high price became the talk of the town
and resulted in the high prices of luxurious row houses in general being subject to pub-
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lic criticism. The city government suspended the approval of the application by Hyundai
Co. on grounds of unreasonably high prices. The city government planned to put a
price ceiling on row houses too, at first at 2.2 million won/pyong
(Wolganhyundaejutaek, April 1984). This was finally lowered to 1.8 million won/py-
ong, which has since been the price ceiling for row houses (Maeilkyongje-Shinmoon,
January 18 1988).
However, as the Price Ceiling applied only when one built 20 or more houses on a site,
developers could still avoid the Price Ceiling by building less than 20 houses. It had
been a common practice throughout the 1980's that developers divided land into several
plots and built less than 20 houses on each site as a separate housing project
(interviewee F).
A typical example was Poonglim Villa built in Yangje-Dong in Gangnam in 1989. The
case was reported in a newspaper because of its unprecedented high selling price. The
price was known as the highest for multi-dwelling housing by that time in the country.
The houses, with 70 to 95 pyongs of floor space, were sold at 6.4 million won/pyong.
The site consisted at first of one plot with an area of 998 pyongs in the Land Register.
The developer divided it into two plots, each with 499 pyongs, and built 12 luxurious
row houses on each plot and thereby avoided the Price Ceiling of 1.8 million
won/pyong (Choongang-Ilbo, September 12 1989).
Price control of such luxurious row houses was again raised as a policy issue in 1990.
The city government proposed to control the prices of row houses even when less than
20 houses were built on a site. The MOC considered putting a price ceiling on row
houses on the basis of total floor space rather than the number of dwelling units built on
a site. The idea was however abandoned. It was concluded that such luxurious houses
were annually built in only small numbers and the price control would have little effect
in stabilizing house prices in general. Also, that price control would only cause further
rise in the prices of existing luxurious houses (KHAB, January 1991).
The prices of luxurious row houses were thus rising uncontrolled. In the Gangnam
Area, the prices were around 2.5 million won/pyong in 1985. This rose up to 3 million
in 1986; 5 million in 1988; 10 million in 1990; and up to 15 million in 1991
(interviewee F).
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The development of such luxurious row houses could, however, not be extensive. First
of all, locations were limited. As one interviewee described it: 'There is an exclusive
market for such luxurious row houses with consumer-oriented design, and the
development of row houses is a profitable business. But sites suitable for such
development in terms of location are limited' (interviewee B). Luxurious row
houses built by large developers were thus small in number. Until 1983, row houses
built by Designated Developers, all luxurious ones, were only 1 to 2 percent of the total
houses built by them in Seoul. By 1988, the portion rose to 7 percent but again fell to
less than 1 percent after 1989 (KI-IAB, February 1983; March 1984; February 1988;
March 1989; February 1990).
Small developers, i.e., Registered Developers, have followed large developers in build-
ing more expensive row houses. Most of them began to use 'villa' for the name of their
houses from 1983. Housing size became bigger: until 1982, row houses built by small
developers were between 15 and 30 pyongs in floor space. By 1986, the floor space of
row houses increased to 25 to 40 pyongs. After 1988, it became between 30 and 70 py-
ongs (KHAB, 1979 to 1990, each month).
Row house prices have far exceeded those of apartments. Figure 5.2 shows prices of
row houses built by small developers in the Gangnam Area. House prices for this figure
were obtained from the news on new house sales that appeared every month in the
Korea Housing Association Bulletins (KHAB). This figure is also contrasted to Figure
4.6a (p181) in the previous chapter in terms of the distribution pattern of prices; house
prices show higher dispersion. This may be due to the much greater variation of row
houses in terms of the quality and location than those of apartments.
Nevertheless it is clearly seen that the prices of most new row houses built by small de-
velopers rose beyond the Price Ceiling for new apartments by 1983. Until the end of
1982, the prices were not exceeding I million won/pyong; the prices were below those
of new apartments at that time which were rising beyond 1.3 million won/pyong as seen
in Chapter 4. However, by the end of 1983, most row houses were priced at between
1.4 and 2 million/pyong while new apartment prices were set under the ceiling of 1.34
million won/pyong.
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Figure 5.2	 Prices of Row Houses, Gangnam, 1979-1988.
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Source: Produced on the basis of data compiled from KHA (each
month, 1980-1989).
The portion of row houses, both those built by small developers and luxurious ones
built by large developers, in the total annual housing construction volume in Seoul had
increased during the late 1970's and the early 1980's as shown in Figure 4.3 (p154).
Until 1977, the proportion of row houses within annual total housing construction was
less than 10 percent. In 1979, it rose to 32 percent. Between 1980 and 1983, it was 25
percent on average. Since then 20 to 25 percent of total houses have been annually built
in row houses until 1990 (SMG, 1978-1985, each year). The increase was particularly
considerable in Gangnam. Between 1984 and 1988, on average, more than one third of
annual total housing construction volume was row houses in Gangnam (SMG, 1985-
1989, each year).
This increase in the proportion of row houses which were mostly built outside the Price
Ceiling has undermined the effect of the Price Ceiling to bind land prices for housing as
well as new house prices. Before going into the movement of land prices for housing,
the next subsection will examine another type of housing, cooperative housing, which
has had greater effects in neutralising the house price ceiling.
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0
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0
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5.3.2 Cooperative Housing
The Cooperative Housing System was introduced in the Housing Construction Promo-
tion Law (HCPL) in 1972 when the government launched the Ten-year 2.5 Million
Housing Construction Plan. The aim was to encourage urban middle class families to
build houses with their own funds and arrangements.
According to the HCPL, there are two kinds of housing cooperatives: community hous-
ing cooperatives and employee housing cooperatives. At present, twenty families or
more in a community who do not have their own homes can organize a community
housing cooperative. Twenty employees or more in a corporate body can organize an
employee housing cooperative too. Housing cooperatives then can either build their
own houses or have priority in purchasing public housing. Housing cooperatives which
want to build their own houses have to obtain the approval of the authority for the
organization. Those who want to buy public housing, with priority, need only to report
their existence as an organized cooperative (Article 44, HCPL). Once a housing coop-
erative is formed, it can have priority in purchasing land developed by public agencies
and in the allocation of loans from the National Housing Fund. They are given reduc-
tions or exemptions in taxes associated with new housing. (Wolganhyundaejutaek, May
1987). This study focuses on employee housing cooperatives which build their own
houses since it is they which have had a significant effect on new house prices and con-
sequent land prices in Seoul.
During the 1970's, housing development by cooperatives was negligible. After the
August 8 Measure in 1978, however, cooperative housing began to attract developers'
attention as the marketability of new housing became a problem. In 1979, designated
developers built 14,628 houses across the nation. This meant a 39 percent decrease
compared to 31,647 houses constructed in 1978. However, cooperative housing con-
structed by designated developers increased to 2,443 units, almost double of that con-
structed in 1978 (KHAB, February 1980).
When housing development was becoming stagnant in 1979 and 1980, some housing
experts and developers recommended to the government to promote cooperative
housing construction by reducing taxes for it. It was argued that cooperative housing
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could be a way of increasing housing provision without incurring housing speculation
as no speculative market existed for it; and that cooperative housing could be devel-
oped without extra cost for land development since it could use small plots of idle land
in developed areas. (KHAB, February 1980).
In the early 1980's, the government adopted a series of measures to encourage coop-
erative housing as the government was also keen to promote housing development
without hurting the stabilization-first economic policy. The government relaxed the
required conditions for organizing housing cooperatives. The minimum number of
cooperative members was reduced to twenty from the previous thirty. According to the
existing regulation at that time, only those working in firms or agencies with 500
employees or more could organize an employees housing cooperative. This was relaxed
to firms and agencies with 100 to 300 employees. Additional incentives were given in
terms of taxation and financing (KHAB, November 1980). In January 1982, the MOC
made it obligatory for companies to provide 10 percent or more of pension funds to
finance cooperative housing development for their employees (Chosun-Ilbo, January 23
1982). The government reduced the Property Acquisition Taxes and relaxed regula-
tions on the transfer of cooperative membership in January 1984 (Dong-A-Ilbo, January
16 1984).
This cooperative housing has gradually become liable for speculative development since
the property boom in 1983. For developers, cooperative housing, together with luxuri-
ous row houses, was becoming a means to evade the Price Ceiling as the price control
system did not apply to it. Large development companies began to expand business in
cooperative housing developments. The following is the examination of how specula-
tive demand for cooperative housing had been growing during the 1980's.
From the point of view of purchasers, cooperative housing might be more expensive as
the prices were not under the government control. However, advantages were greater.
First, as seen in Chapter 3 and 4, there had been excessive demand for new apartments
built under the Price Ceiling in Seoul, particularly in Gangnam. There was a long wait-
ing list for those who wanted to buy such new apartments. They had to wait for many
years subscribing to saving systems for housing in order to be able to purchase new
apartments. Cooperative members were bypassing such long waiting list for housing.
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More importantly, cooperative housing could be cheaper than those of new apartments
which were sold under the Bond Bidding System, which will be outlined below.
From the late 1982 to the late 1983, the gap between the controlled prices and the ac-
tual market prices of apartments were sharply increasing in Seoul as shown in Figure
4.4 (p159). As mentioned before, the differences between the two prices are called
premiums in Korea. These premiums were mostly realized by the first buyers of new
apartments. Hence the prevalence of speculation on new apartments. The idea of the
Bond Bidding System was to convert those premiums into public housing funds. The
system was introduced in 1983. In the system, developers sell new apartments at con-
trolled prices. But new apartment buyers have to purchase government bonds. The
amount of government bonds is not predetermined but determined through a compita-
tive bidding process; new apartment buyers must participate in the process of competa-
tive bidding for government bonds. The highest bidder wins the unit and is obliged to
purchase government bonds in the amount pledged in the bid before the sale is officially
executed. Thus in the system, developers are paid for their apartments at the controlled
prices while house purchasers pay the controlled prices for houses plus the value of
government bonds. The system applies to certain large apartments in the areas desig-
nated by the government as Speculative Areas (Article 13-2 Clause 2, The Housing
Sale Ordinance).
As the Bond Bidding System did not apply to cooperative housing, the prices of coop-
erative housing were still cheaper than the prices to be paid under the Bond Bidding
System. Cooperative housing thus became increasingly popular among wage-earning
middle class people. It was mostly in large enterprises, financial agencies and govern-
ment agencies that housing cooperatives were actively formed. Members of such coop-
eratives were much better paid than those in small and medium size enterprises. In the
latter, it was difficult for employees to form cooperatives because of the smallness of
their own savings and the inability of employers to give necessary financial support
(Wolganhyundaejutaek, July 1985).
Thus cooperative housing has increasingly become an object of speculation among well
paid employees in large enterprises and agencies since the property boom in 1983. It
became a common practice that existing homeowners, pretending to be non-homeown-
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ers, became members of housing cooperatives. Once houses were built, they resold
them realizing a lump sum of capital gains (Wolganhyundaejutaek, July 1985; May
1987; Budongsankyongje, March 1991).
This brought public criticism. The city government had already restricted the resale of
cooperative housing built with financial support from the National Housing Funds;
houses could not be resold within 6 months after the first time occupancy (KHAB,
March 1983). Later, the period was extended to two years. The Seoul city government
also restricted the size of cooperative housing as the house units tended to become
larger in size in July 1985. The new regulations required housing size not to be larger
than 25.7 pyongs in floor space (Kyonghyang-Shinmoon, July 27 1985). This was a
resolute step to control the speculative trade of cooperative housing (KHAB, Septem-
ber 1985).
There existed a wide impression that community housing cooperatives were mostly
fraudulent ones. In provincial cities, they were widely used by small developers to bor-
row funds on favourable terms from the National Housing Fund (NHF)
(Wolganhyundaejutaek, July 1985). In Seoul, the city government prohibited in 1987
organizing community cooperatives except in redevelopment areas. This was to prevent
speculators and real estate agencies from organizing bogus cooperatives, which were
prevalent in the name of community cooperatives (KHAB, March 1987).
Towards the late 1980's, the government reinforced the control of cooperative housing.
In February 1988, the MOC extended the Price Ceiling upon those cooperative houses
which remained after houses were allocated to the cooperative members and were to be
sold to non-members (Kyonghyang-Shinmoon, February 29 1988). In 1991, the city
government made it obligatory for cooperatives to allocate 50 or more percent of hous-
ing to smaller houses with 18 pyongs or less in floor space (KHAB, May 1991).
However, speculative demand for cooperative housing persisted. According to a report
of the Board of Audit and Inspection, out of 674 cooperatives with 27,823 members
organized since 1984, 523 of them with 21,030 members, turned out to be forged ones.
Despite the regulation prohibiting resale of houses within two years after completion,
9,591 units were resold within the prohibited period (Wolganhyundaejutaek, May
1987).
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Membership of housing cooperatives itself began to be traded at high prices. In 1990,
membership of a cooperative in Gangnam was traded at 20 million won. The prices of
cooperative housing often went up to 200 million won (approximately 7 million
won/pyong). In October 1990, cooperative housing was traded in other parts of Seoul
at a premium of tens of millions won even before the development plan was officially
approved. Some real estate agencies established bogus companies and sold employee
certificates required to organize a housing cooperative (KHAB, October 1988).
In response to this increasing speculative demand for cooperative housing, large devel-
opers have actively been involved in the development of cooperative housing. As men-
tioned before, when the cooperative housing system was first introduced, the idea was
to encourage people themselves to build their own houses on their own initiative. How-
ever, as the Price Ceiling increasingly became a barrier to realizing maximum develop-
ment profits by the mid-1980's, developers began to use cooperative housing, among
other tricks, as a means to evade the Price Ceiling.
In the cooperative housing system, cooperatives become developers. They are to pre-
pare development plans, obtain the approval of the authorities, purchase land, hire
construction companies and sell the houses to cooperative members and non-members
if there are extra houses. Since all these works need expertise, it has been common that
cooperatives entrust all the works to development companies. In this process prominent
development companies were preferred since the market value of housing is affected by
the prestige of the companies which built that housing. Large development companies
have, however, not remained merely contractors of construction works. They them-
selves began to initiate cooperative housing development. It became common that
development companies purchase land, make development plans and then invite hous-
ing cooperatives. Cooperative housing has thus become a development method to
avoid the price ceiling and thereby to maximize development profits (KHAB, October
1988; Budongsankyongje, March 1991).
Information on how developers realize maximum development profits in cooperative
housing exist only by word of mouth. In the interviews for this study, this was the sub-
ject on which most interviewees were reluctant to give details. Two interviewees, from
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a small development company and the KNHC, provided the details of how cooperative
housing development had worked.
An interviewee suggested a case example: 'a developer built houses for a coopera-
tive with say 35 members on a site on which 50 houses could be built. In this case,
the developer can sell the extra 15 houses to non-members at market prices (when
the extra houses are 20 or more, the sale must be open to the public at controlled
prices). What is more, all the 35 members are not original cooperative members;
only, say, 20 are original members. The remaining 15 are those who were invited
to join the cooperative later. To these later joiners too, the developer sells the
houses at market prices' (interviewee J). This was corroborated by another inter-
viewee, a small developer, who further explained the role of real estate agencies in the
above process: 'real estate agencies often take part to organize cooperatives or
invite members who want to join cooperatives later. They sell membership to
these later applicants. Only to the original 20 members, the minimum number for
organising a cooperative, are houses sold at cheaper prices on agreement though
still higher than the controlled prices' (interviewee I).
Development companies go through all the administrative procedures in the name of
housing cooperatives. To do this, the companies formally sell land to cooperatives and
participate in the development as a contractor of construction works. This is nothing
but an expedient means to sell houses at higher prices than the price ceiling
(interviewee I).
The results of investigations by the Board of Audit and Inspection and the Public
Prosecutions Administration of cooperative housing development add support to these
statements by the interviewees. Two cases were made public and brought public criti-
cism in 1991 and 1992. They illustrate how development companies have exploited the
cooperative housing system.
The first case, called Suseo Affair, shook the government and political circles at the be-
ginning of 1991. The company involved in the case was Hanbo Housing Company
Ltd., a leading housing developer. The company purchased 35,500 pyongs of land in
the Suseo area (near Gaepo shown in Figure 4.2, p148) in Gangnam between April
1988 and June 1989. The company then invited 26 housing cooperatives with 3,360
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members and made an agreement with them on housing development. Land was for-
mally resold to the cooperatives in December 1989 on a tacit agreement that Hanbo
would build housing for the cooperatives on the land (Budongsankyongje, March
1991).
Earlier in March 1989, however, some 400,000 pyongs of land in the Suseo area
including the land which Hanbo had purchased was designated by the city government
for a Public Purchase and Development (PPD) Area. This meant that Hanbo had to
yield their land to the city government at the appraised value on the basis of previous
use, farm land in a Green Area. Once the land was sold to and developed by the city
government by the PPD, it was in principle to be sold to developers who would build
housing for public sale, not cooperative housing. Hanbo, after it sold the land to hous-
ing cooperatives, began to press the city government to provide the land to the housing
cooperatives after the PPD project in the area. The company incited housing coopera-
tives to appeal to the city government, the Ministry of Construction (MOC), the
National Assembly and the Presidential Office for special provision of land to them. The
cooperative members were from government agencies, newspaper companies and banks
which could have a certain influence on the city government decision. At the same time,
Hanbo itself lobbied men of influence in both the ruling and opposition parties and the
government by offering political funds in secrecy (Budongsankyongje, March 1991;
Kim, ID, 1991).
The city government rejected the demand for special provision of land several times
until September 1990, when it finally yielded to the increasing pressure from the central
government, the National Assembly and the Presidential Secretariat Office. This soon
raised a scandal. As the city government decided to give such special privileges to
housing cooperatives, landowners and residents in the area rose up against it. They also
demanded land after development instead of cash for the compensation of their land
which was to be sold compulsorily to the city government. Landowners and residents
went on stay-in strikes at the city hail for several days in succession. Some subscribers
of the Housing Subscription Savings System, waiting for their turn to buy new apart-
ments at the controlled prices, did not stand idle. They instituted a suit in the high court
against the decision of the city government to provide land to housing cooperatives as
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their chances to get new apartments were reduced (Budongsankyongje, March 1991;
Kim, ID, op. cit.).
In January 1991, it became a political issue. Rumours ran that there were illicit transac-
tions of a colossal sum of political funds between Hanbo and high ranking government
officials and politicians including those in the Presidential Offices. President Rho
ordered the Board of Audit and Inspection and the Prosecutor General to investigate
the matter in February 1991. The affair led to nine arrests and imprisonment including
high ranking officials from the Presidential Offices and the MOC, and five National
Assemblymen from both ruling and opposition parties; the resignation of two ministers
and the mayor of Seoul; and a shake up in the ruling party. The decision to allow the
land for the cooperatives was cancelled (Segye-Ilbo, January 31 1991; Budong-
sankyongje, March 1991; Kim, I. D, op. cit.).
A similar incident happened in a neighbouring borough, Gangdong-Gu in 1992. Kun-
young Construction Corporation, a newly growing housing development company, pur-
chased 6,425 pyongs of land from the Korea Land Development Corporation (KLDC)
in April 1988. The internal regulation of the KLDC prescribed that land developed by
the method of the Public Purchase and Development (PPD) could not be provided for
cooperative housing. Thus the land was sold to Kunyoung on the condition that the
land would not be used for that purpose. However, from the beginning Kunyoung had a
plan to build cooperative housing in the land ignoring the KLDC regulation (Chosun-
Ilbo, October 23, 25, 26, 31, 1992).
After the purchase, the company began to demand that the KLDC change the regula-
tion and lobbied those in authority to influence the KLDC to accept the company's
demand in June 1989. The KLDC changed its regulation to allow Kunyoung to sell the
land to housing cooperatives in September 1989. The company then invited 8 housing
cooperatives with 545 members and sold the land to the cooperatives in November
1989. In September 1990, these housing cooperatives obtained the approval for hous-
ing development on the land. Although the land was formally sold to the cooperatives,
Kunyoung had its subsidiary company to contract the construction works. Thus the
company was in control of the whole development process (Chosun-Ilbo, October 23,
25, 26, 31, November 2, 11, 12 1992). This process involved irregularities. These were
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the ignored or infringed regulations on cooperative housing which had been strength-
ened since 1988, and which will be examined below.
As of 1990, there were about one million subscribers of saving systems for housing: the
Housing Subscription Saving System and the Housing Subscription Deposit System in
Seoul (KNHC, 1992b). They had been waiting for many years for an opportunity to
buy houses at controlled prices which were much lower than market prices. The
increasing involvement of developers in cooperative housing meant their turning away
from housing development for public sale under the price control system and thus less
opportunities for the above subscribers. This worried the government. The government
began to regulate the involvement of housing developers in cooperative housing. In
February 1988, the MOC promulgated a regulation prohibiting developers or construc-
tion companies who sold their land to housing cooperatives to become contractors of
the same cooperatives (Chosun-Ilbo, October 26 1992). However, large developers
adopted an expedient to entrust the construction works to their own subsidiary com-
panies, as was the case with Kunyoung in the above incident, or construction compa-
nies affiliated to the same business group (interviewee I).
In July 1989, the MOC laid down a new regulation that the authorities hold the right to
reject any application for cooperative housing development when the land was pur-
chased from housing development or construction companies. On the authority of this
regulation, the Seoul city government instructed its borough municipalities not to give
approval to plans to build cooperative housing on land owned by or purchased from
development or construction companies (Chosun-Ilbo, October 26 1992). In the above
case of Kunyoung, the borough office ignored that instruction. The case underwent an
inspection of the Board of Audit and Inspection in November 1992. As housing con-
struction was almost completed at the time of the inspection, the case was ended by
punishing public officials who had ignored the regulations (Chosun-Ilbo, November 2,
11, 121992).
The above two cases were made public because they became objects of investigation by
the Tax Administration, the Public Prosecutions Administration or the Board of Audit
and Inspection for their violation of such regulations. The cases may not be generalized.
Nonetheless, the cases confirm the information collected from interviews.
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First, both have in common that developers arranged cooperative housing development
on land they had already purchased. Both companies resorted to an expedient to evade
the regulations mentioned above. They sold land to cooperatives only formally; but in
reality they were actively involved (Kunyoung) or going to be involved (Hanbo) in the
development of housing by having their subsidiary companies contract the construction
works.
Both cases involved speculative cooperative members. When the Suseo scandal broke
out in Gangnam, half of the cooperative members turned out to have been existing
homeowners, who were not eligible for housing cooperative membership. In the case of
Kunyoung, 21 percent of the cooperative members turned out to be unqualified for
membership (Chosun-Ilbo, November 111992).
Cooperative housing has thus become a major type of housing development for large
housing development companies, a way to evade the price ceiling. It is no longer what
it was originally intended to be: a system in which people themselves build their own
houses with their own funds and arrangements. The significance of the cooperative
housing system to this study is its effect on new house prices and land prices, which will
be examined below.
As the Price Ceiling was not applied to cooperative housing, their prices could rise un-
limited. Up until 1987, the rise in prices was moderate. For example, the Hyundai
Apartments (which are highly reputed in the country) built for housing cooperatives in
Gueui-Dong, the other side of the Han River opposite to Apgujeong (see Figure 4.2,
p148) in the late 1987, were priced at around 1.6 million won/pyong while the price
ceiling remained at 1.34 million won/pyong. (Mailkyongje-Shinmoon, January 18
1988). The prices began to rise rapidly from 1988 when the property market started to
boom. In 1988, prices of cooperative housing rose up to 2.5 million won/pyong
(Mailkyongje-Shinmoon, October 14, 1989).
In 1990, the prices were between 2.5 and 3 million/pyong. In the same year, new apart-
ment purchasers under the Bond Bidding System had to pay around 4 million
won/pyong including the prices of the government bonds in Seoul. In the Gangnam
area, market prices of apartments in prestigious areas were reaching 10 million
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won/pyong. Thus cooperative housing members could still realize a capital gain of two
or three times the prices they paid in the extreme case in Gangnam (Budongsankyongje,
March 1991).
Statistics of annual construction of cooperative housing are not available for the whole
period of 1980's. In Seoul, 23,163 cooperative houses were built by 1988, 13,470 in
1989 and 23,531 in 1990 (Budongsankyongje, March 1991). Since these houses have
mostly been built since 1984 (KHAB, October 1988), annual cooperative housing con-
struction in the latter half of the 1980's is estimated around 10,000 houses on average,
14.6 percent of annual private housing construction in Seoul.
The increasing involvement of developers in housing which were not under price con-
trol such as row houses and cooperative housing resulted in the increasing ineffective-
ness of price control.
So far in this section, the ways in which developers have avoided the Price Ceiling Sys-
tem by building row houses and cooperative housing has been examined. An examina-
tion of how many houses have actually evaded the price ceiling will show how far the
price ceiling has become ineffective by such practices of developers. Then the ways in
which these have provided scope for land prices to rise and subsequently pressure
house prices into growing will be examined in the following subsection.
5.3.3 Ineffectiveness of the Price Ceiling System and Rising Land Prices
In 1981, development plans by private developers for 11,834 apartments were
approved in accordance with the Housing Construction Promotion Law (HCPL) in
Seoul. Out of this, 11,008 were for public sale under the Price Ceiling System (SMG,
1982). This accounted for 40 percent of total private housing constructed in that year.
Data on private housing built under the Price Ceiling System in the late 1980's are not
directly available. Thus an estimation was made.
Table 5.1 was prepared to estimate private housing construction under the Price Ceiling
System (the Factor Cost Linkage System in 1990(6)). As mentioned before, housing
6) This is mentioned in Section 3.6.2, Chapter 3
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Table 5.1
	 Estimation of Private Housing Construction under Price
Control, Seoul, 1986-1990.
_________ _________ _________ _________ 	 dwelling units
Total	 Apart-	 Coop-	 Rede-	 Housing	 Per-
private	 ments	 erative	 velopme under price	 centag
housing (B)
	 housing nt
	 control	 e
(A)	 (C)	 housing (E)=(B-C-D) (ME)
	
1986 98,259	 48,326	 n.a	 14,429 ___________ _____
	
1987 54,829	 31,036	 6,041	 12,379	 12,616	 23.0
	
1988 49,064	 18,070	 n.a	 9,723 ___________ _____
	
1989 54,298	 21,677	 13,470	 6,123	 2,084	 3.8
	
1990 91,567	 31,725	 23,531	 1,336	 6,858	 7.5
Source: Produced for this thesis based on data from SMG (1987-
1991, each year); KNHC (1991); Budongsankyongje, March
1991.
development projects which build 20 houses or more on a single site are subject to the
price control for housing sales. Detached houses and row houses have mostly been built
on small sites with less than 20 houses and are thus excluded from the object of price
control. It is mostly apartments which have been built under price control. Column B in
the table indicates total apartments built by private developers in Seoul. Column C is
apartments for housing cooperatives which have not been under the price control. Col-
umn D presents redevelopment housing which has also not been under the Price Ceil-
ing(7).
Now by subtracting both redevelopment housing and cooperative housing from apart-
ments built by private developers in column B, an estimation of the number of housing
under the price control is obtained. The figures in column E are the estimated number
of private housing built under the price control. In 1987, those under the price control
accounted for 23 percent of total private housing construction. For 1988, although an
estimation cannot be made due to the lack of data on cooperative housing, the annual
7) Redevelopment Housing here indicates housing built in the Joint Re-
development, the redevelopment of squatter settlements by the joint venture of
cooperatives of squatters and construction companies. In this scheme, land,
mostly state land or city land, is sold to squatters at appraised prices, and direct
relationship between private landowners and developers does not exist. Thus in
this research, redevelopment housing is not considered in detail.
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report for the city administration notes that private housing development under the
price ceiling was almost non-existent (SMG, 1987). Thus the percentage in 1988 is
estimated at less than 5 similarly to that in 1989. In 1990, after the Price Ceiling System
was replaced by the new Factor Cost Linkage System in the late 1989, the percentage
rose to 7.5.
This decrease in housing construction under the Price Ceiling System implies that the
Price Ceiling became almost ineffective in the late 1980's. In other words, most private
housing developers were avoiding the Price Ceiling System by the late 1980's. In this
respect, the common argument that the Price Ceiling has discouraged housing develop-
ment by making it unprofitable during the I 980s is unfounded. New house prices have
been rising almost uncontrolled in the late 1980's. The question is whether such uncon-
trolled high prices of row houses and cooperative housing have been caused by high
land prices.
As mentioned above, luxurious row houses and cooperative housing development
began in the early 1980's in Seoul. It was the time when housing developers could still
realize good profits in the city. Figure 4.8b (p187) shows that apartment development
in Gangnam was yielding a development profit of 15 to 25 percent of new house prices.
An interviewee, a managing director of a leading housing development company,
remembered that: 'until around 1984, apartment development was yielding a sur-
plus profit of 100,000 to 200,000 wons per pyong in Seoul' (interviewee B). These
figures are equivalent to 10 to 20 percent of new apartment prices. Thus it cannot be
said that it was because apartment development under the price ceiling was unprofitable
that developers turned to luxurious row houses and cooperative housing in the early
and mid-1980's.
In the late 1980's, many large developers were building cooperative housing on their
own land which they had been holding for many years (Interviewee, J; D). According
to a Ministry of Construction (MOC) report, Designated Developers in Seoul were
holding around 270,000 pyongs of land in 1989, which could accommodate more than
15,000 to 25,000 units if built in 15-storied apartment blocks (Hankookkyongje-Shin-
moon, February 23 1989; Seoulkyongje-Shinmoon, April 4 1989). This land was
mostly used for cooperative housing. Leading development companies such as Woo-
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sung, Daewoo and Hyundai Ho. were building cooperative housing on their own land
which they bought several years ago in all parts of Seoul in the late 1980's
(Seoulkyongje-Shinmoon, April 4 1989).
This implies that the development of luxurious row houses and cooperative housing
was not forced by rising land prices. An analysis of new house prices in terms of its
breakdown into development profits, construction cost and land cost (as has been done
in Table 4.3 (p186) in Chapter 4) would confirm this quantitatively. However, the
analysis in this section cannot but be very rough because of the high degree of disper-
sion in new houses prices and lack of data. As seen in Figure 5.2, the prices of row
houses have been highly dispersed because of their diversity in design, quality of con-
struction and location. Row houses are mostly built in small sites with less than 20 units
and thus their prices are likely to be affected by locational differences. Thus it is
extremely difficult to delineate the correlation between land prices and house prices for
a large area such as Gangnam. Apartment prices, on the other hand, are relatively less
dispersed since apartments are built in large estates with hundreds to thousands of
dwelling units and thus much less affected by such small locational differences. Thus in
this research the prices of cooperative housing, almost all of which are apartments,
were analysed.
Table 5.2 shows the change in the estimated breakdown of cooperative housing prices
between 1986 and 1991. The prices of cooperative housing have not been made public
since they have not been sold to the public. Approximate average prices of cooperative
housing were obtained from newspapers and real estate magazines as mentioned in sub-
section 5.3.2. For construction cost, the KNHC estimation was used for the same rea-
son as explained for Table 4.3 (p186). For land prices, the Korea Appraisal Board
(KAB) and the Korea Appraisers Association (KAA) data were used for 1986 to 1990
and for 1991 respectively. The prices are averages of middle grade land in central areas
(Banpo, Seocho and Daechi) of Gangnam where private apartment development has
concentrated. As was done for Table 4.3, it was assumed that there was one year time
lag between land purchase and housing sale; thus land prices of previous year were
matched against house prices of each year. Accordingly one year interest rate on loans
of commercial banks, 10 percent per annum (BOK, 1991), was added to land prices.
Figures in column C are land prices calculated in this way. These land prices were mul-
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tiplied by the Floor Area Ratio (FAR, column D), the ratio of floor space to site area,
to be converted into land cost (E), i.e., land prices per a pyong of floor space of houses.
The FAR was 200 percent until 1987 and 250 after that following the change in density
regulations (see next section). Finally, development profits in Column F were obtained
by subtracting construction cost (B) and land cost (E) from house prices.
This is presented into a chart, Figure 5.3. The top line indicates the prices of coopera-
tive housing and the bottom area indicates the portion of land cost within house prices.
The hatched area between this land cost and construction cost, the top area, represents
development profits. Surplus profits included in the development profits provided room
for land prices to rise.
For Table 4.3 in Chapter 4, surplus profit was calculated by subtracting normal profits
from this development profit. The Normal Profit to Net Sale (NPNS) in the construc-
tion industry was used for normal profit. Since 1986, the NPNS in the construction in-
dustry has been null or negative (BOK, 1991). Thus if the NPNS is taken as the normal
profit for this case, the development profit as presented as hatched area in the figure
can be regarded as surplus profit. It indicates the room for land cost to rise further. In
Table 5.2
House
Year Prices
(A)
Changes in Development Gains in Cooperative Housing,
Gangnam, Seoul, 1986-1991.
_________ _______Unit:_thousand_won/pyong 	 -
Constmc- Land	 Land	 Devel-	 F/A
tion Cost Prices FAR Cost	 opment (%)
(B)	 (D)	 (%) (E)	 Profit
1986	 1,450	 630	 1,200	 200	 600	 220 15.2
1987	 1,500	 636	 1,300	 200	 650	 214 143
1988	 1,600	 712	 1,350	 250	 540	 348 21.8
1989	 2,500	 795	 1,540	 250	 620	 1,085 43.4
1990	 3,000	 928	 2,500	 250	 1,000	 1,072 35.7
1991	 4.000	 1.000	 5.500	 250	 2.200	 800 20.0
Source: Produced for this thesis based on data from Mailkyongje-
Shimnoon (January 18, 1988; October 14, 1988), Budong-
sankyongje (March, 1991) for house prices; KNHC (1992a)
for construction cost; KAB (1985-1989, each year), KAA
(1990) for land prices.
C,
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Figure 5.3	 Changes in Development Gains in Cooperative Hous-
ing, Gangnam, Seoul, 1986-1991.
Year
Source: Produced based on Table 5.3
1986 and 1987, when the housing market was still stagnant and thus house prices were
steady, the profits were only marginal. In 1988, house prices began to rise rapidly while
land costs slightly fell because of the relaxation of density regulation, which will be dis-
cussed soon. In 1989, house prices rose very rapidly yielding a very high surplus profit.
For those houses sold in 1990, land cost began to catch up with house prices. This is a
rough estimation. Yet, it is seen that high house prices have provided the room for land
prices to rise sharply in the late 1980's; as it was in the 1970's and the early 1980's as
seen in Figure 4.8a and 4.8b (p187), in the late 1980's too, high house prices have
enabled high land prices. This coincides with what Hypothesis One suggests.
The remaining question in this chapter is Research Question Two about the role of
landowners: their behaviour in the process of creating and appropriating development
gains and its effects on housing development. This is examined in the following section
in reference to the above housing development situation in the late 1980's.
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5.4 Conflicts, Compromise and the Increasing Government
Intervention
Regarding Hypothesis Two, landowners' behaviour in transforming surplus profits into
land prices has been described in the previous chapter. Yet the examination of the
effects of such behaviour on housing development was left over to this chapter. It has
been hypothesized that the effects are that as certain developers work out new ways of
increasing surplus profits, these new ways soon become the norm. And that difficulties
due to the conflicts between landowners and developers have induced government
intervention, politicizing the determination of land prices.
This section first examines what has happened to the relation between landowners and
developers when it was not directly interfered in by the government. Then it examines
the effects of government intervention.
5.4.1 Changing Ways of Housing Development
The transformation of parts of development gains into the form of land rent or prices is
not carried out in an orderly way. It is facilitated through such unmanageable behaviour
in the land market as monopoly pricing, land withholding and waiting, and speculative
transactions as described for the case of Seoul in the previous chapter.
Such market behaviour was no longer peculiar to Seoul in the late 1980's. In provincial
cities too, land acquisition had become no longer easy. Since the late 1980's, developers
have faced monopoly pricing, land withholding and waiting by farming landowners, and
the trickeries of real estate agencies and speculators in the land market.
Farmer landowners are also difficult to negotiate with. A small developer interviewee
even argued that 'landowners, mostly farmers in small provincial towns, are never
negotiable with at all. They do not care how much their own land is worth but
how much others are paid in the area' (interviewee I). Though this may be a one-
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sided view, all the interviewees agreed that it became increasingly difficult to purchase
from farmer landowners.
Thus most developers have to rely on local real estate agents for mediation. In some
cases, the agents themselves arrange land for developers. They persuade landowners to
sell land at certain prices, then propose developers to buy the land. In this process they
often put several developers into competition with each other raising the prices
(interviewee A; I).
Thus know-how and skills in land dealing have become even more critical in housing
development than before. In the period of development boom in 1988 and 1989, com-
panies who did not have expertise in land dealing often gave up plans to purchase land
from private landowners and turned to public developers for land. Even those who have
well organized land agents networks could purchase only half of the land which they
originally planned to do as of Februaiy 1989 (Hankookkyongje-Shinmoon, February 23
1989).
Towards the end of the 1980's, irregularities associated with land transactions for coop-
erative housing were added to such old practices in the land market. As cooperative
housing development boomed, dealing in land for cooperative housing became lucra-
tive. Residential land remaining undeveloped has been thoroughly searched for coop-
erative housing. Land brokerage has often gone to excess to stir up trouble. Green
tracts of land, used to serve neighbouring residents as parks for many years, has been
converted into land for cooperative housing. This process has raised troubles between
landowners and the municipalities, and between cooperatives and the neighbouring
residents (Seoulkyongje-Shinmoon, September 211989). Lobbying and bribing public
officials in the authorities concerned became common for the conversion of Green
Areas into Residential Areas and for the approval of development plans
(Budongsankyongje, March 1991; Huh, SF1, 1991). Fraudulence in land brokerage has
been frequently disclosed by police investigation. In some cases, brokers defrauded
cooperatives of their prepayments for land by lying that they would buy the coopera-
tives the city-owned land at cheap prices, or would have Green Areas converted into
residential one (KHAB, October 1988; May 1991).
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By the end of the 1980's, land available for apartment development in Seoul except that
provided through the PPD had been priced at the levels at which only cooperative
housing could be profitably developed. An interviewee stated: 'land prices in Seoul
have now las of March 1992] risen up to 4 to 5 million won per pyong. Only
housing cooperatives can buy land at such prices and can still profitably develop
housing. It is no longer profitable if one pays for land more than 2 million won
per pyong for apartment development under the price control' (interviewee B).
Another interviewee thus blamed housing cooperatives for such high land prices: 'all
land in important locations in Seoul is now held by housing cooperatives. Housing
cooperatives are the very ringleaders who have instigated a rapid rise in land
prices for housing' (interviewee D).
In the previous chapter, it has been noted that Hanshin Co., a leading housing develop-
ment company, failed to purchase the remaining land in an Apartment Area in Banpo in
the early 1980's. It was as late as 1990 that the company could develop the land and
then only by building apartments for housing cooperatives. An interviewee indicated
this as an example in which a developer had no option but to build cooperative housing
(interviewee B).
This implies that developers had to build cooperative housing if they were going to pur-
chase land for housing in such a particular circumstance in which cooperative housing
became a way of realising higher surplus profits by evading the Price Ceiling System.
This has caused a trouble to small developers.
It is not because high land prices make housing development less profitable but because
they increase the minimum level of capital investment per a unit area of land. One inter-
viewee from a small development company stated the difficulties. 'For small develop-
ers who build 50 to 100 houses a year, it is difficult to build high rise apartments
because it takes much longer time to build them than low rise ones( 8). Small
developers build 5 storied apartments to quicken the turnover of the working
8) 15 storied apartments take 20 months or more while 5 storied ones take 12 to 15
months for their construction (KNHC, 1992c).
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funds although high rise ones are desirable to save land cost' (Interviewee I). This
means that as land prices rise faster, their competitiveness decrease.
Moreover, rapidly rising land prices drive small developers out of profitable develop-
ment areas. The interviewee continued: 'it is desired to do housing development in
Seoul with a very good marketability. The problem is that as the land prices are
so rapidly increasing, the scale of projects must be reduced in terms of develop-
ment area as the development cycle is repeated. In other words, with small op-
erational capital with which 50 to 100 houses could be built annually, it is difficult
to keep up with the rising land prices. Thus many small developers had to move
into provincial cities where land prices are still at lower levels' (interviewee I).
High development density is an instance in which the conflicts between landowners and
developers have resulted in the increase in the nonnal level of capital investment in
land. In 1978 when apartment estate development was booming, the city government
regulated building distance to be kept at a minimum of 1.2 times building height to
secure the right of neighbours to sunshine. The Floor Area Ratio (FAR), the ratio of
building floor space to the site area, was kept under 180 percent (SMG, 1978).
As developers increasingly complained of the rising land cost, the city government al-
lowed developers to build 16 storied or higher apartment buildings in 1985. Until that
time the apartment building height was restricted at 15 stories. It was a part of the
measures to promote housing development in the mid- 1980's when annual housing
construction was at low levels (Choongang-Ilbo, July 26 1985).
In 1987, the regulations on building density were again relaxed. The minimum building
distance was reduced from 1.2 times building height to 1. The maximum FAR was
raised from 180 to 250 percent (SMG, 1987). When the implementation of the Two
Million House Construction Plan became a pressing policy issue in the late 1980's, the
regulations were further relaxed. The maximum FAR increased from 250 percent to
300 percent; the Building Coverage, the ratio of the ground floor area to the site area,
was increased from 25 percent to 30; the building distance was reduced from 1 times
the building height to 0.8 (Seoulkyongje-Shinmoon, March, 23 1990; Choongang-Ilbo,
April 4 1990).
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However, the relaxation of the density regulations has only had temporary effects in
reducing the burden of land cost. The savings are soon transformed into land prices. 'It
helped save land cost only for land which developers have already purchased'
(interviewee B). It was for this reason that developers have always been calling for fur-
ther relaxation of the density regulations. The problem has been that they had to pay
more for new land for the next turn of business. Landowners are quick to price their
land at the level which only the new higher density development can afford. An inter-
viewee testified that 'it is of no help to relax the density regulations in solving the
problem of rising land cost to developers' (interviewee B).
Whenever the government relaxed density regulations, it was justified by the assertion
that it was inevitable to reduce the land cost burden to develop cheap houses. That
assertion is, in this respect, unfounded. Relaxing the density regulations in the end
results in higher land prices.
5.4.2 Towards the Direct Control of Land Prices
5.4.2.1 Landowner-Developer Joint Development
In the late 1980's, it became extremely difficult to purchase land from private landown-
ers in Seoul. Monopoly pricing was as before, a practice such that when a developer
buys land in an area, a few landowners demand two to three times the prices paid to
others in the same area (interviewee I). One small developer interviewed was having
such a problem at the time of interview. He obtained the city government's approval for
a housing development plan which needs some 5,000 pyongs of land. He bought up
about 3,000 pyongs at 2 to 2.5 million won/pyong up to April 1992. However, the
remaining landowners began to demand 6 to 7 million won/pyong for their land without
which the development plan could not be carried out. The project came to a deadlock
16 months after the company began to purchase land. The company was thus in finan-
cial difficulties with 7 billion won tied up in the land (interviewee H). Thus developers
often have to reduce the site to exclude land for which owners demand monopoly
prices and thus develop the site in odd shapes. In other cases, smaller developers who
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have such monopoly price problems give up land to larger ones who have expertise in
land dealing (interviewee I). Interviewees from the Korea Housing Association (KHA)
and Hanyang agreed that 'now it is inconceivable to purchase land for housing
development through negotiations with 70 to 80 landowners in Seoul' (intervie-
wee, G).
At the end of the 1980's, landowners too were not undisturbed. As seen in Chapter 3,
public criticism on housing and land speculation reached its peak in 1988 and 1989; the
government had to take tougher measures to regulate land holdings and hoarding. The
legislation of Landgonggaenium(9) was the result. Three laws were legislated in
December 1989: the Law Regarding Development Gain Tax; the Law Regarding Ex-
cessive Capital Gain Tax and the Law Regarding the Limitation of Housing Land
Holding. This new policy environment has increased pressures on landowners to release
land for development (Choi, C.K, 1991).
The Law Regarding Excessive Capital Gain Tax provides regulations on the taxation of
capital gains on idle land. It aims to put pressure on landowners to release land for de-
velopment. When the price of certain idle land rises faster than the average land price in
its appropriate administrative area, the landowner has to pay 50 percent of the exces-
sive rise, i.e., the difference between the rise in the price of that particular individual
land and that of average land in the relevant administrative district (Thid).
With the enforcement of this law, landowners were put into a dilemma. If they sold
land, they would have to pay the Property Transference Tax. Even when they sell land
it is difficult to find alternative ways of keeping wealth. It is not easy for landowners to
develop land themselves. They lack know-how and capital for land development. In the
past, they could simply hold land until the price rose to a certain level. However, they
have now to pay every year taxes on capital gains which are not yet realized as long as
they keep that land idle (interviewee F).
Landowners are thus in need of leasing their land. However, in Korea, when land and
buildings standing on it are separately owned by different persons, the landowner has to
9) As indicated in Footnote 2 in Chapter 2, Landgonggaenium ('public' concept of
land) is an idea to restrict private ownership of land.
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pay heavy taxes. This is to prevent rich landowners evading the Inheritance and Gift
Tax by leasing their land to their successors who become building owners and transfer-
ring all the rent from the property to them (interviewee F). Thus landowners were in a
difficult situation in which none of selling, keeping and lending their land was satisfac-
tory.
This situation brought about the landowner-developer joint housing development.
There are a variety of ways of joint development in terms of the division of labour and
share of development gains between the two sides. From the point of view of develop-
ers, the simplest one is that a developer simply carries out construction works and is
paid in cash for the construction costs. The other extreme case is that a developer takes
charge of the whole process from the preparation of the development plan to the exe-
cution of house sales. In this case the developer is paid all the costs plus its share of
development gains. Most landowners are private individuals who are rich in land. Some
are corporate bodies such as educational foundations and manufacturing companies.
Landowners here are not those who are ignorant of the circumstances of the land mar-
ket such as farmer landowners were in the early 1970's in Gangnam. Most of them have
a good knowledge of land development. Some of them are small developers who have
land but lack funds, or have failed to obtain the approval for their development plans.
Developers join these various types of landowners on trust business basis or simply as
contractors. In the former case, land is transferred to developer and land prices are paid
back after development (interviewee A; E).
This is called 'Lets Project' in Seoul. Developers were building apartments, row houses,
villas, leisure buildings and shopping buildings in this way. Payments to developers
were made in the form of cash or building floor spaces. In any case the mechanism is
that the landowner provides land and the developer provides capital, and ideas for
development, and conducts construction works, and then the two share the develop-
ment gains according to their respective contribution (The Housing Survey Depart-
ment, KNHC, unpublished documents, 1992).
There are no statistics and studies yet on this new type of housing development.
Between January and March 1992, the KNHC conducted a survey on business strate-
gies and technology development of 9 prominent construction and housing develop-
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ment companies. The companies surveyed include four leading housing development
companies; three were newly growing large developers; two were large construction
companies. Among these, two leading housing companies and the two large construc-
tion companies were actively carrying out the Lets Projects (Ibid).
The Lets Project had started only a year before this study (February to April 1992).
Therefore problems associated with this new type of development are not yet fuily ex-
posed. However, information gained from interviews suggested that, as one easily may
expect, the assessment of land value was becoming a central source of conflict between
developers and landowners (interviewee A). Irregular practices were making the pro-
cedure more complicated and difficult. Land was often formally valued at lower prices
than its actual value, on the request of landowners to evade parts of property taxes on
land. Thus development was becoming cumbersome in relation to its scale, as in a de-
velopment project which contained no more than a few hundred apartments
(interviewee B).
The interviewees from the three leading development companies agreed that this type
of landowner and developer joint development could not be a major business for them.
The Lets Project may be a business area to help maintain a housing department in a firm
who does not want totally abandon housing business. A company which concentrated
on this joint development managed to build more than 2,000 apartments in 1991 and
was planning to expand the Lets Projects up to half of the total housing sale by 1994
(thid). For larger developers such as Hanyang and Hyundai who built more than 10,000
houses in 1990 (see Figure 1.7, p24), this was not enough to be a main business. 'It
cannot be a major business for large companies. For large housing development
companies, housing development can be main business when they can purchase a
large unit of land and then develop apartment estates in a large scale' (interviewee
A).
This Lets Project is a form in which the conflicting landowners and developers have
come to a compromise, although, it is said (interviewee A; B), it cannot be a major
business of large development companies. Delays and stalemate were becoming com-
mon in joint developments. The government, on the other hand, has not been in a posi-
tion to let the conflicting relationship between landowners and developers take its own
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course. As seen in Chapter 3, the government has become increasingly committed to
housing provision; it has had to promote housing development. Hence the inevitability
of government intervention in alleviating the conflict between landowners and develop-
ers.
5.4.2.2 Dircet Control of Land Prices
The Public Purchase and Development (PPD), as was said in Subsection 3.4.2 in
Chapter 3, is a system in which the government agencies purchase private land at ap-
praised prices rather than actual market prices, and then develop and sell the land to
both public and private developers. When asked, all the interviewees from the three
large private development companies preferred the PPD to the Land Readjustment Pro-
ject (LRP) despite some troubles with the government will be noted soon. The intervie-
wees argued that monopoly pricing by a few small landowners was making housing de-
velopment on land to be purchased from a number of different landowners virtually
impossible. The PPD eliminates all such annoying practices in the private land market.
Secondly, in the PPD area, land is provided with necessary infrastructures
(interviewee, A; E; G).
Thus developers, particularly large ones, have increasingly relied upon land provided by
the PPD. When the development of the two New Towns were announced (see Section
3.2, Chapter 3), large developers thought it was an opportunity to expand their busi-
ness in housing development. Hanyang purchased the largest amount of land in the
New Towns. For the two years of 1989 and 1990, Hanyang built 16,000 apartments
each year, the largest amount of housing construction among private developers (KHA,
1992). In 1990, 81 designated developers bought 2,255,800 pyongs of land for housing
development. Out of this 80 percent of land was purchased from the PPD projects. In
Seoul, 83 percent came from the PPD areas (Choogangkyongje-Ilbo, February 28
1991).
Table 5.3 shows that land provided by the PPD has been increasing. Between 1977 and
1981, land provided by the PPD accounted for 14.2 percent of the total land developed
by the public agencies. In 1982, this rose to 41.6 percent, which was equivalent to 23.3
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Table 5.3 Residential Land Development by Sector and Methods,
Whole Country, 1962-1989.
Unit: 1000 m2
Year	 Public	 Private	 Total
_____ PPD	 LRP*	 RD Subtotal _______ ________
62-66	 1,112 23,003 _____	 17,926 _______ ________
67-71	 3,017 187,879 _____	 186,307 ________ _________
72-76	 2,735 79,685 _____	 62,171 ________ ________
77-81	 10,471	 68,494 _____	 73,881 ________ _________
82	 7,843	 10,141	 406	 18,390	 14,430	 32,320
83	 10,326	 7,763	 349	 18,438	 14,410	 32,848
84	 14,200	 5,738	 431	 20,369	 14,320	 34,689
85	 11,841	 4,653	 109	 16,603	 14,390	 30,993
86	 10,458	 2,640 _____	 13,098	 14,551	 27,649
87	 13,378	 2,318 _____	 15,696	 10,771	 26,467
88	 13,585	 4,060 _____	 17,645	 18,917	 36,562
89	 ________ ________ _____	 32,091	 8,990	 41,081
Source: Compiled from Cho J.H (1990).
* LRP figures between '62 and '81 include privately developed
land
percent of the total land used for housing. In 1988, the figures increased to 77 and 37
percent respectively. The PPD has increasingly dominated residential development since
the late 1980's. Between April 1981 and the end of 1992, 18.9 million pyongs of land
were provided by the PPD. In all 691,000 houses have been built on that land. This ac-
counts for approximately 40 percent of total houses constructed in the country during
the same period. As of the end of 1992, 50.3 million pyongs of land were under devel-
opment by the PPD for 1,162,400 houses. The latter amounts to more than three quar-
ters of the total houses under construction throughout the country at the time (The
Land Development Department, KNFIC, unpublished document, 1992).
The relation between the government and private developers in the PPD has been not
without conflict; there have been disputes over terms of land supply as well as develop-
ment control.
Developers are to pay in advance parts of the prices before actual development works
begin. It was in 1985 when the KNHC and the city government began PPD projects in
Sanggye-Dong, an area located in the northeastern part of Seoul (see Figure 2.2, p78)
that the prepayment system was introduced. In the Sanggye-Dong development project,
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public developers could not afford all the development costs. They recommended to
private developers to participate in the development. From the point of view of private
developers, this was an opportunity to obtain land in large quantities in Seoul
(interviewee, G). This is commonly called 'Public-Private Joint Land Development'.
In this Public-Private Joint Land Development, private developers do not play any role
in making development plans and design, or the management of the whole land devel-
opment process. What they do is to provide funds in the form of prepayments for land
which they are to be allocated after the development. The terms of payment are as fol-
lowings. Developers have to pay 20 to 30 percent at the time of contract. Then 20 per-
cent 3 to 4 months after and the remainder at the time when land is prepared for hous-
ing development. In this process, public developers have often failed to supply on time
and changed one-sidedly land prices agreed by provisional contracts at the beginning
(interviewees A; B; G; H).
These frequent changes in land prices and delays in land supply, the most annoying
troubles to private developers, have been caused mostly by the conflict between land-
owners and the government. The latter has been intensifying since the late 1980's. With
the increasing reliance of private developers on the PPD for land, its success is now
dependent upon the direction of the conflict between landowners and the government.
The next chapter is designed to deal with this subject.
So far in this section, it has been seen that developers faced increasingly higher land
prices as they worked out new ways of increasing surplus profit such as high density
apartment or cooperative housing development; that conflict associated with this has
induced government interventions such as the relaxation of density regulations and the
direct control of land prices. These are what was suggested in Hypothesis Two.
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5.5 Conclusion
The first question examined in this chapter was how developers had realised surplus
profits and thereby provided room for land prices to rise under the Price Ceiling Sys-
tem. This was a part of Question One to examine the situation after the early 1980's.
It was indicated in Figure 4.8a and 4.8b (pl8'7) that the Price Ceiling began to poten-
tially make housing development unprofitable in the Gangnam Area from the mid-
1980's. However, at that time developers were beginning to avoid the Price Ceiling by
building row houses and cooperative housing. In the late 1980's, housing development
subjected to the Price Ceiling almost disappeared in Seoul while annual housing con-
struction was rising fast (see Figure 4.3, p154). The analysis of the changes in land
cost, construction cost and development profits in Section 5.3 showed that developers
were able to realise large surplus profits. Housing development could be profitable at
even higher land prices as suggested in Hypothesis One. The common argument that
land prices have risen under the Price Ceiling and this has discouraged housing devel-
opment is thus unfounded. The Price Ceiling may have added some costs to developers
in employing irregular ways of development but has never been the main cause for the
poor performance in housing development in Seoul in the early and the mid-1980's.
As to Research Question Two, the irregularities in the land market have been de-
scribed in the previous chapter. The irregularities were the practical forms in which
landowners and intervening actors such as speculative investors and real estate agencies
transform future development gains into the present land prices
This chapter has examined the effects of such landowners' behaviour on housing devel-
opment. By continually transforming increasingly larger portions of future development
gains into the present land prices, landowners have made developers face higher and
higher land prices and in turn, developers have devised ever new ways of increasing
surplus profits on the basis of increasing land prices. Conflicts associated with that
process have increasingly resulted in the replacement of the market determination of
land prices with political determination. This is the suggestion of Hypothesis Two.
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Neglect of this point has led to the treatment of land prices and house prices in isolation
from each other.
Large developers have called for the elimination of price control and a strong interven-
tion of the government to eliminate irregularities in the land market such as monopoly
pricing. Many experts and scholars too have argued for the liberalization of new house
prices and stronger control of the land market for the promotion of housing develop-
ment. This means non-intervention in the creation and realization by developers of sur-
plus profits, the material source of land prices, with stricter control of its appropriation
by landowners in the form of land prices. In other words, it is a demand for an inter-
vention in the distribution of development gains in favour of developers which is after
all dependent upon the power balance between the two actors. The PPD is a system in
which the conversion of surplus profits into land prices is directly controlled by the
state power. In the system, power relation between landowners and the state replaces
the market determination of land prices in housing development. The Minister of
Construction emphasized that the government strategy was still 'to promote housing
construction by providing land through the PPD in large scale to private develop-
ers at cheap prices' (KHAB, December 1988).
The next chapter will be an examination of how far the control by the government of
the conversion of surplus profit from development into land rent has been successful.
CHAPTER 6. POLITICISATION OF RENT
RELATION, INABILITY OF
THE STATE TO CONTROL
LAND PRICES FOR HOUSING:
SEVEN CASE STUDIES
6.1 Introduction
The previous chapters have concentrated on the relationship between landowners and
housing developers and the consequent relationship between land prices and house
prices. The examination has evidenced that the rising land cost in new house prices has
been due to the contradictory relation between landowners and developers as
suggested in the Central Hypothesis: developers compete with each other by
continuously searching for new ways of increasing surplus profits; the ability of
developers to create higher surplus profits gives the possibility for landowners to
demand more payments for their land, encroaching larger and larger portions of
surplus profit in the form of high land prices.
This creates a permanent tension between landowners and developers leading to spiral
rises in land and house prices and often a stalemate in housing development. Whenever
the Korean government was in a political crisis, this tension became a problem. A
result was the increasing government intervention in the conflict between landowners
and developers. Public Purchase and Development (PPD) became the major system of
intervention during the 1980's. The previous chapters have examined how the PPD has
become such a major form of government intervention.
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The main concern of this chapter is how far the rent relation, the conflicting re-
lationship between landowners and developers in the creation and appropriation of
surplus profit in the process of housing production, is controllable by state power. As
seen in Figure 1.8 (p25) in Chapter 1, land cost has been rising despite the increasing
land supply by the PPD system. Thus Research Question Three was formulated for
this chapter as 'why has the direct involvement of the government in land
development for housing failed to control land prices for housing ?'.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the PPD became the dominant residential
development method in the 1980's. According to the PPD, the government can
purchase land by compulsion. The conflict between landowners and the government
thus replaces that between landowners and private developers. Landowners are
compensated at appraised values for their land. How to value land and compensate
landowners for the land have been the major sources of conflict between the govern-
ment and landowners.
Clause 1 of Article 46 of the Land Expropriation Law prescribes that land to be
purchased by compulsion must be compensated for at 'reasonable prices'. Differences
in the interpretation of the 'reasonable prices' between landowners and the government
has been the source of trouble. Clause 2 of the same Article provides the criteria and
methods for the appraisal of land value. Until the end of the 1980's, the appraisal had
been based on Pegged Prices( 1 ). Land prices were to be determined by adjusting the
Pegged Prices by appropriate price indexes for the period between the time when the
Pegged Prices were noted and the time of land purchase. For the adjustment price
indexes, the average rise in land prices in the appropriate administrative district or the
total sale price index, had been used. The purpose was to exclude any future de-
velopment gains from the compensation prices. For landowners, 'reasonable prices'
meant prices of land actually traded in the market as affected by new development
plans. It thus meant prices including a part of future development gains. How much
future development gains have to be capitalized into present land prices has then been
at the root of the trouble.
1) The Pegged Land Price was noted in Subsection 3.3.2, Chapter3
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The intensifjing conflict between the government and landowners has resulted in
changes in the forms and levels of compensation for land and associated properties in
the PPD areas. The laws and regulations on the criteria and methods of the appraisal of
land value have been revised increasingly in favour of landowners. The answer to Re-
search Question Three, i.e., Hypothesis Three, was hypothesised that all these
changes in laws and regulations concerning compensation for compulsory land
purchase in the PPD projects have been brought about by the changing power balance
between the government and landowners. This chapter is going to show how the
changing power balance has made the government increasingly lose its grip on the
control of land prices in the PPD areas.
The examination goes back to the mid- 1970's when public developers began to
expropriate land for housing. Section 6.2 examines changing types of land de-
velopment for housing since the mid-1970's and a case in which the KNHC ex-
perienced the first stubborn resistance from landowners. Section 6.3 examines the
development of two housing estates in the early 1980's, Gwacheon and Gaepo. It was
the time when the New Military Government (NMG) embarked on large scale land
development projects to support the Five Million Housing Construction Plan. At the
same time the NIMG also tried to minimize popular complaints. Hence the limited
concession to landowners and residents in the compensation for land and associated
properties. Section 6.4 examines two housing estates developed in the mid-1980's,
Chulsan and Mockdong, where landowners were able to force the government to be
more generous in the compensation. Section 6.5 looks into the case of two New
Towns, Bundang and Ilsan, which began to be developed in 1989. It was in these two
New Towns that the government experienced unprecedented strong resistance from
the landowners and residents. Since these two New Town developments, the PPD has
increasingly failed to provide land for housing at cheap prices as originally intended.
As was said in Chapter 2, the study area for this chapter will be housing estates and
New Towns in and around Seoul. All seven cases are examined in detail. Two other
cases are also examined but very briefly only for comparison. Among all these nine
cases, six were developed by the KNHC. The examination is mainly based on the
experiences of the KNI-IC in residential land development. The KNI-IC has been one of
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the largest and the only public developer which had been conducting land development
for housing throughout the 1970's and 1980's. Three other cases, the Mockdong Estate
developed by the Seoul city government and two New Towns, Bundang and Ilsan,
developed by the Korea Land Development Corporation (KLDC) were also examined.
These are the cases in which an important turning point in government policies on
compulsory land purchase were made.
The examination is based primarily on information provided by three interviewees from
the KNHC. Yet, documents have been consulted for detailed statistics and numerical
data.
6.2 The Beginning of Compulsory Land Purchase for Housing:
the late 1970's
The test of Hypothesis Three needs an examination of the historical process by which
the relation between the government and landowners in terms of power has changed
the forms and levels of compensation for compulsory land purchase. It covers a period
from the late 1970's to the late 1980's. This section is an examination of the initial
stage of that historical process: the historical background for the increasing govern-
ment intervention in land development for housing and the first incident of compulsory
land purchase by the KNHC.
Subsection 3.3.2 in Chapter Three has examined the overall political and economic cir-
cumstances in which the government had been increasingly obliged to adopt measures
for compulsory land purchase for housing. This section examines the system itself in
detail in reference to the KNHC's experience. First, it reviews changing types of land
development by the KNIHC. Then it shows a case in which the KNHC faced the first
strong resistance by landowners against its land expropriation. Finally it reviews the
changing policy environment which pressed the government to adopt more
concessionary policies towards landowners.
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6.2.1 Increasing Government Involvement in Land Development for
Housing
In 1962, the then new military government carried out an extensive reformulation of
laws and regulations including those regarding housing and land development. The
Urban Planning Law provided legal bases for four types of residential land develop-
ment: the Land Readjustment Project (LRP), the Housing Plot Development (HPD),
the Residential Land Project for Public Housing (RLPPH), and the Project by
Changing the Nature of Topography (PCNT).
Land development by the LRP was discussed in Chapter 4. The HPD was to be carried
out by public developers such as local governments, the Korea National Housing
Corporation (KNHC) and the Korea Land Development Corporation (KLDC) within
the Urban Planning Areas(2). In the FIPD, public developers have no power to buy
land by compulsion; they are to buy land through direct negotiations with landowners.
The PCNT can be carried out by both private and public developers for building sites
with no more than 10,000 m2 of land within Urban Planning Areas. In this system too,
developers do not have the right to buy land compulsorily. Only in the RLPPH, do
central and local governments have the power to expropriate land for public housing
(Cho, J.H, 1990). Yet compulsory land purchase for housing development was rare as
most land development had been carried out by the LRP as seen in Table 5.3 (p245)
during the 1960's and 1970's.
Until the early 1970's, the KNHC had developed land mainly by the Housing Plot
Development (HPD). The KNHC had to acquire land through direct negotiations with
landowners, it had suffered the same difficulties as those experienced by private devel-
opers in the 1970's, which have been mentioned in Section 4.4 in Chapter 4. The
difficulties of the KNHC in purchasing land did not, however, attract the government's
attention until the early 1970's. First of all, until the early 1970's, annual housing con-
2) The Urban Planning Area is that for which the Urban Master Plan and the
Urban Development Plan are formulated, approved by the Minister of Con-
struction and publically noticed in accordance with the Urban Planning Law.
In this area, land use should conform to regulations provided in the Urban
Planning Law and the Building Law (Urban Planning Law and Building
Law).
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struction by the KNHC was insignificant. Figure 6.1 shows the annual housing
construction by the KNHC and its contribution to that of the whole country between
1962 and 1991. Until 1972, its annual housing construction had rarely exceeded 2,000
units; its contribution to the whole country's annual housing construction was merely
1.5 percent on average.
In 1972, when the government formulated the Ten-year 2.5 Million Housing
Construction Plan, the KNHC was ordered to increase its annual housing construction.
It started thus doubling its housing construction annually between 1973 and 1975 (see
Figure 6.1). As the housing construction increased, the KNHC could no longer rely on
land purchase through negotiations with landowners. Thus from 1974, the KNT-IC
began to entrust land purchase to local governments who had the power to expropriate
land for public housing. Local governments were paid commissions for that. They,
mostly in financial difficulties, responded by cooperating with the KNHC's devel-
opment plans. This became the major way of purchasing land for the KNHC until 1981
Figure 6.1 Annual Housing Construction by the KNHC, 1962-199 1
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although the KNHC was given the power to expropriate land for public housing(3)
through the amendment of the KNHC Law in 1975 (KNHC, 1992c). Local gov-
ernments could exercise certain influences over leading figures in their administrative
districts to persuade landowners to cooperate with KNHC's housing development
plans (Interviewee J).
As the property market boomed in the late 1970's, as seen in Section 3.3 in Chapter 3,
conflicts with landowners were intensified. It became increasingly difficult for local
government officials to persuade landowners to sell their land at the prices offered by
the KINHC. What was worse, as housing development moved to the outskirts of cities,
the KNHC began to have troubles with local governments over the cost of the
extension of infrastructure such as roads, city water and sewer lines to the new housing
estates. Thus it became difficult to rely on local governments' cooperation for land
purchase (interviewee J).
Moreover, the annual housing construction by the KNHC was reaching 30,000 units in
1978. The KNFIC needed much larger quantities of land than ever before. A more
powerful legal basis for land acquisition was thus required. The Housing Construction
Promotion Law (HCPL) was amended in December 1977 to simplify the procedures
for the purchase and development by the KNHC of land by compulsion for public
housing. According to the new HCPL, once the KNHC obtained the approval of a plan
for Residential Land Project for Public Housing (RLPPH) from the central gov-
ernment, all permission procedures required by other individual laws were exempted.
This RLPPH had since replaced the Housing Plot Development and been the KNIHC's
major land development method until the early 1980's, when the new Residential Land
Development Project in Designated Area was introduced (KINHC, 1992c).
In the early 1980's, with the start of the Ten-year Five Million Housing Construction
Plan, a more powerful land development system was adopted with the enactment of
the Residential Land Development Promotion Law as mentioned in Subsection 3.4.2 in
Chapter 3. The Residential Land Development Project in Designated Area is the
3) The definition of Public Housing is indicated in Subsection 3.2.3 in Chapter
3.
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method of land development based on this Law. The Public Purchase and Development
(PPD) is a general term of development methods by which land is purchased by
compulsion and developed by public developers. Thus both the Residential Land
Project for Public Housing (RLPPH) and the Residential Land Development Project in
Designated Area (RLDPDA) come under the category of the PPD although in 1980's
the latter has become dominant( 4). Both in the RLPPH and in the RLDPDA, public
developers have the power to expropriate land. The difference between the two is that
in the former, land can be developed in Residential Areas while in the latter in any
areas designated by the Minister of Construction for residential land development. For
the RLDPDA, Green Areas are usually designated for residential land development.
Once a RLDPDA plan is approved in accordance with the Residential Land Devel-
opment Promotion Law, the plan is regarded as having gone through all the
procedures required by other individual laws related to land development including the
Urban Planning Law( 5). For example, changes of zoning of the area in accordance
with the Urban Planning Law are exempted. Thus it simplified the procedures which
public developers otherwise have to follow to obtain development permission to
facilitate housing development.
Thus the later the laws were enacted, the more powerful they were in terms of the legal
power of public developers against landowners in the acquisition of land. Since the
promulgation of the Residential Land Development Promotion Law, the KNHC too
has increasingly adopted the the Residential Land Development Project in Designated
Area (RLDPDA) for housing development. Table 5.3 (p245) has already shown that
government intervention in general has been increasing. Figure 6.2 shows the changing
land development method by the KNHC. It shows that since the late 1970's, almost all
land has been purchased by compulsion.
4) Thus hereafter in this study, the PPD refers to the RLDPDA unless
otherwise stated.
5) There are 19 laws which any land development plan may have to go through
for approval otherwise (Article 11 of the RLDPL).
257
Figure 6.2 The KINHC Land Development by Methods, 1961-1991.
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6.2.2 Compulsory Land Purchase under the Strong Government in
Banpo Estates
It was in the Banpo Estates that the KN}IC faced for the first time a stubborn re-
sistance from landowners (KNHC, 1 992c). The estates were located in the Gangnam
Area in Seoul (see Figure 4.2, p148) where, as mentioned in Chapter 4, speculative
investment in land had been most prevalent in the country in the 1970's.
The areas, with 121,318 pyongs, were developed by the city government through the
Land Readjustment Project (LRP). Land in the areas was thus all 'returned land'( 6) to
landowners. A part of their original land was deducted to make up for the development
costs. In this process, landowners had to struggle with the city government to mimmize
the deduction. After all the difficult processes, landowners were then waiting for
favourable chances to realize capital gains by selling their land. Moreover it was the
time when the property boom began and land prices were rising very fast (interviewee,
6) This was explained in Section 3.2.3 in Chapter three.
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K). Between April 1977 and April 1978, land prices in the area rose by more than one
hundred percent. As of April 1977, land prices in the area were between 50,000 and
150,000 won/pyong. These rose to 200,000 and 350,000 won/pyong one year later
(KAB, 1977; 1978).
Thus the KNHC's plan to expropriate land outraged the landowners. To tell the
conclusion first, the KNHC in the end expropriated the land at 59,000 won/pyong on
average, according to the final decision of the Central Land Expropriation Arbitration
Committee (CLEAC) in September 1977. No other compensation than the cash for
land was made. As will be seen in later sections, this is contrasted to later development
cases in which other forms of compensation were paid in addition to compensation
prices for land. Landowners protested violently against the compulsory purchase. They
raided the home of the KNHC president and held sit-in demonstrations on the
development site obstructing construction works (KNHC, 1992c).
Under the harsh Yushin regime, however, such resistance could not affect the KNHC's
development plan. At that time press activities and the freedom of speech were strictly
controlled. The case did not attract any public attention. Land purchase by compulsion
was not yet an issue for the anti-government forces struggling hard against the regime.
The landowners' resistance in Banpo in 1977 became only an isolated local issue
(interviewee K).
In the National Assembly, opposition politicians began to debate such compulsory land
purchases after the Banpo case. They accused the government of infringing people's
right of private property in land development. They blamed the one-sided determi-
nation of land prices and 'unfair' criteria for the appraisal of land prices. They
demanded that the government withdraw the eminent domain entrusted to local
governments; pay full compensation at actual street value; provide resettlement mea-
sures for those who were to be displaced by the development (SNA, 1977; 1978: the
third conference of the 97th special session on June 29 1977; the first conference of the
98th session, September 23 1977; the ninth conference of the 98th session, October 24
1977; the 11th conference, October 27 1977; the 10th conference of the 100th session,
July 18 1978).
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The Yushin regime (1972-1979) had ruled the country almost by presidential decree.
With the power concentrated into the President, the debate in the National Assembly
might have had little effects on actual policies. However, the intensifying anti-gov-
ernment movement seen in Section 3.4.1 in Chapter 3 was undermining the high-
handed position of the government in dealing with popular enmity.
Toward the late 1970's, the Park Regime was losing its popularity. In the general
election in December 1978, the opposition party won more votes than the ruling
Democratic Republic Party though failed to win a majority in seats (HRI, 1988).
Reducing popular discontent has been a conventional measure to win popular support
in Korea in a period of political crisis. From 1979, the government began to take a
series of appeasement measures in non-political fields such as the elimination of the
guide-lines on the increase in wages (Suslina, 1988). Such appeasement policies also
applied to land development for housing.
In 1980, when the New Military Group seized power, to minimise public discontent
was an important priority. The National Defence Emergency Board (the military junta)
adopted measures to regain public trust in urban development policies. The relaxation
of restrictions of building activities in Green Belts was one of the measures. The Board
also announced that land would be compensated at fairer prices (Chosun-Ilbo, August
1980). A series of revisions of laws and regulations concerning land expropriation and
compensation were carried out in thess circumstances.
In August 1980, the Enforcement Regulations of the Special Law Regarding Land
Expropriation and Compensation (SLRLEC), which was promulgated in March 1977,
was revised. Regulations on compensation for agricultural crops, plants and cattle
were amended in favour of farmers. In March 1981, the regulation was again revised
extensively to simplify procedures for landowners to get compensation payment. It
made it an obligation for developers to take into account landowners' opinion in the
assessment of compensation prices and to pay the whole compensation in cash before
the start of development works (the Enforcement Regulations of SLRLEC, August
1980; March 1981).
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The appropriateness of the Pegged Prices as the base for the appraisal of land value
was questioned in the National Assembly (SNA, the sixth conference of the 108th
session on October 23 1981; the third conference of the 110th session March 11
1982). In the 23rd conference of the 108th session in December 1981, the ruling party
proposed an amendment bill of the Land Expropriation Law in favour of landowners.
It proposed the elimination of the provision which made it obligatory for appraisers to
use the Pegged Prices as base price; it gave landowners the right to appeal to the
judgement of the Central Land Expropriation Arbitration Committee (CLEAC) and the
right to buy back their land when developers failed to develop the land for the original
purposes within five years or all or part of the development plan became cancelled
within 10 years. This bill passed the National Assembly in December 1979 with the
provision on the Pegged Prices unchanged (SNA, 1981: the 24th conference of the
108th session).
Thus policies related to land for housing in the 1970's showed two contradictory
tendencies: on the one hand, to use stronger state power in land purchase and on the
other, to minimize popular enmity in that process. These two conflicting necessities
have conditioned land development policies in the 1980's. The balance between the
two increasingly became dependent upon power relations between the government and
landowners. This will be evidenced in the following sections.
6.3 Concessionary Compensation under Control, the Early
1980's
6.3.1 Gwacheon New Town development
It has been mentioned in Subsection 4.2.1 in Chapter 4 that President Park persisted in
his policy to control the further concentration of population, economic and ad-
ministrative activities in Seoul throughout the 1970's. On his order to control the
growth of the capital, particularly of the northern part of the Han River, a series of
measure were taken: the designation of a Green Belt around the city in 1971; the
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imposition of the Resident Tax in 1973; the restriction of building and extension of
universities in 1973; the control of building new factories in 1975 (Kim, J.R, 1990).
The deconcentration of government offices and public agencies was one of the
measures.
Gwacheon New Town was planned to accommodate the government offices to be
deconcentrated from the city centre and a population of 45,000 (KNHC, 1984a). The
area is located 15 km south of the city centre of Seoul and 5 km south of Gangnam
(see Figure 2.2, p'78). It was a Green Area surrounded by a Green Belt( 7). 23 percent
of the area was dry farm fields, 36 percent was paddy fields, 16 percent was housing
sites, and 14 percent was forests. 1,647 households lived there as of March 1979, out
of which 860 were homeowners and 787 were tenants. 208 were farm households
(Thid).
The development plan was drafted in August 1978, and approved by the President in
September 1978. In April 1979, the MOC issued a notification of the Pegged Prices
for the area. The Pegged Prices were 84,000 won/pyong for housing sites, 70,200
won/pyong for dry fields, 43,900 won/pyong for paddy fields and 55,800 won/pyong
for forests (Thid). After this, the KNHC and the (iyonggi Province Government, the
competent authority of the area which was entrusted with land purchase for the
KNHC, began to contact landowners to start negotiations. They held joint meetings
with landowners and residents to persuade them to accede to the development plan.
Such efforts continued throughout the latter half of 1979. The KINHC distributed
pamphlets explaining the development plan among residents and sent its staff to visit
each village to survey landowners and residents' opinion (ibid).
7) The Urban Planning Law divides the Urban Panning Area into four basic
areas (12 areas in detail) and four special areas. For each area, land use is
regulated by the Urban Planning Law and the Building Law. Both can over-
lap. Green Area is one of the four basic areas. It is fi.irther divided into three
areas: Natural Green Area, Reserved Green Area and Productive Green
Area. Geen Belt is the common name of Development Restriction Area, one
of the four special areas. In Natural Green Areas, very low density de-
velopment is possible. In other Green Areas as well as in Green Belt,
development is strictly controlled. Green Areas have been converted into
Residential or Industrial Areas as urban built-up areas expanded. However,
the government has maintained a policy to strictly prohibit development in
Green Belt. Thus Green Belt has been the areas where development is most
rigidly controlled (The Urban Planning Law; the Building Law).
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However, landowners, well informed about the benefits to landowners of the LRP
widely carried out in the nearby Gangnam Area in the 1970's were agitated over the
plan to purchase land compulsorily (interviewee K). In the beginning of 1979, when
no compensation plan was finalized yet, landowners and residents began to submit
petitions to the presidential office and the government departments. Since they
included different interest groups such as farming landowners, absentee landowners,
shopkeepers and tenant households, their demands were diverse. However, major de-
mands were: to develop the area by the Land Readjustment Project (LRP); to
compensate land and buildings at market prices if compulsory purchase was inevitable;
to provide new land for resettlement; to provide rental apartments to tenant
households; to sell as priority new shops to existing shopkeepers (Ibid).
The first demand to develop the land by the LRP could not be considered. It was firm
government policy not to use the LRP wherever possible in the late 1970's. This was
because of the adverse effects of the LRP such as high land prices after development
and difficulties in obtaining large tracts of land for apartment development as men-
tioned in Subsection 3.4.2. The 'market prices' of land were ambiguous. The Pegged
Prices were announced based on land prices in the area as of April 1979. Since then,
the actual prices had been changing according to the expectations on compensation for
land and properties associated with it. For the KNHC, there was no other way of
determining land prices than appraising land prices on the basis of the Pegged Prices as
prescribed in the law (interviewee K).
The KINHC instead proposed to give resident landowners titles to new apartments after
development. As seen in Chapter 4, as there were gaps between the prices of new
apartments and actual market prices, what is called premium, the title was regarded as
an indirect compensation for land. At first, landowners persisted in demanding their
land to be compensated at full market prices. However, as there was little possibility of
concession from the KNHC and the government, landowners began to seek a
compromise. They strongly demanded housing plots at cost prices rather than
apartments after development. Much larger premiums were expected from land than
from apartments. In the original development plan, there was no plots planned for
detached houses. Provision of housing plots to landowners at cost prices meant that
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the KNI-IC had to give up building about 1,000 apartments and thus lose revenues
from the sale of apartments. This became the most critical point of dispute between
landowners and the KNHC. The Ministry of Government Administration (MGA)
intervened at this stage. The MGA was in charge of building the new government
offices in the area and also in charge of dealing with popular discontent. At this time,
the mid 1979, the government was politically in a difficult situation as mentioned in
Chapter 3 and was cautious not to cause popular enmity. The MGA pressed the
KNHC to accept the landowners' demand for housing plots. After several months of
dispute between the MGA and the KNHC, the KNHC finally surrendered to the
pressure (interviewee K). Resident landowners who had lived since before the
development plan was announced in October 1978, were eligible for the housing plots.
All 686 housing plots were provided at cost prices with 70 pyongs on average (Ibid).
Thus, in contrast to the case in the Banpo estates, an additional compensation was paid
to landowners in Gawcheon. The provision of housing plots at cost prices as a part of
compensation was not unprecedented. In the development of an industrial New Town,
Banwol, a rural area located 30 km southwest of Seoul, the government provided
housing plots to landowners (Ibid). Since the late 1970's was a period of property
boom, they could realise a lump-sum of capital gains by reselling the new plots. As the
government could avoid troubles with landowners with such measures, it became a
conmion practice to do so in the development of industrial New Towns in the
southeastern coastal areas in the late 1970's. The resettlement measures increasingly
became a way to make up for parts of the gap between appraised prices and what
landowners called the 'market prices'. This was the first time that the KINHC
established such resettlement measures for the smooth implementation of development
projects. Resettlement measures later increasingly became a supplement to the cash
compensation for land expropriation as premiums associated with new land and
apartments increased (interviewee, K).
Non-landowning residents were a problem. Tenants were paid only parts of moving
expenses instead of titles to rental apartments which they had demanded. Owners of
illegal houses and those who moved into the area after the development plan was
publicly announced were paid no compensation at all. It was mostly such tenants and
late-comers, who were compensated only a little or not at all, who resisted with clubs
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and knifes whenever existing houses were demolished. It became common that KNI-IC
staff were beaten up by the residents or splashed all over with excrement until all the
ground was cleared. However, they were not a significant threat to the development.
The major conflict between the KNHC and landowners was thus settled by the early
1980's. The whole land purchase was completed by early 1982. The development of
the first phase area started in March 1980 and that of the whole area was completed in
August 1984 (Ibid).
In Gwacheon, compensation for properties in the development area was thus much
more generous than that in the case of Banpo, in which no other compensation than
the cash for land value was paid to landowners. This was due to the political instability
following the assassination of President Park in 1979; the government was cautious not
to incur popular enmity. Once the New Military Group seized power firmly in the late
1980, the position of the government in land development was also consolidated.
6.3.2 Gaepo Estates Development
Gaepo is located in the southern end of Gangnam with an area of 2.54 million pyongs.
It was one of the largest areas of farm land that remained intact until the early 1980's in
Gangnam (see Figure 4.1, p147 and 4.2, p148). The whole area of Gaepo began to be
developed in 1981 when the government designated large areas of land for residential
development in order to increase land supply for the Ten-year Five Million Housing
Construction Plan. In April 1981, 10 billion pyongs of land were designated
throughout the country in accordance with the new Residential Land Development
Promotion Law (RLDPL). Gaepo was one of the designated areas to be developed by
three agencies: Seoul City Government, the Korea Land Development Corporation
(KLDC) and the Korea National Housing Corporation (KNHC). Between 1981 and
1984 the KNHC built 9,080 apartments in the area in two phases: 4,260 on 105,858
pyongs of land in the first phase and 4,820 on 220,535 pyongs of land in the second.
The land for the second phase project was provided by the Korea Land Development
Corporation (KLDC) (KNHC, 1984b). The development of the first phase estate,
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where the KNHC purchased land from private landowners will be examined in this
study.
In September 1980, before the whole Gaepo area was formally designated a
Residential Development Area, the KNHC was already going ahead with a housing
development plan in the area. It was surveying an area of 1.5 million pyongs in
September 1980, immediately after President Chun ordered the building of 5 million
housing within ten years. The housing development in the area was also one of the
development projects hurried through by the government as a part of stimulating the
economy. In the Economic Ministers Meeting( 8) in November 1980, it was decided
that the KNHC began first with the development of 105,858 pyongs of land in the area
(Ibid).
67.7 percent of the area was farm land and 25.2 percent was forests. Orchard, paddy
fields and dry fields comprised the farm land. There were thirty farm houses. As of
April 1981, land prices in the residential area in Gaepo (which still remained a rural vil-
lage) were between 50,000 and 80,000 won/pyong. In the neighbouring residential
areas such as Daechi-Dong and Dogock-Dong which had already been developed by
the LRP, prices of residential land were between 350,000 and 550,000 won/pyong
(KHB, 1980). The KN}TC planned to purchase land at 59,100 won/pyong on average.
The KNHC started negotiations with landowners in March 1981. Landowners
demanded full compensation for their properties: compensation at the prices similar to
those in the already developed neighbouring areas (KNHC, op. cit). A clan stubbornly
resisted the development plan not for higher compensation payment but for the
preservation of their common land where their ancestral burial ground was
(interviewee J).
Although Martial Law had been lifted in January 1981, collective action against
government policies was still tabooed. Mass media, reorganised by the National
Defence Emergency Board (NDEB, i.e., military junta), was under the strict control of
the government: no report of public discontent could be published. The Legislative
Committee of the NDEB was still performing the role of the National Assembly. From
8) See footnote 12 in Chapter 3 for the explanation of Economic Ministers.
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the point of view of the landowners, there were no forces for them to appeal to. They
could not push strongly on their demand (interviewee J).
From the point of view of the KNHC, however, pushing its plan by force was also not
so simple. It had to be prepared for being provoked by landowners and residents in the
area. The New Military Group tried to show itself to be generous to the weak,
although it took a firm stand against any collective activities against government poli-
cies. How smoothly a development project was carried out had been a tacit measure of
the competence of the managers of its agencies to the government. To the managerial
staffs of the KNT-IC, avoiding trouble with landowners and residents was thus a priority
(interviewee J).
Moreover, as was said above, the project was related to the government policy to prop
up the economy, which was in recession in the early 1980's by ordering public works
as early as possible. The KNHC had to proceed with the projects without any delay.
And any delays in the whole development schedule also had a negative effect on the
assessment of the performance of the managerial staff of the corporation. Therefore
the KNHC wanted to minimise troubles with the landowners and the residents and to
accelerate the proceedings (interviewee J).
In those circumstances the KNHC suggested, after the example of the case in
Gwacheon, that it would provide housing plots to the resident landowners in the area
as a additional compensation. Most landowners had no choice but to comply with the
KNHC's proposal. They were finally paid 65,345 won per a pyong of their land on
average and were provided with housing plots, each with 50 pyongs of land (Ibid).
This was a cheaper price compared with that paid in Gwacheon which was inferior to
Gaepo in terms of location.
The dispute came to a settlement by May 1981, only two months after the KNI-IC
began to negotiate with landowners. Tenant households and residents who were not
entitled to any compensation staged violent demonstrations against the development.
However, they could not disturb the proceedings of the development in any significant
way (interviewee J).
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In comparison with the cases in the 1970's, in the early 1980's there were some conces-
sions to the landowners and the residents in the PPD. Yet the government was in full
control of the process. However, from the mid-1980's, the government was
increasingly pushed to concede more to landowners.
6.4 Forced Concessions in Compensation: The Mid-1980's
6.4.1 Chulsan Estate Development
Chulsan was the first estate developed by the KNHC in accordance with the Resi-
dential Land Development Promotion Law (RLDPL). It was a Green Area with
430,000 pyongs of land and located in the Gwangmyong city neighbouring Seoul to
the east (see Figure 2.2, p'78). The area was agricultural land, but as its source of
agricultural water, the Anyang River, flowing through industrial estates, was severely
polluted, it was losing its value as farm land. The area was designated for residential
development in May 1983. The development plan was approved in 1984.
In the area, there were approximately 2,000 households including tenant households.
Most land was leased to or squatted by low income people, who raised cattle or grew
hothouse plants. Thus houses were mostly illegal or uncertain in their legal status.
There were 1,500 to 2,000 ground facilities including such houses, cattle sheds and
hothouses (interviewee, J).
As was the case in Gwacheon and Gaepo, the first confrontation between the KNIE-IC
and the landowners and residents was over the compensation prices of land and
properties. At the end of 1983, when the KNHC's plan to purchase land at appraised
values was exposed, landowners gathered to proclaim that they would refuse to sell
land. The land prices were to be valued according to the current use: agricultural land
in a Green Area, where building activities were strictly controlled. Landowners,
however, demanded that their land be valued as residential land. They argued that
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although their land were presently used for paddy fields, the land was worth the price
of residential land and thus must be paid for at the same prices as those of residential
land in the vicinity (interviewee, J).
The prices of land just outside the designated area were rising fast due to the
development plan. Before the development plan was announced, land prices in the
vicinity were between 300,000 and 400,000 won/pyong in the Residential Area. When
the Chulsan area was designated for residential development, they went up to 1 million
won/pyong: a rise by two to three times. When the KNHC started to purchase land,
they rose by up to three to four times. This further widened the gap between the
appraised prices and the prices which landowners demanded. Non-landowning
residents were also demanding compensation for their properties and for relocation
costs. Shop owners in the area wanted land in the Commercial Area in return after
development. Tenant households claimed titles to new apartments (interviewee, J).
As the KNHC persisted in its original policy to compensate land at prices appraised as
land in Green Areas, landowners refused the KINHC's survey of their properties for the
appraisal. Property surveys started in Summer 1983 were dragged on and continued
until Winter 1983. During those months, KNHC staff had meetings with various
groups of landowners and residents in the area to persuade them to comply with the
KNHC's plan. Some residents resorted to violence to disturb the meetings and property
surveys during the whole period (interviewee, J).
After several months of negotiations and collisions, the KNHC finalised a com-
pensation plan in May 1984. As to land prices, the KNHC paid 129,950 won per
pyong on an average as valued by two authorized appraisal agencies (KNHC, 1992a).
In addition, resident landowners were given housing plots with 50 pyongs at cost
prices. Absentee landowners who did not own their own houses were given title to
new apartments after development in the area. Large landowners, who were mostly
absentee landowners, readily complied with the offer from the KNHC. They were
interested in buying land in the vicinity as soon as possible since when an area was
developed and a large amount of cash, paid by the KNFIC for compensation, got
circulated in the region, land prices usually rose fast in the surrounding areas. By
completing procedures for selling land in a short time, they also could save time and
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costs. Some landowners refused and went to the judgement of the Central Land Ex-
propriation Arbitration Committee for higher compensation prices (CLEAC). In the
latter cases, the prices went up by five to ten percent (interviewee, J).
Owners of illegal houses( 9) were given titles to purchase new apartments with less
than 20 pyongs in floor space. Tenants were given rental apartments. It was the first
time for public developers to provide such rental apartments to tenant households.
Compensation for tenants had been regarded as a personal civil affair to be settled indi-
vidually between tenant and landlord at that time. Shopkeepers were given priorities in
buying commercial land or shops after development at the average contract prices
(Mailkyongje-Shinmoon, May 14, 1984).
Some squatters who mostly moved into the area after the designation of the area for
development with the aim of benefiting from compensation, failed to prove their
ownership of houses. They were paid no compensation and thus violently resisted the
demolition and clearance works. The clearance of those houses would have been the
most difficult job in the development without the heavy flood in the basin of the
Anyang River in September 1984. The flood swept away all the ground facilities
including such squatter houses (interviewee, J).
Apart from this, compensation for land and properties associated with it was more
generous than in Gwacheon and Gaepo. New housing plots, apartments and rental
apartments were provided at cost prices on top of cash payments for land and
properties purchased by compulsion. As there was a considerable difference between
the prices of new properties at which the residents were provided and the actual
market prices, i.e., what is called in Korea, premiums, the titles to new properties were
commercialised. The provision of titles to such new properties with good premiums
has since become an indirect form of compensation in addition to cash payments for
land (interviewee, J).
9) Squatters were requested to show the KNI-IC certificates issued by the city
government to prove their ownership of houses. Since their houses were not
registered in the Resgistry Office, the city government issued the certificates
on the testification of the heads of neighbourhood associations (interviewee,
J).
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Such generous compensation in Chulsan was however not made solely out of the good
will of the KNI-IC. A fierce struggle by landowners and residents for more
compensation payment affected the KNHC's compensation plans. The struggle was
taking place in a development nearby, managed by the Seoul city government. That
was the Mockdong Housing Estate Development.
6.4.2 Mockdong Estate Development.
Mockdong is an area with 1.31 million pyongs of land located southwest of Seoul. Its
conditions of location was similar to those of Chulsan. It is located 6 km down the
Anyang River from the Chulsan Estate (see Figure 2.2, p78). The area had been mostly
agricultural land but used to be flooded and had been ruined by the heavily polluted
Anyang River. It also had very poor access roads. In the area, there were squatter set-
tlements alongside the Anyang River. They were first built in the 1960's when the city
government relocated some of squatters in the city centre to this area. Each household
had been allocated 8 pyongs of land for temporary accommodation (SMG, 1991b).
In April 1983, the city government announced its plan to develop the area using the
PPD system. The area was formally designated for Residential Land Development in
June 1983. The development plan was approved by the MOC in January 1984 (Ibid).
When the development plan was announced, landowners and the residents were
anxious whether their land and properties would be expropriated at cheap prices. They
soon presented petitions to the city government and the Ministry of Construction
(MOC) to purchase their land at 'fair market prices, i.e., not at the one-sidedly
appraised ones' (Kyonghyang-Shinmoon, January 23 1989). The prices of residential
land in the area were between 150,000 and 170,000 won/pyong before the an-
nouncement of the development plan (Ibid.). On the announcement of the plan, land
prices just outside the area were rising to 450,000 to 700,000 won/pyong
(Choongang-Ilbo, April 26, 1984).
The city government offered 70,000 won/pyong on an average as appraised based on
the Pegged Prices, which was issued in 1978 at 25,000 won for farm land (Oh, H.J.,
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1985). Enraged at this offer, landowners began to organize a campaign against the
development plan. The involvement of squatters and tenant households in the row over
compensation prices for land and properties turned the campaign into a public
commotion.
Squatters were claiming compensation for their houses at appraised prices plus new
apartment at discounted prices plus cash for moving expenses. Tenant households
were demanding rental apartments or housing plots with 20 pyongs plus loans of 5
million won for each household at low interest rates. These tenants households
remained a major source of trouble until mid-1985. There were some 2,000 tenant
households in the area. The city government had maintained that compensation for
tenants was a private matter between the tenants and landlords. They were thus to be
excluded from any compensation and resettlement programme (Ibid).
In reponse to these demands, the city government proposed to give titles to buy new
apartments to landowners and legal home owners; titles to new apartments plus
100,000 wons for moving expenses for each household to the squatters; priorities in
buying new shops to the existing shopkeepers after the development. Excluded from
these compensation were tenant households mostly living in the squatter settlements
(Ibid).
These suggestions were rejected by landowners and residents. Petitions, demon-
strations and appeals to authorities as well as negotiations continued for almost one
year. A final negotiation talk between the representatives of landowners and residents
and a vice mayor of Seoul city government was held in August 1984. As both sides
persisted in their original policy and demands firmly, the talk came to a rupture. In Au-
gust 1984, thousands of landowners and residents occupied Yanghwagyo Bridge, a
key position on the main road to the Kimpo International Airport, staging a sit-in
demonstration demanding the cancellation of the development plan. The rally ended in
a collision with riot police resulting in many casualties and arrests. After the clash, the
resistance of landowners and homeowners was daunted (Ibid).
However, the tenants struggle continued since they were desperate with no payments
at all. Militant students came in to support the tenants. Since the defeat of the Gwangju
uprising in May 1980, students had inclined toward a socialist revolution and tried to
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form a coalition with Minjung in order to proceed with their anti-establishment
movement. Minjung means all those oppressed under the successive authoritarian
regimes. It thus includes industrial workers, urban poor and peasants(1 1)• It was in this
Mockdong development that anti-government students were involved for the first time
in an organized form in the urban poors' struggle for shelter. The bloody fighting
between the coalition of tenants and students and the demolition squad (usually
gangsters) employed by the city government and backed up by not police continued
until mid-1985 (Ibid).
As the fighting dragged the whole development project out for more than half a year
and began to attract public attention, the city government finally retreated from their
uncompromising policy. In March 1985, the city government acceded to the tenants'
demand. It suggested two alternative ways of compensation for tenants to choose: a
room in a rental apartment in the area (two households in one apartment) or cash
payment up to 500,000 won for moving to other areas. To encourage them to leave
Seoul, the city government also suggested the provision of administrative support and
loans when they collectively built resettlement areas in the neighbouring province.
Further if they moved further away from the capital region, i.e., Seoul and its
neighbouring Province, they were promised a million wons of government grant plus
700,000 wons of moving expenses plus 2 millions wons of loans for rehabilitation
funds (Ibid).
The tenants were not totally satisfied and their resistance continued for several months.
However, exhausted by the long struggle, tenants one by one accepted the city govern-
ment's proposal. By mid-1985, the resistance came to an end. Construction works
could begin in December 1985, almost one year later than originally planned (Ibid).
This tenants' struggle may have no direct relevance to the relation between public
developers and landowners and to the consequent determination of land prices.
However, their joining forces strengthened the position of landowners in the
negotiations for compensation. They led the van in demonstrations and physical
11) The historical background of the student involvement in tenants struggle as
well as labour movement was mentioned in Subsection 3.6.1.
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collisions with not police on the site and in the street. Their struggle brought public
criticism of the high handed management of land development.
This Mockdong case was the first incident in which the practices of the government to
push forward development plans one-sidedly was seriously challenged. The KNT-IC,
which had no such strong administrative power as the city government, had had to be
much more generous to landowners and residents for a smooth development in
Chulsan (Interviewee, J).
6.4.3 Changing Aspects in the PPD
Mockdong was the first PPD project in which the development agency was forced to
make a concession to the demand of residents, while Chulsan was the one in which the
developer avoided the worst collision by providing more generous compensation
payments in advance. The Mockdong incident has brought about changes in gov-
ernment policies in the PPD areas. Since the incident, human rights groups and anti-
government forces have increasingly involved themselves in the struggle of the poor
residents and later farming landowners against the compulsory purchase of land. Three
new situations could thus be described as appearing in the PPD projects around the
mid- 1980's.
First, compensation for compulsory land purchase became a political issue, attracting
the attention of the press and politicians. Inappropriate compensation for tenant
households in Mockdong was criticised by the press (Don-A-Ilbo, August 8 1984;
Kyonghyang-Shinmoon, March 18 1985; Maeilkyongje-Shinmoon, March 18 1985;
Seoul-Shinmoon, March 19 1985). In the fourth conference of the 129th session of the
National Assembly in April 1986, the low compensation prices for land in Mockdong
(30,000 to 100,000 won/pyong) were criticised by opposition politicians (the New
People's Party) as the robbing of people's private property (SNA, 1986).
To alleviate popular enmities in public land development, the government revised the
Executive Regulation of the Special Law Regarding Land Expropriation and
Compensation (SLRLEC) in June 1986. In the past, the value of land was to be
assessed for its current use based on the Pegged Prices. This was changed to that
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which was to consider the trading prices of land in similar conditions in other areas.
Buildings and other ground facilities were previously to be valued at cost prices,
depreciated for the period of use. This was changed to that assessed by comparing the
actual market prices of similar ones. Residents were to be given only moving expenses.
They were now to be paid two months living expenses (urban wage earners' average
households expenses in the EPB statistics). Employees in the factories in the area were
to be paid compensation for suspension from or loss ofjobs (KNHC, 1989a).
Second, since the Mockdong incident, human rights organizations including catholic
priests and university professors were increasingly involved in the problems of those
who were relocated by public land development. A brutal eviction of a hundred
squatter tenants in Sanggye in 1986 brought about unprecedented political and public
attention to the problem of the displaced in 1987. It was a redevelopment project
carried out by the city government. Tens of families evicted from the Joint Re-
development Area in Sanggye-Dong lived on the premises of Myongdong Cathedral in
the heart of Seoul for nearly one year from 1986 to 1987 (Kim, H.K, 1988). After the
Democratisation Declaration on June 29 1987(12), their miserable situation opened up
debates on government policies on the urban poor. In 1988, when the new government
under the new democratic constitution was established, political parties, government
agencies as well as religious groups and anti-government civil groups held public fo-
rums, meetings and conferences on the housing problem of the urban poorO 3 ). The
Seoul Displaced Association was formed by the representatives from squatter tenants
throughout the city. Scholars and students in anti-government movements established
the Urban Poor Institute. This sympathy with and support for tenants extended to
farming landowners in the later cases which will be examined in the next Section.
Third, new forms of speculation became prevalent in the PPD area. As mentioned
before, the provision of titles to new apartments or land after development became a
means of supplementing cash compensation, speculation in land and properties which
12) See Section 3.5.1
13) Papers presented to the Public Forums held under the auspices of the
Great Catholic Seoul Diocese Ministerial Commision for the Urban Poor in
June 1988 and December 1988 show the growing interests of scholars and
experts in the problems of tenants households in urban development.
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were to be purchased by the public developers became prevalent. Titles to new
apartments and housing plots began to be traded at much higher prices than those
initially paid since the mid-1980's. The titles to a room in a rental apartment in
Mockdong, for example, were traded at a price of 3.4 to 3.5 million wons as of May
1987 (Maeilkyongje-Shinmoon, May 18, 1987).
As seen in Chapter 4 and 5, there were always actors quick to cash in such expected
gains in present values in the property market. They were mostly speculative investors
and real estate agencies. Speculation in existing properties which were to be
compensated became prevalent in various forms. A typical example was the division of
land into small plots. In some cases, real estate agencies bought land at higher prices
than those the KNHC would pay for the land. An interviewee from the KNHC ex-
plained how this happened: 'Real estate agencies or speculative investors buy land
which is to be purchased by the KNHC at, for example, 150,000 won/pyong, at
300,000 won/pyong. They divide it into small size plots of 90 m2 at minimum.
Then they sell the divided plots at 600,000 won per pyong realizing a capital gain
of 300,000 won/pyong. This 600,000 won can be taken as the market value of the
compensation for the land, i.e., the appraised land prices plus other indirect
compensation such as titles to housing plots or new apartments' (interviewee, L).
This became a problem when the KN}{C developed another large housing estate in
Seoul, Sanggye. Sanggye is an area located in the north-eastern part of Seoul. The area
to be developed by the KNHC was 1 million pyongs. It was mostly farm land (78.5
percent) and forest(1 4) When Sanggye area was designated for Residential Land
Development, the partition of land into smaller plots were prevalent since when each
plot owner was allocated housing plots after development as part of relocation
measures they would get a lump sum of capital gains (interviewee, J).
Thus from the Sanggye Estate development, the government adopted measures to
prevent such speculation on the existing properties in the designated areas for PPD
14) The patterns of conflict between the KNIE-IC and landowners and residents
over the compensation, and the process by which the conflicts came to a
settlement in Sanggye Development were very similar to the case of
Chulsan. Thus the detail is not described here.
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projects. In the case of Sanggye, the government designated the area to be liable to the
Land Transaction Report System. Thus in the area all land transactions had to be
reported to the authorities in advance. The Sanggye area was also designated as a
Special Area for Speculation Control where heavier property transfer tax was to be
imposed (KNHC, 1989a). Further the government decided not to provide housing
plots to landowners for additional compensation. In April 1985, the MOC announced
that in PPD areas developed land such as housing plots and commercial land would not
be provided in the name of resettlement measures. According to the MOC, this was to
correct the irrationality that landowners were compensated twice: prices for land and
premiums associated with land they were allocated after development'
(Hankookkyounje-Shinmoon, April 17, 1985).
Thus since the Mockdong incident, the PPD projects had been facing new cir-
cumstances: politicisation of compensation for compulsory land purchase; more
pressures on the government to concede to landowners and residents' demands;
increasing speculation on compensation. This tendency led to a crisis of the PPD
system at the end of 1980's as will be seen in the following Section.
6.5 PPD in Crisis
6.5.1 New Towns in the late 1980's.
The political and economic circumstances in 1987 and 1988, in which the Two Million
Housing Construction Plan was formulated, were outlined in Section 3.5 in Chapter 3.
As a part of the plan, public development agencies such as the KNI-IC and the Korea
Land Development Corporation (KLDC) began to develop three small New Towns
around Seoul in 1988: Pyongchon, Sanbon and Joongdong (see Figure 2.2, p78). In
April 1989, President Rho, T.W. announced the development of two additional New
Towns, Bundang and Ilsan. It was in these two New Towns that the Public Purchase
and Development Projects (PPD) system came face unprecedented strong defiance of
landowners and residents.
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The two New Towns were primarily designed for middle and high income families. In
Section 1.1, the circumstances in which the rise in house prices became a political issue
in the late 1980's were mentioned. To repeat briefly, high house prices, which began to
rise fast in 1987, became a political issue from late 1988. The rise in house prices
frustrated not only low income households but also middle and high income families.
The rapid rise in house prices in Seoul, particularly in the Gangnam area (see Figure
4.4, p159), was a case of the latter. The government seems to have aimed at the
stabilization of fast rising apartment prices in Gangnam by announcing a mass housing
supply plan around Seoul through the development of New Towns.
The plan was to develop the Bundang area into a New Town with 105,000 houses in
5.4 million pyongs of land and Ilsan into another New Town with 75,000 houses in 4.6
million pyongs of land between 1990 and 1992 (MOC, 1989).
Bundang, located 20 km south from the city centre of Seoul and 10 km from
Gangnam, had been a Green Area, but under strict development control as in a Green
Belt, since 1976. However, the area had been proposed several times for a site of a
New Town since the mid-1980's, when land availability for housing began to be talked
about in Seoul. Rumours had frequently run that the area would soon be developed
and it is known that land in the area was owned by speculative investors (SSSG,
1 990a).
Ilsan is located 20 km north from the city centre of Seoul. It had had no such prospect
of urban development. It was a Productive Green Area and its farm land was mostly
Absolute Farm Land, the conversion of which was strictly controlled. It was only 25
km south of the border with North Korea where 1 million armed forces from both
sides were confronting each other. It had never been expected that it would be
developed into an urban area. Farming residents had lived for generations since their
predecessors developed slime land along the downstream of the Han River. They were
then realizing fairly good profits by cultivating lucrative vegetables sold in Seoul
(SSSG, op. cit.; Hankookkyongje-Shinmoon, July 7, 1990).
Bundang had an area of 5,551,929 pyongs, 70 percent farm land and 23 percent
forests. There were 3,693 landowners and 51 large landowners with 10,000 pyongs or
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more, who owned 35 percent of the whole land. 62.5 percent of land was owned by
absentee landowners, mostly believed to be speculative investors (Hangyore-Shin-
moon, October 14, 1989).
Ilsan had an area of 4,760,559 pyongs. There were 4,647 landowners. Only 26
landowners owned more than 10,000 pyongs whose land accounted for 16 percent of
the land. Those with less than 5,000 pyongs numbered 3,540 and they owned 73
percent of the land. Landowners were thus mostly small holders. 66 percent of the land
was farm land, 21.4 percent forests and 1.6 percent housing sites. Absentee
landowners comprised only 25 percent. 4,052 households lived there with a population
of 17,795 including 1,814 tenant households. There were 2,871 houses out of which
257 were illegal houses (SSSG, op. cit.).
On the government announcement to develop their areas into New Towns by the PPD,
landowners and residents in the areas immediately reacted against the compulsory land
purchase. On May 11989, 50 inhabitants in Bundang gathered at the Seongnam city
hall and proposed conditions for the development of their land: the provision of
appropriate resettlement measures before the start of development project and the
reflection of residents' opinion in the planning process. However, in Ilsan, residents and
landowners from the beginning made clear their firm position against the development
itself. On the same day they organized the Residents Association for Campaign Against
the Development. (Hangyore-Shinmoon, May 2, 1989).
The next day, in Bundang, a thousand residents gathered at the city hall demanding an
alternative means for living. In Ilsan, 1,300 residents occupied a railroad and held sit-in
demonstrations demanding the cancellation of the development plan (Hankook-Ilbo,
May 3, 1989). In the following week, sit-in demonstrations at the headquarters of
political parties, on the highways and rail ways, and Street demonstrations in front of
the National Assembly continued. Such responses were not unprecedented as seen in
the previous cases. However, this time, their response attracted the attention of anti-
government scholars and experts in urban issues, and politicians (Seoulkyongje-
Shinmoon, May 4 1989; Chosun-Ilbo, May 7, 1989). In the National Assembly,
politicians in the ruling party pressed the Minister of construction to adopt measures to
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pacify increasing popular discontent (SNA, 1989: the 8th conference of the 145th ses-
sion).
The government prepared a compensation plan in a hurry to pacify the strong
opposition of landowners and residents. On May 10 1989, the MOC announced the
compensation plan. It suggested that the assessment of land values would consider
actual land prices in the vicinity rather than be mechanically based on the Pegged
Prices. The suggestion included the provision of housing plots to resident landowners
after development as additional compensation. This was a retreat from the government
policy decided at the time of Sanggye development not to provide developed land as
compensation. The government proposed the provision of commercial land not only to
existing shop owners but also to farming landowners who wanted to change their
occupation to commerce. This was also unprecedented. Tenant households were to be
provided rental apartments as before. The government also promised to provide
substitute agricultural land for farmers in Ilsan in the vicinity. On May 30, the Minister
of Construction announced a development plan for 600,000 pyongs of agricultural land
in the neighbouring county for farmers in Ilsan (KLDC, 1989).
Thus the compensation plan was much more generous than those in the previous cases.
The government and the KLDC stepped up the publicity activities on the development
plan and compensation plan. The government organized the Compensation
Deliberation Committee with 15 to 23 members from the residents, the KLDC and lo-
cal governments. 30 percent of the members were to be representatives of landowners
and residents. They distributed pamphlets explaining the plan and requesting coopera-
tion from property owners. The government and the KLDC held, for the first time,
public forums on the development plans and the compensation plan (Ibid). They even
held a meeting with the residents to have the appraisers explain the process and criteria
of land valuations (SSSG, op. cit).
However, the opposition campaign was not softened. Particularly that in Ilsan was
violent. Residents from Ilsan continued to hold sit-in demonstrations at the National
Assembly and at the headquarters of political parties. Several farmers killed themselves
protesting against the forced deprivation of their land. This gave rise to ftirther
violence by the residents (Ibid). Opposition members of the National Assembly
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proposed to adopt a resolution to cancel the development plans and demanded that the
government reform the present housing development strategy at the grass-roots. The
Residential Land Development Promotion Law (RLDPL), the base law for the PPD,
was criticised as an undemocratic law enacted under the dictatorship of the New
Military Group in the early 1980s (SNA, 1989: the third conference and the sixth con-
ference of the 146 session on May 18 and 26 1989). The latter half of 1989 was
dominated by the issue of the New Town development in street demonstrations and
public forums.
This development was contrasted to that in the three other New Towns which began to
be developed only one year earlier. In the three New Towns public development
agencies had also been in conflict with landowners and residents. However, in these
areas, the conflicts did not develop into such a political issue. A specification of some
differences between the two groups of New Towns may help explain why the devel-
opment of Bundang and Ilsan, of all other New Towns, caused such wide public
discussion and became a political issue.
The first difference is in the scale of development. Table 6.1 compares five New
Towns under development in the late 1980s around Seoul. In terms of development
area, Bundang and Ilsan are 4.3 times larger than the total area of the other three New
Towns. There were 3,700 and 4,647 landowners in Bundang and Ilsan respectively
(SSSG, 1990a). In terms of residents, Bundang and Ilsan had 8,000 and 4,000
households respectively. In Sanbon, there were approximately 2,600 landowners and
Table 6.1 Development Plan of the Five New Towns around Seoul, 1990
______________ Bundang Ilsan Pyongchon Sanbon Joondong
Area
(1,000 pyong)
	
5,550	 4,750	 1,490	 1,260	 1,630
Population
(1,000 persons)	 390	 280	 170	 170	 170
Houses	 97,500	 75,000	 42,500	 42,500	 42,500
Source: Adapted from unpublished document, the Ministry of Con-
struction, 1990.
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residents households (interviewee K). In other words, the government had to face
much larger number of people who were to be compensated and relocated in Bundang
and Ilsan.
Second, as mentioned before in the other three New Towns, public development
agencies such as the KNI-IC were individually facing with local landowners and
residents. Development plans were known to landowners before the official procedure
for development was taken. In Bundang and Ilsan, the central government itself
directed the whole process from the formulation of the plan to major policies for
compensation. The plan had been kept secret until the President himself announced the
development. The idea to develop the two New Towns was proposed by the Presiden-
tial Secretariat Office although the KLDC was in charge of its implementation. In
consequence, from the beginning the central government had to directly confront not
only landowners and residents in the two development areas but also all the opposition
forces.
In these circumstances, political organizations and human rights organizations
intervened in support of the landowners and residents' campaign against the de-
velopment. Scholars and urban experts were criticising the rough-and-ready
development without properly considering its effects on the life of the residents and
impacts on the increase in population in the capital and regional traffic and
environment (Joongangkyongje-Shinmoon, May 24, 1989; Shindong-A, June 1989).
Opposition Parties demanded that the government reconsider the development plan. At
first, they demanded some changes in the development plan such as the allocation of
more houses to low income households. As the resistance of landowners and residents
became violent, they began to oppose the development plan itself (Joongangkyongje-
Shinmoon, May 11, 1989). At this time, the ruling party lacked a majority in the
National Assembly. Opposition parties finally adopted a resolution to urge the
government to reconsider the plan on May 27 1989.
Yet, the government was determined to push forward with the development as origi-
nally planned. Any significant retreat would damage the President's dignity which had
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already been jeopardised by the unrest of industrial workers and the urban poors'
struggle in 1987 and 1988. If the government was again pushed back in the New Town
development, as they seemed to have feared, the authorities would have greater
difficulties in maintaining their grip on discipline in the society.
On May 29, the Minister of Construction announced that he would not reconsider the
plan itself, though the development of Ilsan could be postponed for another two or
three years during which farmers could continue to work on their land (Hankook-Ilbo,
May 30 1989). In June the government and the ruling party joint meeting concluded
for carrying forward the development plan with some supplement of compensation
measures (Seoulkyongje-Shinmoon, June 2 1989). On June 19, the President
confirmed on the air that the government would carry on the development plan by
paying full compensation for landowners and residents (Dong-A-Ilbo, June 19 1989).
By this time, anti-government organizations were involved. Later in July 1989, they
formed the Joint Committee to Support the Campaign Against the New Town
Development. They included the Korea Agrarian Movement, the Korea Urban Poor
Union, the Urban Poors Institute, the Young Architects Association, the Federation of
Seoul Students Association, the Goyang-Gun Residents Association for the Promotion
of Democracy. They were supported by the Korea National Democratization Move-
ment, the Progressive Politicians Coalition, the Greater Seoul Catholic Diocese
Ministerial Commission for the Urban Poor (Pamphlet on the Public Forum on the
Bundang and Ilsan Development held by the Joint Committee to Support the
Campaign Against the New Town Development in July 1989).
These organizations were interested particularly in Ilsan, since in Bundang the struggle
of landowners and residents was for more compensation from the beginning while in
Ilsan it was against the New Town development itself. However, their involvement
was not welcomed by landowners and residents in Ilsan. Landowners and residents In
Ilsan did not want their campaign to be exploited by the anti-government movement.
The residents themselves formed the Residents Association for Campaign Against the
Ilsan New Town Development, which consistently emphasized that they had no links
with any anti-government political groups, political parties and other ideologically
motivated sympathizers. They even refused a suggestion from residents in Bundang to
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form a joint campaign since their demand was cancellation of the plan while that in
Bundang was for more generous compensation. Their activities including street
demonstrations and public forums which continued throughout the latter half of 1989
made the issue an object of public concern (SSSG, 1990a; 1990b).
Although the opposition organizations could not form a direct coalition with
landowners and residents, their activities, street demonstrations and public forums,
gave indirect aid to landowners and residents in the struggle with the government.
They had links with opposition parties and, in the situation in which opposition parties
held a majority of seats in the National Assembly, they could exert a certain influence
on the government.
The strong resistance by the landowners, supported by these organizations, brought
about a significant delay in the development of the New Towns. The valuation of the
properties for compensation was to be completed by August 1989. The payment of the
compensation cost to residents was due to begin in September in the same year. The
formal Development Plan was to be approved by the Ministry of Construction by
August 1989 and construction work was to be started in October 1989 (KLDC, 1989).
The KLDC started property surveys in April 1989. However, because of the strong
resistance of landowners and residents, the survey showed little progress until the end
of June 1989. The government and the KLDC finally began to enforce the survey
under the cover of riot police at the end of July in 1989. Landowners confronted them
with demonstrations on the sites, at the offices of political parties and government
offices. Physical collision on the sites often led to casualties and many arrests (SSSG,
1990b). By October, in Bundang the KLDC could barely manage to complete 70
percent of the survey which was begun in August 1989 (Choongang-Ilbo, October 19
1989).
Landowners and residents could not resist indefinitely. In Bundang, as there were no
sign of further concession on the side of the KLDC, a number of landowners,
speculative investors, began to accept the KLDC's proposal. First of all, compensation
prices for land were more generous compared with those in the previous cases. The
Pegged Prices issued in 1986 were 100,000 to 135,000 won/pyong for housing land,
30,000 to 50,000 won/pyong for farm land and 10,000 to 21,000 won/pyong for
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forests. The prices were adjusted by the average rise in land prices in Seongnam city,
the competent authority of Bundang. When the development plan was announced, land
prices in and outside Bundang were rising by two to five times: prices of farm land in
the surrounding Green Areas rose to 100,000 to 350,000won/pyong; those of housing
land to 400,000 to 1,000,000 won/pyong (Hankookkyongje-Shinmoon, May 4 1989).
In October 1989, land in Bundang was valued at 727,000 won/pyong for housing sites,
263,000 won/pyong for paddy fields, 285,000 won/pyong for dry fields and 120,000
won/pyong for forests on average respectively (SSSG, 1990). This means that the
compensation prices became much closer to actual trading market prices in the vicinity
than in the case of Chulsan.
In addition, they could expect a considerable premium with new properties sold to
them as part of compensation at cheaper prices: housing plots at 50 to 60 percent of
cost prices and new shops or commercial land at appraised prices (Hankookkyonje-
Shinmoon, February 2 1991). This is compared to that in Chulsan where housing plots
were provided at cost prices and shops and commercial land at the average contract
prices with the highest bidders.
2,400 tenants households, 59 percent of the residents, were not satisfied with the
compensation and continued collective sabotage. They demanded titles to rental
apartments with 8 to 20 pyongs or six months' living expenses, and temporary housing
before demolition. The KLDC instead suggested to the tenants to choose either the
title to rental apartments or three months' living expenses (2,225,000 won for a family
of six). It was these tenant households which resisted further but were no longer an
obstacle to the development proceeding.
In contrast, in Ilsan, most landowners were still demanding the cancellation of the de-
velopment plan itself. It was difficult to find alternative agricultural land like the
present one which had many advantages as a suburban agricultural land. The KLDC
had great difficulties in carrying out surveys on properties because of the stubborn
resistance and refusal by the residents.
Only with the lapse of time, landowners again one by one came to negotiation. By the
end of 1989, organized resistance in both Bundang and Ilsan ended. Landowners and
residents were fighting individually for more compensation by appealing to the Central
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Land Expropriation Committee or the Court. Entering 1990, the target of the struggle
to cancel the development itself was almost abandoned. The point of dispute moved on
to the compensation and resettlement measures (SSSG, 1990b).
By July 1990, one year after the KLDC began to enforce a survey for compensation
and compulsory purchase, compensation for landowners in Bundang was completed.
In Ilsan, 75 percent of the land was purchased and 25 percent was awaiting the final
decision of the Central Land Expropriation Arbitration Committee (CLEAC) for
compensation prices (Hankookkyongje-Shinmoon, July 7, 1990).
The government after all succeeded in carrying forward the development plan. Yet, the
strong resistance in the two New Towns and subsequent concessions by the
government in the compensation measures meant a significant change in the relation
between landowners and the government, resulting in rising compensation payments
for compulsory land purchase in the PPD.
6.5.2 Losing Control of Land Prices
These New Town developments had become a precedent in which landowners and
residents were able to push the government to make concessions in the determination
of land prices and compensation for properties. Since the incidents in Bundang and
Ilsan, the PPD came to face increasing difficulties in terms of rising compensation
payments throughout the country.
First, the case in the two New Towns directly affected the determination of com-
pensation prices of land and associated properties. In Seoul, the city government was
developing residential land for the Two Million Housing Construction Plan in 1989 in
the remaining Green Areas in Gangnam. In these areas, landowners, spurred by the
incidents in Bundang and Ilsan, claimed more compensation for their properties:
compensation for their land at the prices of land in the vicinity which were two to three
times the appraised prices; title to larger apartments (so far usually small sizes
apartments, i.e., less than 20 pyongs in floor space, were given for compensation);
provision of land after development at half of the cost prices; provision of new
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commercial properties. Landowners even demanded that the city government allow
them to develop the land or to develop their land by the LRP; to compensate building
at construction costs of new buildings (Mailkyongje-Shinmoon, March 31, 1989;
Choongang-Ilbo, April 17, 1989; Hankook-Ilbo, May 311989; Chosun-Ilbo, June 17
1989; Chosun-Ilbo, March 9 1990; Chosun-Ilbo, May 17 1990). The same situation
spread to provincial cities (Chosun-Ilbo, June 22, 1989; March 8, 1991). The result
was increasing land prices and more expensive compensation payment for the PPD.
Since the incidents in Bundang and Ilsan, the government has sought to improve the
legal framework to confront the problems of the PPD. In 1990, regulations on
compulsory land purchase and compensation were revised several times in order to, as
the government described it, 'conciliate the need to use land for public interests and the
obligation to protect private property' (KNHC, 1992c). First of all, Pegged Land Price
was replaced by the New Public Notice Price as the base price on which compensation
prices of land were valued. The Land Expropriation Law and the Special Law
Regarding Land Expropriation and Compensation were amended in such a way that
land value was to be appraised on the basis of the new Public Notice Price. The
Pegged Land Prices (PLP), once issued, were not periodically renewed. Only in the
designated areas where land prices were rising very fast, was the price to be renewed
every three years. Thus PLP was usually far lower than actual market prices. The
PNLP was to be notified to the public every year based on actual trading prices. The
new system has been in effect since January 1990 (KNHC, 1992c).
Accordingly, compensation prices for land in Seoul have been rising fast: it was
1,542,000 won/pyong in Suseo in 1990; 1,600,000 won/pyong in Daechi in 1990;
2,619,000 won/pyong in Banghwa in 1991; 3,870,000 won/pyong in Wolgye in 1992;
4,158,000 won/pyong in Banghwa in 1992; 4,320,000 won/pyong in Gongneung in
1992 (Mailkongje-Shinmoon, January 15 1992). These prices were almost equal to
those of land purchased in the private market. An interviewee said: 'there is now little
gap between actual street value and compensation value for expropriated land in
the PPD projects, (interviewee, J).
In consequence, the prices of land provided to private developers through the PPD
have been rising fast. The portion of land cost in new house prices in the PPD areas
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has accordingly been increasing. Table 6.2 shows data suggested by an executive of a
development company to show the rising portion of land cost in the PPD areas. In
Table 6.2 Changes in the Price of Land Provided to Private Devel-
opers through the PPD projects, 1986-1990.
Date of	 Land Prices	 Land Cost Portion in
Provision	 Location	 (won/pyong)	 New House Prices
______ __________ ________	
(%)
Sep. 1986	 Junggye, Seoul	 641,500	 21.3
Oct. 1988	 Dusan, Daejeon	 733,350	 22.5
Sep. 1989	 Bundang, Seong-
__________ nam	 1,098,760	 33.6
Jun. 1990	 Joongdong,Buche
__________ on
	 1,448,790	 33.4
Dec. 1990	 Gayang, Seoul	 2,809,930	 48.8
Dec. 1990 Suseo, Gangnam,
__________ Seoul
	 4,991,000	 60.4
Source: Lee, H. S. (1991).
Figure 6.3 Price Indexes of Land Purchased by the KNHC, 1975-
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1986, land cost accounted for 21.3 percent of new house prices. This rose to 60.4
percent in 1990. This coincides with data shown in Figure 1.8 (p25).
For the KINHC too, the PPD is also no longer cheap in terms of land prices in
residential development. Figure 6.3 is a comparison between the indexes of the prices
of land which the KNI-IC has purchased from private landowners and those of average
housing land prices in large cities and small cities. It shows that the rise in land prices
paid by the KN}IC had kept pace with those of average housing land prices until the
mid-1980's. However, from the late 1980's, the KNHC's purchasing prices began to
rise faster than average prices. This is despite the increasing reliance of the KNHC on
the PPD which aimed at acquiring land at cheaper prices(see Figure 6.2). In other
words, the PPD has increasingly failed to provide land at cheaper prices since the late
1980's.
Figure 6.4a and 6.4b compare the changes in new apartment prices, the prices of raw
land and developed land and building density in three PPD project areas developed by
the KNHC, Gaepo, Sanggye and Sanbon. Figure 6.4a shows that both land prices and
development cost land have risen faster than new house prices. Between 1981 and
1990, new house prices rose 1.6 times while raw land prices, land development cost
and the consequent prices of developed land rose 5, 11.4 and 7.6 times respectively.
This means that land prices have risen while the quality of land in terms of location and
infrastructure has been getting poorer. In Figure 6.4b, the prices and development cost
of land was converted into prices per pyong of floor space. It shows that the KNHC
has had to increase building densities in order to keep land cost per pyong of floor
space at a low level. Private developers have built at the maximum densities from the
early 1970's as seen in Chapter 4 and 5: average Floor Area Ratio (FAR) had been 180
percent until 1986; 250 percent until 1988; 300 from 1989 in and around Seoul. The
KNHC's average FAR had been no more 80 percent in and around Seoul until the early
1980's (KNHC, 1986). It increased to more than 150 percent by mid-1980's, then to
200 percent in 1990 (unpublished document, Site Planning Department, KNHC, 1992).
The increase in indirect compensation payment has become also a problem. Table 6.3
is a summation of compensation in the housing estates and New Towns examined in
this chapter. In the case of Banpo in 1977, landowners were paid only cash for land. In
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Figure 6.4a Changes in House Prices and Land Prices Selected
KNHC Estates, 1981-1990.
'81 Gaepo	 '87 Sanggye	 '90 Sanbon
Land price	 Development cost 	 House price
Figure 6.4b Changes in House Prices, Land Cost and Building Den-
sity, Selected KNHC Estates, 1981-1990.
'81 Gaepo	 '87 Sanggye '90 Sanbon
Source: Produced for this thesis based on unpublished data from
Department of Land Development, KNHC, 1992.
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the early 1980's, resident landowners were provided with new apartments or housing
plots at cost prices. In the late 1980's, both resident and absentee landowners were
given housing plots at 50 to 60 percent of cost prices and commercial land or shops at
appraised prices.
For example, in the case of Sanbon, 25 percent of commercial land was allocated to
existing landowners and shop owners as additional compensation. Commercial land
after development was to be sold to the highest bidders. It thus had been a major
source of development gains to the public development agencies, which had mostly
been invested in the construction of infrastructure facilities. To sell them at appraised
prices means a loss in development gains, which is possibly passed on to new house
prices. How much such indirect compensation affected development gains and in con-
sequence new house prices is not known. However it can be a problem if the present
practices continue (interviewee K).
At the time of the survey for this research, April, 1992, when the property market was
in a depression, many landowners around Seoul were suggesting to the KNHC to
develop their land. Land prices were then appraised based on the new Public Notice
Prices, which were very close to actual market prices. In addition, when land was
expropriated, landowners were exempted from the Property Transfer Tax. When they
buy substitute land in other areas, the Land Acquisition Tax too was exempted. This
means that land purchased by compulsion in the PPD projects is no longer
compensated at lower prices than market prices (interviewee K).
The increasing indirect compensation in the PPD projects has also been attended with
various corrupt practices. First, speculation investment aimed at such indirect
compensation has caused problems. Titles to 60 to 70 pyongs of housing plots and 6 to
8 pyongs of commercial land, for example, were traded at 150 million won on average
in Bundang and Ilsan (Hankookkyonje-Shinmoon, February 2 1991). Division of plots
or joint registration of landowners on a plot of land became prevalent aimed at housing
or commercial plots as happened in the time of the Sanggye development mentioned in
Subsection 6.4.3.
Squatting aiming at compensation became prevalent since the late 1980's. In the New
Towns and housing estates in the late 1980's, the illegal construction of squatter
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houses aiming at compensation increased. They were mostly built by professional
organizations, often gangster organizations. Once the houses were sold to squatters,
they staged collective actions demanding compensation. In order to prevent such
squatting, the KNHC as well as other public development agencies has had to employ
private guard companies in the PPD areas (interviewee K).
As monitoring and control of new squatter house building was strengthened,
partitioning existing houses became prevalent. The inside of houses were partitioned
into several compartments which were then let to new tenant households moving in
aiming at compensation. This latter form reached a culmination in the five New Town
development areas (interviewee K). In the Suseo and llwon area in Seoul,
homeowners in the area remodelled open sheds or cattle sheds into rooms and then
rented them to new tenants. In an extreme case, 15 households shared five rooms.
Many of the new tenants were known as having resided in other development areas
and redevelopment areas where they were given titles to rental apartments for com-
pensation ((Mailkyongje-Shinmoon, March 31, 1989).
False residents registration was also prevalent. Aiming at the titles to rental apartments
given to tenants, those who had some connections with people in the areas designated
for development transferred only their residents registration. In some cases, husband
and wife registered separately to claim title to a new house each. Although the govern-
ment revised laws and regulations to strengthen the control of such irregularities, it
became common that real estate agencies wheedled speculative investors or squatters
to buy land or shacks saying that by collective actions they could get certain
compensations (Mailkyongje-Shinmoon, March 31, 1989).
These corrupt practices became to disrupt the implementation of the PPD projects.
First, as speculation became prevalent in land and properties in the PPD areas, the
government has had to take tough anti-speculation measures since the Sanggye
development started in 1985. The government had to adopt strong anti-specultion
measures in Bundang and Ilsan immediately after its announcement of the development
plans. In the two New Towns, the government organised the Speculation Investigation
Squad at the National Tax Administration and local governments to monitor
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speculative activities in the area. The Land Transaction Permission System was
applied.
Second, squatters and tenant households also disturbed development works as they
were very likely to be excluded from compensation. In the development process, the
demolition of existing structures became one of the most difficult jobs. The clearance
squad of the Borough Offices often failed to do their job because of the stubborn resis-
tance of people. Thus from the late 1980's, private demolition squads, who were
actually gangsters organizations, were hired (interviewee L). The government also re-
vised the Special Law Regarding Public Expropriation and Compensation such that
squatters and tenants who moved into the areas after the time the plan was announced
were not given any compensation. The Squatter Control Squads were organized by the
KLDC and local governments to prevent further squatting. To prevent false resident
registration aiming at compensation all administrative service for moving into the area
after the designation of the development area was frozen (MOC, 1989).
The government has sought for alternatives to the PPD system to avoid all these
problems since the New Town incident in 1989. In 1991, the government considered a
system in which a part of the compensation prices of land were paid in bonds which
were to be redeemed annually for up to five years. It was to be applied to land owned
by absentee landowners and non-business land owned by corporations when the
compensation prices exceeded a certain level. Whether such a system was against the
constitution came into question in the Economic Ministers' Conference, in November
1991. Thus in the Cabinet Meeting, the proposal was changed into a more relaxed one
which prescribed the system to be applied only with the agreement of landowners.
However, since no landowners would agree to the payment in bonds, it was unrealistic,
and finally the idea was abandoned (Chosun-Ilbo, November 3 1991).
In the National Assembly, a completely new framework replacing the present
Residential Land Development in Designated Area (RLDDA) was proposed. In the
ninth conference of the 147th session in June 1989, 70 members of the National
Assembly proposed an amendment of the Residential Land Development Promotion
Law (RLDPL). The main point was to compensate a certain portion of the land pur-
chased by compulsion in new land after development: a compromise between the LRP
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and the PPD. This was once suggested and lobbied for by the landowners in Bundang
and Ilsan. The proposal was postponed as the government was also drafting "the
Urban Development Law" which was to integrate and replace various laws concerning
land development and to eliminate sources of public discontent in housing
development. Yet, by the time of the survey for this research, April 1992, the
government had not suggested any definite alternative to the present PPD system.
6.6 Conclusion
Concerning the conflict between landowners and the government in the PPD, scholars
in Korea have concentrated on the legal and policy-technical aspect of the issue. Land
development by force has often been judged against its constitutionality and the effect
on the well-being of the existing residents. It has been tacitly assumed that the state has
both the power and obligation to adopt constitutionally justifiable measures which can
attain a compromise. All the conflicts and irregularities associated with the land market
have often been attributed to deficiencies in policies (Hwang, M.C, 1985; Sohn, J.Y.,
1989; Lee, J.S., 1990).
The social processes by which such problems were created have often been neglected.
In consequence, the effectiveness of the PPD in controlling land cost in residential
development, a main objective of the system, has not been properly questioned. It is
still commonly argued that land price for housing should be and could be contained by
clever policy measures. This underlies the current debate on the price control of new
houses as mentioned in the first Chapter.
Chapter 3 showed the circumstances in which the power of the government has
weakened along with the constitutional change towards democracy in 1987. This
chapter has shown the effects of such changing power balance on the determination of
land prices in the PPD projects. The determination of land prices has been dependent
upon a power balance between the government and landowners. There have always
been resistance from landowners against land expropriation. It was the changing power
relations in the late 1980's that brought about a significant concession by the govern-
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ment in the form of compensation. The PPD is now losing its effectiveness in
controlling land costs since the late 1980's, when the government power was weakened
along with the constitutional change. Land purchased through expropriation is no
longer cheaper than that in the market. This supports Hypothesis Three.
A side effect of the political determination of development gains between landowners
and the public developers in the form of the compensation and resettlement policies is
the increasing speculation on the latter: buying properties in the PPD area before de-
velopment and pressing the government to yield larger portions of development gains
through the compensation and resettlement measures. All forms of irregularities from
commercialised squatting to the division of land plots are the result. Often it was the
low income speculators who were ready to clash with police on the sites for
compensation from the government. Such struggle disturbs the proceeding of
development work inflicting administrative costs on developers. They, the low-income
speculators, as vanguards in the street fighting, have helped landowners to gain a third
party's profit in the struggle for better compensation.
Policies have often been ex post facto measures; they have been only formalization of
what was settled by the changing power relations. That is why the institutions and
policy measures associated with land development are so inconsistent, fragmented and
complicated.
The tacit assumption which underlies the present debates on price control is that the
state can control land cost at a lower level than the market does. What is evidenced in
this chapter suggests that such an assumption is unrealistic under the present housing
development strategy which takes the private appropriation of development gains as a
major motive.
CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION
7.1 Issues and Questions
The research began with a question of how increasingly larger portions of new house
prices have been allocated to land cost as new house prices have risen in Seoul during
the 1970's and 1980's. Studies on this issue in Korea have mostly concentrated on the
identification of factors affecting land prices, on a tacit assumption that land prices have
pushed up house prices. A few scholars had put forward an alternative idea based on a
theoretical elaboration of Ricardo's propositions on land rent. A review of the relevant
literature, in Chapter 2, showed that neither of them could give an appropriate answer
to the question about the relationship between land prices and house prices.
The research then explored the idea that the relationship between house prices and land
prices is not determined by one single factor, i.e., any one of them determining the
other, but the relationship is the result of the interaction between both. Michael Ball's
thesis of the structure of housing provision showed that the relation between land prices
and house prices could be understood only in the context of the interaction between
landowners and developers in the housing development process. This interaction takes
the form of conflict, a competition over development gains. It is suggested that the ris-
ing land cost for housing is an outcome of that conflict and competition.
The potential of the relationship between landowners and developers to explain the role
of urban land in the housing development process was taken as the initial assumption in
this research. The problem became then to identi& how that relationship may result in
particular outcomes such as rising land cost for housing. As conflicts and competitions
are socially mediated, social relations between landowners and developers become
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important in understanding the relationship between land prices and house prices. Since
social relations are specific to concrete situations, it has been argued that the determi-
nation of the portion of house prices allocated to land cost is historically specific. It was
at this point that this research needed to inquire into the material basis of this social
relation. In other words, to answer the question of how the conflict between landown-
ers and housing developers has resulted in the particular form in Korea, that as new
house prices rise increasingly larger portions of them have been allocated to land cost,
an understanding of the material basis of the conflict is necessary. This means an
understanding of how the source of the conflict, development gains, is created and
appropriated.
For this purpose, chapter two of the thesis examined in some length Marx's concept of
rent and decided to adopt his concept of differential rent as a central explanatory con-
cept. On the basis of the analyses in Chapter 1 and 2 the thesis reformulated the central
research question: What relation between landowners and developers has brought
about the continuous rise in land cost for housing in Korea under the increasing
government intervention to regulate it'.
To answer this question, the research examined two aspects of the process by which the
source of development gains, surplus profits, is created and appropriated: the material
conditions of the interaction between landowners and developers and the social rela-
tionships between them. Accordingly the hypothetical answer to the research question
comprised these two aspects: the continuous rise in land cost for housing in Korea
is the outcome of the conflictive and contradictory interaction between landown-
ers and developers, determined by the fact that developers create surplus profits
and landowners appropriate increasingly larger portions of them in the form of
land rent. This affects the way developers produce housing and limit their ability
to reduce house prices. The government has not been able to regulate that inter-
action because of its inability to break from its housing development system
driven by the private appropriation of surplus profits.
Housing developers, like any other commodity producers, seek after surplus profits.
They work out ways of increasing surplus profits. These surplus profits become the
material source of land prices: land prices are the forms by means of which landowners
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appropriate that surplus profit. The ability of developers to create surplus profit here
becomes the material foundation on which landowners and developers interact. The
creation of surplus profit is however not solely at developers' discretion. It is a condi-
tion of housing production forced by the fact that landowners come into the process of
surplus profit creation and demand part of that profit. Once developers create the pos-
sibility of increasing surplus profit, this provides the scope for landowners to demand
further surplus profit for land prices. In other words, developers, by creating surplus
profit, create the condition for the landowners to get a further part of it.
This is the material conditions in which landowners and developers inevitably enter into
a conflicting relationship in housing development, and this thesis sustained that the
growing portion of land cost in new house prices in Seoul had been primarily an out-
come of that conflict between developers and landowners. The thesis also sustained
that this conflict is socially mediated in Korea by means of government policies on
housing and land development. Thus the second part of the Central Hypothesis is about
social relations. It was hypothesised that the government strategy of housing provision
has been designed such that private appropriation of development gains, i.e., surplus
profits, would be the driving force of housing development, and that it has been condi-
tioned by historical political and economic circumstances in Korea.
The research comprised, therefore, mainly two parts: how far the rising land cost for
housing has been affected by the material nature of the relationship between landowners
and developers as suggested by Marx's concept of differential rent; and how social
relations, in the form of government intervention in the relationships between land-
owners and developers, have not been able to regulate the rising land cost for housing.
Research Questions One and Two were formulated to address the first part and exam-
ined in Chapter 4 and 5. Research Questions Three and Four were formulated to
address the second part and examined in Chapter 3 and 6.
This last chapter attempts to summarise and comment on all the empirical findings in
the previous chapters in order to show how they support the Central Hypothesis of
this research. This will be done in the order of the research questions rather than that of
Chapters, which were organised for convenience into a historical examination of hous-
ing development in Seoul during the past two decades.
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7.2 Landowners and Developers in the Creation and Appro-
priation of Development Gains
In the debate on rising land cost for housing in Korea, developers have been tacitly
regarded as victims of high land prices. This conflicts with the suggestion of the Cen-
tral Hypothesis of this thesis. Research Question One was thus formulated as: Have
housing developers in Korea been responsible for the rising land costs that have
accompanied the housing programmes since 1970's?.
To test this hypothesis, the research examined in Chapter 4 and 5 the developers'
strategies and behaviour to increase surplus profits and the amount of the same that
they were able to realise. The examination was carried out for two separate periods: the
1970's, when no restrictive control on new house prices existed, and the 1980's, when
the strict Price Ceiling System was applied.
Chapter 4 examined how housing developers were able to grow fast exploiting favour-
able conditions such as booming housing markets and policies to utilise large develop-
ers for government housing programmes during the 1970's. In the process of identifjing
the material source of their growth, the chapter analysed the relation between new
apartment prices and land prices in Yeouido and Gangnam between 1974 and 1986
through a simple regression model using the rates of changes in land prices and house
prices. The analysis showed that the rate of increase in land cost has little significance in
explaining the rate of change in house prices (X coefficient=0.090785, Std. Err of
Coef.0. 147882, R20.033 127). The chapter then analysed the composition of new
apartment prices to see to what extent developers have realised surplus profits. The
analysis showed that new apartment prices had contained a considerable amount of
surplus profit (10 to 35 percent of new house prices) until the early 1980's. This was
interpreted in this thesis as indicating that there had been scope for landowners to raise
land prices further without affecting the profits of the developers.
For the 1980's, the first part of Chapter 5 examined how developers worked out ways
of increasing surplus profits under the Price Ceiling. The examination disclosed that
from the mid-1980's developers turned to two types of development: luxurious row
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houses and cooperative housing. These types of development were used to evade the
Price Ceiling System and thereby to realise high surplus profits. In Seoul, almost half of
new houses was provided under the Price Ceiling System in 1981. By 1987, houses
provided under the Price Ceiling System had almost disappeared. The common argu-
ment that land prices had risen despite the Price Ceiling turned out to be unfounded.
Land prices had not risen while new house prices had been fixed but had risen while
new house prices had also risen.
The second part of Chapter 5 examined whether the development of luxurious row
houses and cooperative housing were choices forced by landowners, i.e., an inevitable
choice for developers to meet high land prices. The examination showed that it was not
the case. First, most land on which developers built such houses in the mid-1980's had
been owned by them for many years. Secondly, the chapter analysed the composition of
the prices of cooperative housing. The analysis showed that new house prices involved
large surplus profits. This was interpreted to mean that the ability of developers to cre-
ate high surplus profits by evading the price ceiling had provided room for land prices
to rise.
Both examinations, in Chapter 4 and 5, evidenced that developers had been able to real-
ise large surplus profits by exploiting rapidly growing housing demand and government
policies favourable to developers and by evading the Price Ceiling System during the
1970's and 1980's. They thus had provided scope for land prices to rise.
Then the question became whether this meant that landowners had been neutral in
influencing new house prices. Thus Research Question Two was formulated: 'What
was the role of Landowners in the creation and appropriation of development
gains?.
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 examined changing behaviour and attitudes of landowners and
their effects on housing development. It was in the late 1970's, when apartment devel-
opment became lucrative and competition among developers became intensified, that
the patterns and attitudes of landowners began to change. Housing development booms
during the 1970's provided good opportunities for landowners to realise larger portions
of surplus profit in the form of land prices. This attracted speculative investment in land
for housing. Speculative investors, from housewives with some savings to real estate
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agencies, began to replace farming landowners. Remaining farming landowners became
conscious about their land value. Pervasive among these farming landowners was a
sense that they had to be paid for their land at least more than what others were paid in
the vicinity. Monopoly pricing, land withholding and waiting, and speculative land
transactions became prevalent in consequence.
These, often called irregularities in the land market, were the practical forms in which
landowners increasingly transformed larger portions of surplus profit into land prices.
Under these circumstances, once a developer worked out a new way of maximising
surplus profit and that gave the chance to landowners to realise higher land prices,
those higher prices became normal payments for all land of similar quality and location.
Landowners in the whole area demanded the same or higher prices for their land. This
was observed in the case of cooperative housing. Land prices paid for cooperative
housing became normal prices for land available for apartment development in Seoul by
the late 1980's. Most private apartment developers had to build cooperative housing if
they wanted to continue housing development at such high land prices.
Increasing high density and high rise housing estates have been consequences of the
same process. Once a new high density development yielded high surplus profits and
land prices rose to a higher level, all other land where such high density development
was allowed was priced at the same or higher prices. This resulted in a higher land cost
burden on later developers. The latter then followed the same or other new ways of
development which could finance high land prices.
Thus although landowners have not directly determined new house prices as seen in the
examination of Research Question One, they have affected the way in which housing
was produced. The increasing land cost has meant the transformation of increasingly
larger portions of surplus profit into land prices. That process has conditioned all
developers to adopt new building methods when the new methods became a way of
increasing surplus profit, as in the case of high density housing development. Coopera-
tive housing development has been also one of the ways of realising high surplus profits
under the particular condition of price ceiling. In this sense, landowners have not been
merely passive actors in the appropriation of land rent.
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Simply attributing the rising portion of land cost in new house prices to fortuitous mar-
ket situations misses this point. It has been due to the material nature of the contradic-
tory and conflictive relation between landowners and developers in housing develop-
ment, which conditions land prices and new house prices to affect each other resulting
in a spiral rise in both. This has been the way in which the portion of land cost has been
rising in the new house prices.
7.3 Social Conditions for the Establishment of the Urban Rent
Relation in Korea
The actual forms and consequences of contradictions and conflicts between landowners
and developers are dependent upon wider social relations and historical circumstances.
This involves two issues that were examined in this thesis: the social relations respond-
ing to the contradictory interaction between landowners and developers, and historical
conditions in which these took place.
The Korean government intervention in the relation between landowners and develop-
ers represents an institutional form of the social relations between these actors. As seen
in Chapter 3, the contradiction between landowners and developers became a problem
to the government whenever it needed to promote housing development in Korea.
Hence the government increasingly intervened to regulate this conflict. However, as
shown in the first Chapter, the direct involvement of the government in land develop-
ment for housing has not been successful in controlling land cost. Thus Research
Question Three was formulated: how has the direct involvement of the government
in land development had affected the relationship between landowners and devel-
opers and what has been the effects on land prices for housing?.
Chapter 6 examined this question through case studies of seven Public Purchase and
Development (PPD) projects.
Compulsory land purchase for public housing began in the mid-1970's. The research
showed that at that time there was no organised resistance from landowners against
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compulsory purchase of their land. Landowners had not been in a position to exercise
any significant political power as a distinctive class since the Farm Land Reform in the
early 1950's. There were criticisms on the compulsory land purchase in the National
Assembly. Opposition politicians often criticised that land expropriation gave favours
only to large developers at the expense of small landowners. However, under the
authoritarian rule of the Park Regime, which ruled the country by presidential decree
from 1972 to 1979, such criticism did not affect the government intervention.
In the early 1980's, when the government launched the 5 Million Housing Construction
Plan, the PPD system was introduced. The PPD is a system in which the government
agencies have the right of compulsory purchasing of land, to be developed and pro-
vided later for both public and private housing.
In the early 1980's, when the New Military Group was formed into a civilian govern-
ment, the new regime was anxious to improve its relations with ordinary people. As an
appeasement policy, the new government instructed public agencies not to cause public
discontent in urban and housing development. It was in these conditions that the gov-
ernment made some concessions to landowners. PPD projects, for example, began to
include resettlement measures such as the provision of titles to new apartments or new
housing plots in addition to cash payment for land. However, by and large, the determi-
nation of land prices in housing development remained under the fill control of the
government until the early 1980's.
The situation changed in 1984 after the politically damaging open conflict between
landowners and residents and the government in the Mockdong Estate Development. It
was the time when students in anti-government movements and human rights groups
began to intervene in housing and urban development in support of the urban poor. As
a consequence of all these, the government was forced to increase concession to land-
owners included in PPD projects. That took the form of indirect compensation for land
and properties purchased by compulsion. Since that time, the government has been
steadily losing power in its relation with landowners.
The political crisis in 1987 resulted in the fall of the authoritarian regime under Presi-
dent Chun, which was replaced by a more moderate government in 1988. The democ-
ratisation accelerated the changes in the power relation between the government and
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landowners in favour of the latter. A new struggle of landowners and residents against
the government took place in the two New Towns, Bundang and Ilsan in 1989. The
government has since virtually lost control on land prices in the PPD projects. As of
1992, land prices in the PPD areas were no longer cheaper than market prices. The
difference between compulsory purchasing land prices and actual market prices was in
fact expressing such additional indirect compensation as titles to housing plots, com-
mercial land and new apartments. When this indirect compensation is added, land prices
in the PPD may be higher than those paid in private land development although basic
prices remained under control.
The direct involvement of government in the relationship between landowners and
developers has politicised the determination of land prices for housing but has been
increasingly failing to control rising land cost. Chapter 3 examined the historical politi-
cal and economic circumstances that conditioned this failure. In order to do this Chap-
ter 3 provided the answer to Research Question Four: What political and economic
circumstances have conditioned the government's inability to control land prices
for housing?
Class struggle which began in Korea after the liberation of the country from Japanese
Rule in 1945 ended in the political defeat of the working class by the time of the end of
the Korean War in 1953. Strong state and weak labour relations were established. One
consequence was that housing provision was left to private development. This housing
strategy was consolidated by the military coup in May 1961. The Military Junta
launched an industrialisation programme to develop export manufacturing industries in
the early 1960's and the Heavy and Chemical Industries from the late 1960's. It subor-
dinated financial capital to the interests of industrial capital. Successive Korean gov-
ernments have since adopted policies to control financial resources in favour of indus-
trial development. In consequence, the housing and land development system was
designed on the basis of self-financing principles. Private appropriation of development
gains has since been the major driving force of housing and land development.
As seen in the cases of the three long term housing construction plans, whenever the
government was in political difficulties, it intervened in the relationship between land-
owners and developers. Broadly, this relationship has changed from the time of the
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Land Readjustment Project (LRP) to the Public Purchase and Development (PPD), i.e.,
from weak state intervention towards a more direct control of the relationship between
landowners and developers. However, in both systems, the self-financing principle and
resulting reliance of housing development on speculative investment has remained
unchanged. In other words, private appropriation of development gains has consistently
been the driving force of housing development. The conflict between landowners and
developers has thus always existed in housing development. The evidences provided in
Chapter 3 suggested that there has been no way of controlling those conflicts and con-
tradictions, that have resulted in spiral rises in land and house prices.
Thus the first part of the research was the identification of the material basis of the
conflict between landowners and developers, that is, the mechanism by which surplus
profits, the source of the conflict, are created and appropriated. The ability of devel-
opers to create surplus profit provides the material foundation for land prices to go up.
This creates a condition for more surplus profit to be transformed into land prices
through the ability of landowners to dictate the way developers produce housing to
create even more surplus profits.
As to social relations, changing government policies were examined as institutional
forms in which the interaction between landowners and developers is socially mediated.
The research concluded that the failure of the government to control rising land cost
has been caused by its form of intervention in the relationship between landowners and
developers. This has forced the government to drift according to changes in the balance
of political power involving landowners and developers. By this conclusion, this
research contradicts existing policy studies in Korea that attribute the failure to control
rising land cost to policy inconsistencies, lack of political will or moral weakness from
the part of government to eradicate speculative investment. Thus the rising land cost
for housing has been an outcome of conflicts over housing development, i.e., struggle
between landowners and developers as conditioned by the wider social environment,
the struggle between labour and capital. All these indicate that the evolution of Korean
housing markets and policies associated with them is not the consequences of technical
factors such as exogeneously given land prices or policy shifts but the consequences of
conflicts generated in the process of housing development itself
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This conclusion suggests that there is no way of controlling this process by the means
which are presently used and proposed in Korea, as will be briefly commented below.
7.4 Some Comments and Implications of the Conclusion
As indicated in Chapter 1, new house price control has recently been one of the most
controversial issues among scholars, developers and the government in Korea. It is in
this debate that lack of understanding of the relationship between land prices and house
prices becomes manifest and causes confusion. Concerning land prices, the liberalisa-
tion of new house price has been advocated on the ground that the elimination of price
control would encourage housing development and thus by increasing housing supply,
would finally lead to a fall in house price (Kim J. H, 1988; Kim, J. H, 1990; Yoo, J.H.,
1990).
In contrast, concerning land prices, the measures advocated has been stricter regula-
tions of the land market. It has been argued that the government has to take stronger
measures to control land prices in housing development along with the removal of
house price control (Yoo, J.H., 1990, KIM, J.H., 1991). The prevalence of speculative
investment practices in the land market had long been blamed for rising land prices.
Thus the control of speculative investment in land and consequent irregularities in the
land market had been regarded as the most important and urgent measure to stabilise
land prices.
Taxation has been the major measure to regulate the irregularities associated with
speculative investment. It was believed that land taxes raised land holding costs, cut
down capital gains and thus discouraged demand for land. Hence lower land prices in
the end (e.g., KRIHS, 1989). Thus it was asserted that if 100 percent of capital gains
were taxed away and all the provisions on tax exemption and reduction were abolished,
land price could be controlled (KHA, 1991b).
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Then regarding the question of why taxation has so far been ineffective in controlling
land prices, many pointed to technical and administrative limitations and side effects
associated with the tax systems (Lee, J. J, 1 988a); inaccurate assessment of land price
and low level of taxation (Sohn, J. Y, 1989; KHA, 1991b). Loopholes in the tax sys-
tem, such as tax exemption and reductions in exceptional cases, have been also criti-
cised as helping speculators, developers and landowners to avoid tax either legally or
illegally (Kim, J. H, 1991). All these defects in tax policies and systems have been
blamed for the failure to establish order in the land market.
The findings in this research contradict these arguments. First, the argument presup-
poses that if a fair rule is maintained in the competition between housing developers
(for example, there is no collusion among developers to keep house prices at high
level), the liberalisation of prices would lead to a fall in new house prices. The research
findings contradict this proposition. The research suggests that high land prices in Seoul
have not been the result of either collusion or lack of competition among developers,
but the competition between developers has been ineffective to reduce house prices due
to the existence of rent relations.
The second assumption in the above arguments is that if the relationship between land-
owners and developers is not disturbed by the government, private housing develop-
ment would be cost effective resulting in lower house prices. Historical evidence in this
study suggests that the direct relationship between landowners and developers does not
guarantee smooth housing development. As seen in Chapters 4 and 5, to negotiate with
a number of landowners has been one of the most difficult problems for private devel-
opers. Although they were in conflict with the government in the PPD areas in the late
1980's, most interviewees expressed that they preferred land purchase from public
agencies to that from private landowners. Designated Developers have pressed the
government to encourage private land development for housing by giving them the
right to expropriate land for housing. The government power to control land price in
the PPD has, however, already been weakening, and these wishes of developers seem
to be unrealistic.
The assumption of orderly land market conditions is also doubtful. It is assumed that if
orderly transaction is maintained, land prices could be stabilised. This ignores the fact
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that the present housing strategy of the government has been based on the self-financ-
ing principle and heavily reliant on speculative investment. It has been seen in this
research that whenever there was a need to promote housing development either for
political or for economic reasons, the government had to relax regulations on specula-
tive investment including tax exemptions or reductions. That's why there has been such
frequent changes in tax rates and the regulations on tax exemption and reductions. In
consequence, such elimination of capital gains, if it was perfectly effective as argued,
would undermine the whole present housing development strategy.
The improvement of house building technology has also been a policy issue although on
a different level from the policy issues mentioned above. Mass production of low cost
housing using highly productive building technology has long been conceived as a way
of achieving low price housing. There have been studies on the limitations of the possi-
bility of improving building technology in housing industry (Ball, 1985). Even if there is
a possibility, low production cost does not necessarily lead to low price housing. High
rise building technology was an example. High density development has been an issue
among architects and planners as a way of reducing the burden of land cost in housing
development. From the point of view of developers, higher density development has
been a way to ease the burden of increasing land cost per unit of building floor space.
Disputes have persisted between the Korean Ministry of Construction and developers
over the regulations of building densities. The MOC has had to yield to the developers
demand as housing supply became a priority in the government policies in the late
1980's. Issues in the studies on development densities have been what adverse effects
such high density would have in terms of the inconveniences due to overcrowding or
environmental psychological impacts. Not enough discussions have existed about the
effect of such high density development on the land cost. It has been believed that high
density would definitely ease the burden of land cost (e.g., Yoo, J.H., 1990, 1991).
However, the examination in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 suggests that this has not been
the case. Any relaxation of density regulations has helped developers to realise more
surplus profits but only temporarily: the surplus soon after has been converted into
higher land prices. Hence developers' complaints about rising land price not too long
after certain density regulations were relaxed. Thus if only land cost is concerned, high
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density development will only have a temporary effect. It can hardly be an effective way
of relieving the land cost burden in the longer term.
The Land Expropriation Law
enacted
The Korea National Housing
Corporation Law, the Urban Plan-
ning Law and the Building law en-
acted.
The Korea National Housing
Corporation established
APPENDIX A. Chronological Table for Chapter 3
Date	 Politics	 Housing
1945
August
September
1948
August
Independence from the
Japanese colonial rule
South Korea came under the
US Military Government
rule
Establishment of the first
Korean Government
1950
February
April
June
The Farm Land Reform Law
enacted
Farm Land Reform started
Outbreak of the Korean War
1953
July	 Korean War ended
1954
November	 The Republic of Korea-U.S
Mutual Defense Agreement
1960
April
	
Student Uprising leading to
the collapse of President
Rhee's Regime
June	 A constitutional amendment
to the Parliamentry System
1961
May	 Military coup under the
leadership of General Park
The Supreme Council for
National Reconstruction
(military junta) took over
the government
1962
January	 Start of the First Five-Year Economic De-
velopment Plan
July
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Date	 Politics	 Housing
December	 The Housing Fund Operation
Law enacted
1963
November	 The Public Housing Law enacted
December	 The establishment of the Third Republic	 The Housing Fund Operation
under the president Park 	 Law enacted
1964
June	 Student demonstration
against the Korea-Japan
Conference for
Normalization of De-
plomatic Relations; and
Martial Law proclaimed in
Seoul
1966
June	 The Korea-Janpan Agreement
signed and sealed; students
and opposition parties
demonstrated against it; the
Garrison Decree invokated in
Seoul
1967
June	 Students demonstrations
denouncingthe rigged
general election
November	 The Temporaiy Tax Law Re-
garding Control of Real Estate
Speculation enacted
1968
January	 North Korean armed
guerrilla stormed Seoul
1969
July	 Guam Doctrine declared by
the US president Nixon
1970
November	 Self-burning of a young
worker, Chun
1971
March	 Withdrawl of one US
infantry division from Ko-
rea
April	 Presidential Election
May	 General election
October
November
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Date	 Politics	 Housing
August	 Urban poor's not in the
Gwangju Estate
December
1972
August
December
State of Emergency de-
clared
August 3 Measure:
Presidential Emergency
Order to freeze debts of
enterprises owed to
unregulated money market
Yushin constitutional reform
The Ten-Year 2.5 Million Housing
Construction Plan formulated
The Housing Construction
Promotion Law enacted
The Specific District Development
Promotion Law enacted
1973
January	 The start of the de-
velopment of the Heavy and
Chemical Industries
declared
April The Pegged Land Price System
introduced for industrial estate
development
1974
January	 Presidential decree for the
stabilization of national housing
life
1975
April The MOC decided to allow local
governments to expropriate land
for public housing
September	 The Apartment Area System
introduced
1977
July
December
The Special Law for National
Housing Stabilization
The Housing Construction
Promotion Law amended
July
August
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Date	 Politics	 Housing
1978
February	 The MOC minister instructed local
1979
January
August
government to restrict the LRP
Hyundai Apartment Scandal
August 8 Measure to control
property speculation
The Korea Land Development
Corporation established
YEt women workers sit-in
demonstration
October	 Civil riots in Pusan and
Masan
October	 President Park assassinated
December	 The New Military Group
seized the power
1980
January	 Minors' uprising in Sabuk
April
May
August
September
December
1981
July
Student demonstration
against the government
Civil uprising against the
new Military Group and
subsequent massacre in
Gwangju
The National Defence
Emergency Measures Board
(military junta) established
The civilian president Choi resigned	 The National Defence Emergency
General Chun elected the president at the Measures Board prepared the Five
electoral college	 Million Housing Construction
Plan.
President Chun ordered the MOC
to build Five Million Housing
within ten years
The Residential Land Development
Promotion Law enacted
Measures adopted to promote land
and housing development
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Date	 Politics	 Housing
July	 The National Housing Fund
reorganized
August	 Price ceiling system introduced in
Seoul
1983
April	 April 18 Measure to control
property speculation
1987
April	 President Chun put
moratorium on consti-
tutional reform
June	 Demonstration protesting
against the moratorium
The government acceded to
the opposition's demand for
constitutional reform toward
democracy
December Presidential election: ruling
party candidate Rho won the
presidency
1988
Februaiy	 The 2.5 Million Housing
Construction Plan announced
1989
April
	
Development of two new towns
Bundang and Ilsan announced
May May 18 Measure: measures
adopted to force large en-
trepreneurs to sell off 'non-
business properties and to
control land speculation
August	 August 10 Measure to control
land speculation; Replacement
of the Price Ceiling System with
the Factor Cost Linkage System
1990
May	 Measures adopted to control
housing development as a part
of policy to stabilize the
economy
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APPENDIX B. List of Interviewees
Large Private Development Companies
Interviewee A
	 Deputy Manager
Housing Project Construction Department
Hanyang Corporation
Interviewee B	 Executive Managing Director
Hyundai Housing and Industrial Co., Ltd.
Interviewee C
	
Former Architect and Planner
Hyundai Housing and Industrial Co., Ltd.
Interviewee D
	 Manager
Building Department
Hyundai Housing and Industrial Co., Ltd.
Interviewee E	 Manager
Housing Project Construction Department
Samsung Engineering & Construction Co., Ltd.
Interviewee F	 Manager
Real Estate Planing and Management Division
Secritary's Office
Samsung
Interviewee G
	 Director
Housing Development Promotion Department
Korea Housing Association
Small Private Development Companies
Interviewee H	 President
Shinahn Construction Co., Ltd.
Interviewee I	 President
Korea Construction Co., Ltd.
Korea National Housing Corporation (Public Housing development Agency)
Interviewee J
	 (Former) Manager
Land Purchaser Department
Korea National Housing Corpoation
Interviewee K
	 Manager
Land Purchase Department
Korea National Housing Corpoation
Interviewee L
	 (Former) Section Chief
Land Purchase Section
Seoul Branch Office
Korea National Housing Corpoation
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